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The thesis discusses the issues related to (mis)management of the Se San River in 
Ratanakiri Province in Northeast Cambodia, as part of the Mekong River Basin. Dam 
construction on the Vietnamese side of the border of this trans-boundary river (and other 
rivers in the same basin) has been a contributing factor to infrequent water levels on both 
sides of the river, resulting in a loss of food security and lacking both environmental and 
social assessments, especially in Cambodia and Laos. The rivers of the Mekong Basin are 
truly borderless in nature and therefore the thesis also examines the geopolitical issues 
between the countries of the Mekong Basin and in particular the issues between the 
countries of Cambodia and Vietnam. The historical events in the Mekong Basin since 
colonial times for which especially the French but also the British to a large extent were 
responsible have in many ways defined what the Basin is today. Subsequent upheaval and 
war in Cambodia set this country back many years and it did not receive much help from 
its neighbours in getting back on its feet. Only in recent years has the country benefited 
from strong economic growth and discovery of mineral resources off-shore. However the 
country itself is abundant in natural resources and should be counted among the largest 
potential producers of rice (in the Mekong plains) and also its forests’ give life to fish and 
rivers in the region.  
I became most interested in the issues related to Cambodia, The Mekong Basin and in 
particular the Se San River through my internships with UNESCAP in Bangkok (Water 
Security Section) and the MRC Secretariat in Phnom Penh and they helped me define the 
contents of this thesis. 
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Being a microcosm of the Mekong Basin as such, the Se San River Basin is affected by 
multi-scale politics, sovereignty issues and mis-management of valuable environmental 
resources. Simultaneously, the thesis argues that questions of race and ethnicity (related 
to the people living in the highlands) are deeply implicated in issues related to social and 
environmental issues in river (highland) areas of the Mekong Basin. 
The people of Ratanakiri province are to a great extent indigenous and did originally not 
receive great attention from the central government in Phnom Penh, which was a 
contributing factor to the lack of focus on the issues of the Se San River. However in 
recent years UNDP and other UN agencies and a wide range of NGOs have been working 
with the government on the issues challenging the indigenous communities of North-East 
Cambodia, both in terms of natural resources management and good governance as well 
as human protection. Food security in the region was earlier a serious issue after the fish 
had almost disappeared from dammed rivers, but fortunately small streams gave 
opportunity for growing vegetables and the remaining forests also offered a good source 


































1. Introduction:  Hydropower, Tangled Nets and Cross-Border 
Tensions 
 
The building of the 720 MW Yali Falls Dam, beginning in November 1993, on the Krong 
Poko, flowing into the Se San River, a trans-boundary river shared by Vietnam 
(upstream) and Cambodia (downstream) formed a 64.5 km
2
 reservoir 525 metres above 
sea-level, and has since 1996 been generating numerous reported adverse externalities for 
downstream riparian communities. This thesis is in part a study of the complex politics of 
‘scale’, ‘position’ and ‘place’ (Lebel, Garden & Imamura, 2005; Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004) 
associated with the impacts of the Yali Falls Dam. The original intention of the 
researcher was to examine how geopolitics within the Mekong Basin as a whole relates 
to, influences and affects issues of trans-boundary environmental resources management, 
as well as issues of livelihood security for riparian communities. However, the study has 
narrowed its focus to examine the multiple ‘story-lines’ (Hajer, 1995) that relate to 
specific trans-boundary developments, with a specific emphasis on the Se San River. 
Through this case (and analysis of various related story-lines) we can also explore other 
challenging questions and issues that fundamentally relate to the politics of sustainable 
resource management, issues of environmental security (Barnett, 2001; Dalby, 2002), 
livelihood security (Kristensen, 2001), and trans-boundary resource geopolitics in the 
Mekong Basin (Bakker, 1999; Hirsch, 1995; 2000; Diokno & Nguyen Van Chinh, 2006). 
However, it has also become increasingly necessary to focus not merely on intra/inter-
state, intra/inter-agency, agency/state geopolitics, but also on state and agency relations 
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with various indigenous communities involved in the politics of the environment 
(Leepreecha, McCaskill & Buadaeng, 2008).  
 




1.1.1 Figure Se San Watershed (with Sre Pok and Se Kong Rivers) (3 SPN) 
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The Se San watershed is in many respects the focus of this study (Figure 1.1.1), although 
the thematic focus on ‘trans-boundary resource management’ and on the cultural politics 
of environmental resources should have wider intellectual and practical resonance. The 
Se San River has two big tributaries, the Sre Pok and the Se Kong with respective 
catchment areas of 29,450 km
2
 and 28,400 km
2
 (Mekong Secretariat, 1971). The Se San 
drainage area of 17,100 km
2
 includes 11,000 km
2 
in Vietnam and 6,100 km
2
 in Cambodia 
(ADB, 1995). The Se San Basin is largely mountainous, with two plains, stretching from 
a high plateau in Vietnam, from Kon Tum southward to Ban Me Thout in the Sre Pok 
basin and the wide valley of the Se San around Veun Sai in Cambodia. The Se San joins 
the Sre Pok about 35 km upstream of Stung Treng town, and the Se Kong River about 5 
km upstream of the same town. These form the basis of a trans-border watershed zone 
across the Vietnam and Cambodia border, which is vitally connected with the broader 
Mekong Basin. Scientific hydrological studies indicate the importance of tributaries 
during the dry and wet seasons to the Mekong flow, and there are seasonal figures for the 
contribution of the Se San, Sre Pok and Se Kong to the mainstream flow, as well as 
annual flow contributions of the three rivers at Kratie, downstream from Stung Treng 
town, is estimated to be between 16 - 19 percent (see ADB, 1995; Halcrow, 1999; 
TERRA, 1999; Toda, et.al., 2003). Of considerable relevance for this research is the 
connectivity of hydrological, ecological and environmental processes within the Mekong 
Basin as a whole. Thus, the projects ‘one of the most important tributaries’ Se San River 
have impacts in the trans-border valley itself as well as broader implications for the 
Lower Mekong (Baird, 1995).   
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Hydropower development has a long history in the Mekong, although the actual 
implementation of many hydro-electric dam projects along the mainstream and tributaries 
was often shelved due to actual warfare and Cold War geopolitics (Jacobs, 1995; 2002). 
Official interests in hydropower development in the Se San River can be traced back to 
the 1961 Mekong Reconnaissance Team study (TERRA, 2000). The Mekong Committee 
issued a 1970 Indicative Basin Plan with numerous hydropower plants proposed (see 
figure 1.1.2 below), including five in Cambodia and ten in Vietnam (Australian Mekong 
Resource Center, November 2002; Mekong Secretariat, 1971). However, the 1970s were 
turbulent years in the Lower Mekong, which eventually saw the termination of the 
Mekong Committee, with an ‘Interim’ one being set up minus Cambodia, which by the 
end of the 1970s was practically isolated by the actions of the  ruling Khmer Rouge 
(Jacobs, 2002: 358). The 1980s were more peaceful although Cambodia and Vietnam 
remained under an international embargo and the work of the Interim Mekong Committee 











Se San Watershed 
History of Hydropower Development  
Official interests in hydropower development in the Se San River Basin began in the 1960s, following the 
1961 Mekong Reconnaissance Team study.1 
In the first Mekong Masterplan in 1970, 16 potential sites for hydropower plants were identified, with five 
in Cambodia and ten in Vietnam. The remaining project - the Upper Se San 4 and the Dak Hondrai 
project - was "international", based on the assumption that Vietnam and Cambodia would gain from 
hydropower and flood control respectively.2  
However, the planning was impeded by the difficult political situation in the late 1970s. Studies resumed 
in the following decade with the introduction of the interim Mekong Committee. In the 1984 review of 
previous plans by a consultancy firm WATCO, there were six hydropower proposals for Vietnam and 
three for Cambodia. Till the Asian Development Bank's involvement in the 1990s, the 1984 review was 
the "authoritative study" in use.3  
 
Proposed Hydropower Schemes in Se San River Basin 4 
Schemes proposed by 
Mekong Secretariat (1970) 
Schemes proposed by 
WATCO (1984) 
Lower Se San no.1 Not recommended 
Lower Se San 2 & Lower Sre Pok no..2 Not recommended 
Lower Se San 3 Lower Se San no. 3 
Prek Liang no.1 Prek Liang no.1 
Prek Liang no.2 Prek Liang no.2 
Upper Se San 4 & Dak Hodrai Upper Se San 4 
Upper Se San 3 Upper Se San 3 
Yali Falls  Yali Falls  
Plei Krong  Plei Krong  
Dak Bla no.1 Dak Bla no.1 
Dak Bla no.2 Dak Bla no.2 
Kontum Area  Kontum 
Taneang Prong area Taneang Prong  
Dak Potong area Dak Potong  
Plei Ku South  Plei Ku 
 
1.1.2 Historically proposed hydropower schemes in the Se San River Basin (AMRC, 
2002) 
 
The Yali Dam, located in Gia Lai Province of Vietnam, was constructed some 80 km 
upstream of the Vietnam international boundary with Cambodia at a cost of an estimated 
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US $ 1 billion (Quinn & Dapice, 2000) with the Russian and Ukraine governments 
supplying substantial finance of the project, with additional technical support coming 
from Switzerland, Sweden and Japan. The Interim Mekong Committee, prior to the 
formation of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995, was also influential in 
assisting to plan and coordinate the project. The Yali Falls Dam was not the only 
hydropower project planned for the Se San, and also rivers such as the Sre Pok, by the 
Vietnamese State and international partners. In spite of growing public criticism from 
Mekong-based environmental groups, civil society organizations and Se San riparian 
communities, hydro-power development has continued apace since the opening of Yali 
Falls Dam (see Chapter 8). Hydropower optimization studies by the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
together with their partner, Vietnam’s power utility, Electricity of Vietnam Corporation 
(EVN), a company owned by the state, also see Chapter 6 and Appendix 3, narrowed 
their focus to six potential dams on the upper Se San River Basin (Se San 3, Se San 3A, 
Se San 4, Dak Bla, Plei Krong, and Upper Kom Tum) (Halcrow & Partners, 1999). Of 
those hydropower sites, Vietnam started to develop four large-scale hydro dams in the Se 
San River cascade (Se San 3, Plei Krong, Se San 3A, and Se San 4) with installed 




Figure 1.1.3 Location of hydropower projects in the Se San River Basin, 2004 (3 SPN)  
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Numerous researchers and local studies indicated serious changes, based on detailed local 
studies, to the hydrological regime and negative impacts on fisheries, livelihoods and 
public health (Baird et.al., 2002; Center for Natural Resources and Environmental 
Studies, CRES, 2001; Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004; Kuroiwa, 2007). A prime example of post-
Yali Falls Dam development is the 260 MW Se San 3, approximately 20 km downstream 
from Yali Falls, with construction financed by Vietnam with Russian support, beginning 
in May 2003. As with the Yali Falls Dam, Se San 3 involved virtually no prior 
consultation with downstream riparian communities and no assessment of flow 
requirements (Worley, 2000; 2001; Ryder, 2005). This has generated considerable calls 
from concerned non-governmental organization, concerned academics, international 
agencies and community-based groups for more transparent decision-making processes, 
social and environmental impact assessments (Baird et.al., 2002; CRES, 2001; Fisheries 
Office & NTFP, 2000; Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004; Ojendal, Vikrom & Mak Sithirith, 2002; 
Lerner, 2003; Pepper, 2002; Ryder & Imhof, 2004; Ryder, 2004; 2005; 3S Working 
Group, 2007; Wyatt & Baird, 2007, to name a few).  
 
At the time of writing, Vietnam continues to expand her hydropower electricity 
generating capability, with ongoing developments and near future projects in the pipeline. 
EVN recently gained state approval from the Ministry of Finance of Vietnam to issue 
EVN corporate bonds for hydropower projects covering 2008-2010. This is designed to 
help raise capital for further hydropower projects in the country, including covering Se 
San 4, and Sre Pok 3 hydropower plant, plus several others along different rivers 
(Vietnam Business News, 9 January, 2009 – see Appendix 3. Details of the large-scale 
expansion of hydropower in Vietnam are just beginning to be publicized, with plans for 
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an additional nine hydropower plants in 2009 with a total output of 2,969 MW (Vietnam 
Business News, 10 January, 2009, see Appendix 3. Whilst these hydropower plants are 
not all in the Se San River vicinity, including plants to be located in the sough central 
coastal province of Phu Yen and hydropower plants in other parts of the central 
highlands, these projects indicate the continued vitality and importance of hydropower 
schemes in Vietnam, and indeed throughout the Mekong Region. Importantly, in addition 
to generating trans-border environmental, economic and social problems, such projects 
are often perceived by relevant power generating agencies, international donors, 
construction corporations, and key decision-makers within riparian states as prime 
opportunities for cross-border developmental collaboration. For example, the EVN 
International Joint Stock Company of Vietnam signed a memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with the Ministry of Planning and Investment of Laos PDR to invest in three 
hydropower plants in Muang Et District of Laos (Nam Et 1, 2 and 3 dams) with a total 
capacity of 420 MW (Vietnam Business News, 5 January, 2009 - see Appendix 3). 
Herein lies the hydropower dilemma (of being able to deal with the side effects of 
hydropower such as environmental degradation and at the same reap the benefits in terms 
of better energy supply) in terms of tackling negative externalities, the fact remains that 
harnessing ‘the techno-economic hydroelectric power potential of Vietnam’ (and other 
parts of the Mekong) is viewed positively both in terms of national ‘development’ (Tran, 
2000) and in terms of regionalization within the so-called Greater Mekong Sub-region 
(GMS) projects being sponsored by the ADB (ADB, various; Stensholt, 1996). Indeed, 
numerous hydropower projects on Mekong tributaries supply cross-border electricity. Or 
else, like the original Yali Falls Dam, they are designed to meet the ‘national’ electricity 
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needs, such as the southern industrial region of Vietnam focused on Ho Chih Minh City 
via a World Bank-funded 500 KV transmission line (Asia Pulse, 2001; Hirsch & Wyatt, 
2004: 54). This means that ‘the politics of scale’, ‘position’ and ‘place’ are extremely 
complex in relation to Mekong hydropower, with certain places and sectors, regional and 
national needs being prioritized over negative externalities, which are frequently 
perceived as primarily ‘localized’ in scope (Lebel, Garden & Imamura, 2005; Hirsch & 
Wyatt, 2004). In chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis I will tackle these issues in relation to the 
trans-border impacts, geopolitics and cultural politics of the environment. 
 
1.2 The Yali Falls trans-border incidents 
 
The 720 MW Yali Falls Dam was started in November 1993, and it eventually formed a 
64.5 km
2
 reservoir 515 metres above sea-level. Already by early 1996, local people along 
the Se San in downstream Cambodia’s Ratanakiri Province began observing ‘unusual’ 
impacts (Baird, et.al., 2002). On both the Vietnam side (CRES, 2001) and on the 
Cambodia side (Fisheries Office & NTFP, 2000) a wide variety of negative impacts were 
being reported quite soon after the dam began filling up the reservoir in 1998 (Vietnam 
News, 28 July, 1998), initially flooding farmlands, forests and villages of about 6,782 
people (1,375 households) from Jarai, Ro Ngao and Bana ethnic groups by the end of 
1998 (CRES, 2001: 7). Between the years 1994-2000, 24 villages were forcibly relocated 
in the Vietnam section of the Se San affected by reservoir and flooding caused by the 
dam, and a number of downstream settlements were also adversely affected by flooding 
events (CRES, 2001). Across the border in Cambodia there were further serious incidents 
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affecting as many as 28,000 people, around 4,500 families, and 32 villages (Baird, et.al., 
2002; Fisheries Office and NTFP, 2000). Many of these people were from various 
different indigenous groups, with Khmer people being a minority, and livelihoods being 
related to small-scale farming, swidden forms of agriculture, non-forest timber products, 
foraging, some gardens, fishing and other river-based livelihoods.  
 
By June 2000, the four turbines of the Yali Dam became fully operational in a project 
that was expected to contribute 3.68 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity a year to 
the national grid (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2000; Deutsche Press-Agentur, 2000; 
Xinhua News Agency, 2000). However, even before full operations that year there were 
water release fatalities. According to the Fisheries Office and Non-Timber Forest 
Products (NFTP) Project (2000) there were at least 32 drowning deaths allegedly related 
to unusual water surges and irregular flows caused by the Yali Falls Dam. A particularly 
bad water release on 16 March 2000 has sometimes been referred to as the ‘Yali Falls 
incident’ for it triggered much adverse publicity for the dam, and subsequently resulted in 
the Mekong River Commission sending a team of three officers on a fact-finding mission 
to Ratanakiri, which agreed that there were negative effects from abrupt water releases 
from the Yali reservoir (MRC, 2000). Oxfam America investigated too, and the 
organization observed: ‘The Yali Falls incidents suggest erratic release patterns from the 
dam. These flash floods have claimed human lives, destroyed livestock for thousands, 
forces entire communities to resettle to higher ground, and have possibly affected in more 
subtle ways the river and those that depend on it’ (Pepper, 2002). (Baird et.al.,2002) 
surveyed 30 locations, 29 villages within ten communes and two districts and reported 
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numerous negative impacts, including loss of boats, equipment, agricultural plots, 
riverbank gardens, increased turbidity, reported declines in water quality, human health 
problems attributed to water changes, livestock losses, and evidence of fishery declines 
(see Chapter 6). Various other studies have also reported on damaging downstream 
externalities with most of these impacting indigenous communities (Bou, 2000; Baird, 
2001; Baird and Meach, 2005; CRES, 2001; Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004). By the end of 2003, 
the Cambodian government, working through the Mekong River Commission, formerly 
asked Vietnam to mitigate the devastation caused by the first of the Se San cascade of 
dams, the Yali Falls Dam (The Phnom Penh Post, 21. November, 2003). Until the time of 
writing, there have been improvements in advance warnings of water releases, but as yet, 
little progress in terms of attempting to regulate flows in accordance with other needs, 
such as fishery management, and no compensation awards to the many people suffering 
the major downstream impacts of the Yali Falls Dam inside Cambodian territory (see 
Chapters 7 and 8).  
 
1.3 Thematic foci 
 
This thesis examines the following related key concepts: 
 
Trans-border water resource governance  
 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, this thesis will examine trans-border water 
politics and governance by utilizing several important geographical concepts already in 
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currency. For instance, the way river management is ‘imagined’ in dominant discourses 
of key agencies (Bakker, 1999), such as the MRC, is one highly relevant issue, 
particularly with regard to broader principles of trans-boundary governance such as 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) (Hirsch, 2006a; 2006b). In the Mekong, 
IWRM principles have frequently failed to inspire due to the resilience of geopolitical 
boundaries and intransigent state sovereignties. Ideas about ‘trans-boundary risk 
management’ (Linnerooth-Bayer et.al., 2001) do not seem to have influenced the 
consultant-generated environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in the Mekong Basin.  
Furthermore, past geopolitical events, ongoing border disputes, jealous nationalisms, and 
a variety of cross-border rivalries continue to bedevil efforts to secure genuine trans-
border cooperation over environmental resources (see Chapter 5). I shall also argue that 
the cultural politics of riparian communities, indigenous groups and civil society agencies 
cannot fully escape the ‘territorial traps’ (Agnew & Corbridge, 1994) of inter-stateness. 
Many of the adverse impacts examined in Chapter 6 relate to geopolitical rivalries and a 
lack of openness between Vietnam and Cambodia, which has tended to obscure the 
indigenous politics of access, utilization, ownership and rights over vital environmental 
resources.   
 
Multi-scales, sectors and places 
 
In addition, there are other complex dimensions of political geography relating to both 
trans-border politics and impacts that relate to ideas about ‘scale’, ‘position’ and ‘place’ 
within the river basin (Lebel, Garden & Imamura, 2005). Clearly, it is important to 
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understand the broader implications of trans-border impacts, or at least to view these 
impacts within a comparative international perspective that re-scales the politics of 
localized harm (Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004). However, I also believe that ‘position’ (which 
has geographical and social aspects) and the ‘politics of place’ (in the borderlands, 
indigenous places and notions of locality) are equally relevant to an analysis of trans-
border rivers and other environmental resources.   
 
The MRC and trans-border water governance 
 
One of the key trans-border water governance institutions is clearly the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC). A significant part of my analysis is devoted to examining the work 
and response of the MRC in relation to trans-border problems, such as those highlighted 
in the Se San River Valley. My analysis of the MRC is partly informed by a deliberate 
strategy to be an intern within the Secretariat for part of the research period (Chapters 4 
and 6). Key questions relating to the MRC’s role in the basin are: Is an institution that is 
primarily inter-governmental and serving member state needs (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 
PDR and Thailand) really able to address fundamental trans-border problems created in 
one state and affecting the riparian communities of another? Are dominant discourses 
concerning hydropower development, the needs to foster more rapid economic growth, 
and issues of energy transfer to foster ‘regional’ and ‘national’ economic development  
over-powering other key aspects of ‘sustainable’ planning, including environmental 
sustainability, and the principles of integrated management that would include non-
hydropower sectors?  
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The importance of local communities  
 
The lack of interest from the national levels towards the local communities affected by 
the impacts of the Se San Dam emphasizes the need for the local people to work together 
with the help from the international community, such as NGO’s, the UN and other 
organisations supporting community mobilization and local governance. National 
governments in both Cambodia and Vietnam are still very attentive to their local 
government (including water governance) representatives and by showing that 
sustainable development is in the interest of local communities and thus in the interest of 
people in the country this thesis will argue that this is likely to impact national decision 
makers.  
 
1.4 Road Map (of subsequent chapters) 
 
Chapter 3 shows the importance of being both and insider in the MRC, to get access to 
government views and representatives as well as the MRC Library, and of being an 
outsider when doing my own fieldwork and learning the importance of local communities 
and how they are affected by decisions made at the national level, when all they really 
want is sustainable development and livelihoods locally, which is also for the good of the 
country as a whole. 
 
 20 
Chapter 4 explains the importance of geopolitics and contested spaces where trans-
boundary issues in the Mekong Basin really have gained their own dynamic with national 
borders set up by colonial powers and which do not really make sense in relation to 
cultures, and sometimes geography, of the people living in the area. For example, a dam 
that is only located in a Jarai area in Vietnam does not break the links between Jarai 
people across the international border. Furthermore, how these people deal with the 
livelihood, social and environmental impacts of the dam is tremendously important for 
their future well-being. It is difficult for these indigenous communities to appreciate why 
they should not be treated in the same way on each side of the border by their local and 
national governments when it comes to the multiple impacts of the Se San Dams. 
 
Chapter 5 shows why a regional organization like the MRC is still so affected by national 
governments. It is a regional organization of nation states doing what they find best 
despite the interests of neighbouring countries. This again is very much contrary to the 
people who live across borders and who are much more linked with their communities as 
well as their local governments working together contrary to national governments who 
might not be acting in the interest of locals.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses more in detail the issues of environmental and social impacts in 
relation to various villages and communities along the Se San River Valley. The different  
indigenous groups are often directly affected by mega-projects in river systems, 
especially when located in peripheral places such as Ratanakiri province. The lack of 
social and environmental impact assessments clearly disfavours local communities with 
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the close connections that exist between ecology and society (including food security) 
and when projects have trans-border impacts they can easily put people living in a 
peripheral area of a country at a disadvantage.  Especially indigenous communities who 
live in a tight relationship with nature are being affected severely and for instance such 
communities have had to almost give up fishing on the Se San River. On the other hand 
eco-tourism might help local communities generate income, however only reaching a 
small proportion of people.  The MRC has to some extent helped local people by 
requesting more water level data from Vietnam after initially being subject to much 
criticism over the Yali Falls dam. However it has by far not addressed the multitude of 
problems of local villagers as addressed by local NGO’s such as the 3SPN.  
 
Chapter 7 again focuses on how the MRC (if it was possible for it) could work with local 
communities and civil society in achieving sustainable development instead of having to 
follow the interests of national governments, who might have lost the links to their local 

























2. Concepts and the Trans-border Mekong Basin 
2.1 Mekong River Basin and Trans-border Resource Politics 
This thesis is informed mainly by geographic and multi-disciplinary literatures, as well as 
by political approaches to trans-boundary resources. Especially important are literatures 
related to ecology, hydro-politics and political geography, and it is here where the thesis 
aims to contribute new insights and fresh information on the contested resources in the 
Lower Mekong Basin. Political geographies of the Mekong relate to a set of concepts 
which will be developed throughout this thesis, particularly those of ‘position’ (upstream 
– downstream and position in relation to fishery and other resources), ‘place’ (as 
understood in relation to relations in the Mekong, such as between capital cities and 
peripheral rural villages), and ‘politics of scale’ (as a very dynamic issue which can 
transcend the issues of position and place and local, national and regional hierarchies).  
 
More than 200 separate river basins in the world are shared by two or more countries. 
These international rivers constitute a significant portion of the world’s fresh water 
resources and are a great asset to the nations sharing them. The Danube, the Nile, the 
Congo, the Indus and the Mekong are large international rivers with unique assemblages 
of relations, issues and geopolitical alignments. As a quick illustration of why geopolitics 
relates to international river developments, the Mekong River Basin was during much of 
the Cold War era an under-developed hydrological and ecological resource system 
primarily because there was an ideological division of the region between ‘Communist’ 
and ‘non-Communist’ states, and it is only in the past two decades that the whole Basin 
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has been opened up to many new hydropower and other large projects with significant 
trans-border impacts.  
 
The headwaters of the Mekong emerge on the Tibetan Plateau, 4,500 km from where the 
Mekong Delta enters the South China Sea in Vietnam. Measured in terms of average 
runoff, the Mekong is perhaps the 10
th
 largest river in the world, measured in length, 
perhaps the 12
th
 largest. The lower Mekong basin, defined as a watershed area 
downstream of China and Burma, which includes parts of Thailand and Vietnam and 
almost all of Lao PDR and Cambodia – represents 77% of the total catchment and 
contributes approximately 80% of the river’s flow, the majority of which originates in 
Lao PDR (Bakker, 1999:212). Regional disparity, both inter- and intrastate is wide, with 
vastly different rates and levels of development.  
 
The Mekong was until recently an unusual river, compared to rivers such as the Nile or 
the Mississippi, in the sense that its natural environment was kept quite pristine due to a 
lack of development over the years, mostly due to a lack of cooperation between the 
Mekong countries as a result of long wars in the region. As noted above, this scenario has 
been shifting in recent years with construction of hydropower dams in the tributaries of 
the Mekong (in Vietnam and Laos) and on the Mekong mainstream in China. This 
influences the livelihoods of indigenous peoples who often depend on the natural 
resources of the river for the food supply. It is well-known that construction of dams 
impacts on the number of fish in a river due to the shifting water levels caused by a dam.  
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Badenoch (2002:3) refers to how the relationships between upstream activity and 
downstream impacts of the Mekong River should be considered complex. Scenarios for 
alteration of the Mekong River’s hydrological regime, dam plans for the Mekong 
mainstream in Yunnan and on tributaries in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam as well as 
inter-basin diversion plans in Thailand, have the potential for significant downstream 
impacts, as well as impacts closer to the sites where dams are constructed such as on the 
Se San River in Northeast Cambodia/Central Highlands of Vietnam. 
 
In the Mekong Delta of Vietnam floods periodically cause damage to infrastructure and 
crops on almost 2 million hectares of land, but it also leaves silt behind on the flood 
plain. This silt is crucial to farmers’ ability to produce rice that feeds much of Vietnam 
(and for export). It is now a dilemma for Vietnam that the dams being constructed by 
itself upstream on the Se San River, a tributary to the Mekong mainstream, might affect 
its own citizens’ livelihoods in the Mekong Delta downstream due to the changing water 
levels. 
 
As put forward by the MRC-GTZ Watershed Component Programme (Van Tuyll, 2003: 
1), there is a natural relation between up-and downstream areas. Downstream areas take 
advantage of the natural resources, mainly water (quantity, quality and availability over 
time) coming from upland areas, and suffer from impacts of degradation in upland areas. 
Activities in upland areas have a direct impact on developments downstream. In the case 
of the Mekong River upstream and downstream areas, they often have to be seen in a 
trans-boundary context due to the geography of the river. 
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According to Rothert (1995:7), many aspects of the Mekong River system remain poorly 
understood. Most studies are focused on detailing the benefits of proposed hydropower 
projects and seldom look at potential environmental and social repercussions. Many 
questions related to fish ecology, tributary and mainstream hydrology, sediment 
dynamics and the river’s importance to local communities are left unanswered. If 
hydropower projects are developed according to existing plans, the Lower Mekong Basin 
will be profoundly altered, every significant tributary is to be dammed, thousands of 
square kilometres of forest, wetland and agricultural land will be inundated, over 1,500 
kilometres of flee-flowing river will be converted into still-water reservoirs, important 
fish migrations will be blocked and, according to official estimates, many people will 
need to be relocated.  
 
The Mekong has attracted more intensive studies from scholars in the 21
st
 century as it is 
increasingly apparent that the River Basin is a hotly ‘contested waterscape’ (Molle, Foran 
and Käkönen, 2009). One geographer, Philip Hirsch (2010: 321) when examining the 
geopolitics of the river has predicted that ‘it truly appears that the status of the Mekong 
River and its tributaries as relatively free-flowing may be coming to an end.’ Other 
geographers have sought to disentangle some of the institutional and national strands of 
hydropower politics and trans-border resource politics (Bakker, 1999; Hirsch, 2006; 
Sneddon and Fox, 2006); of the politics of scale in relation to upstream-downstream 
impacts of dams (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004); and the politics of scale, position and place in 
relation to water utilization (Lebel, Garden and Imamura, 2005). Whilst elsewhere in the 
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region, political anthropologists and sociologists have examined the politics of resource 
land disputes, territorialisation, and forest resource politics (Vandergeest and Peluso, 
1995; Vandergeest, 1996). The complex political – legal landscape of the Mekong has 
been examined by international legal specialists and geographers (Johns, Saul, Hirsch, 
Stephens and Boer, 2010).  
 
The study area of this thesis focuses on the trans-border tributary rivers of the Se San, Sre 
Pok and Se Kong.  Rather than focus my attention on the whole of the River Basin which 
is an enormous zone spanning the international boundaries of six countries. I view the Se 
San, Sre Pok and Se Kong river basins as having many of the attributes of resource 
politics in the Mekong Basin as a whole. First, the study area is a trans-border zone of 
Cambodia and Vietnam, also partly Lao PDR. Second, there is a history of cross-border 
tensions in the zone, particularly between Vietnam and Cambodia. During the last two 
decades, Vietnam has become an influential geopolitical (and upstream) power exercising 
its influence on Cambodia. Parallels can be drawn to other upstream riparian geopolitical 
relationships elsewhere in the Mekong Basin, such as the extreme upstream riparian 
China and its dam building affecting downstream Laos and Thailand.  Third, the MRC is 
significant as a key agency facilitating cooperation between the Lower Mekong Basin 
countries. An aspect of this research is to try to understand the relations between the 
MRC and two key partners within the inter-governmental institutions – Vietnam and 




2.2 International Legal Frameworks 
 
One of the big drawbacks with international legal frameworks is that they rest on the 
concepts of territorial sovereignty, tending to reify states as the principal stakeholders 
over rivers, land, and resources.  So whether or not principles of absolutism or equity are 
being applied, states stand as the major players and key decision-makers. Even so, it is 
also important to consider other concepts that extend the discussion of ‘trans-border 
governance’ beyond the national interests of the states involved. Although the efficient 
use of international fresh waters is vitally important, the difficulty in getting basin states 
to cooperate makes these waters less readily exploitable than national water resources. 
Political boundaries present real obstacles to efficient use and are often more difficult to 
overcome than physical ones (see in maps 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 how these differ on the 
Mekong River).  
 
A river basin is interconnected through the flow of the river’s waters. Thus the use of the 
waters in one part of the basin may affect the use in another part. Water abstraction, 
waste discharges, flow regulation – all can have basin-wide impacts. The boundaries that 
cut across or follow a river do not confine those impacts to the originating country. Some 
countries will exploit the river while others, because of their unfortunate location within 
the basin, must endure the impacts arising from that exploitation. A basin country is often 
tempted to take advantage of its favoured position within the basin (upstream versus 
downstream riparian). In pursuit of its self-interest that country may pass on industrial 
and domestic wastes to a downstream neighbour or seek development within its share of 
 29 
the river that will benefit it at the expense of more economic or environmental projects 
that would require cooperation among basin countries. Examples for the types of 
development a country might pursue include dam construction or navigation channel 
projects. The uneven distribution of positive and negative impacts from the use of 
resources and differing demands among the basin countries for the water obscure a basin-
wide perspective and frustrate cooperative action to manage and develop the resource 
efficiently. Consequently, shared water resources often suffer greater environmental 
abuse and are not as productively used as are comparable national water resources (Le 
Marquand, 1977: 1). 
 
There is no economic incentive for cooperation when an upstream country uses an 
international river to the detriment of the downstream country and that country has no 
reciprocal power over the upstream country. Consumptive use of the river waters, flow 
regulation, waste disposal, dam construction and navigation channel projects by an 
upstream riparian are examples of water use that lead to upstream-downstream conflicts. 
A country that takes advantage of its favoured position on a river has no real economic or 
political incentive to alter its behaviour. 
  
The spectrum of international political objectives which countries hold ranges from 
specific strategic imperatives necessary for national self-preservation to ethereal goals of 
a desired world order. International river issues tend to fall in the “middle range of 
objectives” (Le Marquand, 1977: 11). These objectives are generally concerned with 
satisfying domestic, social and economic demands through international agreement or 
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maintaining amicable relations with neighbouring countries, such as it is done within the 
MRC in the “Mekong Spirit”. This is not always the case, however. International rivers 
agreements may work to legitimise new frontiers. Agreements that provide for 
recognition of a river as a boundary or even make provision for future cooperative use of 
a shared resource may have little to do with the river. Rather they may establish in 
international law a new boundary, such as a navigation agreement involving blasting of 
reefs in the river thus changing where the boundary is. If the boundary is normally in the 
middle of the river, blasting rocks that belong to one of the countries along the river will 
cause an alteration in the middle of the river, and therefore also a changed boundary. 
 
Environmental challenges, such as achieving efficient water allocation, recovering habitat 
and species stability, halting forest degradation and preventing air pollution are important 
domestic issues, but they ignore national political boundaries as well. The fact that the 
Mekong countries share their forest, water and biodiversity resources, making the region 
one of the richest in the world environmentally speaking, also means that the countries 
must share responsibility for managing trans-boundary ecosystems (MRC: State of the 
Environment Report 1997). Indeed ecosystems often span national borders and create 
international environmental linkages. Poverty in rural communities has led to over-
exploitation of forest, land and water resources with environmental implications reaching 
beyond the immediate local communities. Large-scale development activities and illegal 








Development of the Lower Mekong Basin’s hydro potential should, according to the 
MRC State of the Basin Report (2003) take time in order to carry out the investigations 
needed prior to construction of dams, to ensure that dams do not have serious effects on 
the environment and/or human welfare. The following negative and positive impacts of 
hydropower are listed by the Commission: 
 
So far only about five percent of the Basin’s hydro-potential has been developed 
according to the MRC. At present most of the power generation developments planned 
for Thailand and Vietnam (the two major users of electricity in the Mekong region) are 
Negative Impacts of hydro projects 
 
 Adverse impacts on the ecosystem (aquatic life, animals, birds, vegetation) 
 Blocking of the flow of sediment 
 Negative impacts due to changing a river’s flow pattern 
 Negative social impacts (resettlement, loss of livelihood) 
 Loss of scenic landscapes (tourism potential) 
 Negative impacts on water quality, due to storage of water (eutrophication, lower 
temperatures for discharges water) 
 Negative impacts on other users of water (navigation, fisheries) 
 Problems during the construction period (noise, vibration, dust, traffic problems) 
 
Positive impacts of hydro projects 
 
 Harnessing a renewable natural resource 
 Reducing the negative impacts that power generation has on the global environment 
(for example, reducing the use of fossil fuels will lessen air and water pollution) 
 Increasing the river’s flow in the dry season, and reducing peak flow during the flood 
season 
 Increasing the availability of electrical power will stimulate economic development 
and improve people’s living standards 
 Revenues will be earned from the sale of power 
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thermal and gas turbine projects (fuelled primary by natural gas and coal). Since 
hydropower potential in the Mekong Basin is largely underdeveloped, hydropower may 
become an increasingly important source of electricity in the future. However for now, 
plans involve only a small part in the Lower Mekong Basin, which is on the tributaries. 
Only China has considerably larger plans upstream, however only about 18 % of the run-
off of the river defers to China and Myanmar. But the impact of hydro-power is seen 
clearly where it is being used, such as on the Se San River on Northeast 
Cambodia/Vietnam, and is probably an indicator for what is to come should the big 
hydropower potential on the Mekong be developed further. 
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Comparing the impacts listed by the MRC and (McCully, 1996) who is thought by many 
specialists to be an ‘expert’ on the negative impacts of dam construction, there is scope 
for consideration concerning the negative impacts of dam construction, something which 
will be discussed in much more detail later, when getting into depth with the issues of the 
Se San River. 
 
 
2.4 Watershed Management 
 
 
McCully (1996:30) lists the main environmental impacts of dams as follows: 
 
a) Impacts due to existence of dam and reservoir 
 
 Upstream change from river valley to reservoir 
 Changes in downstream morphology of riverbed and banks, delta, estuary and 
coastline due to altered sediment load  
 Changes in downstream water quality, effects on river temperature, nutrient load, 
turbidity, dissolved gases, concentration of heavy metals and minerals 
 Reduction of biodiversity due to the blocking of the movement of organisms and 
because of changes above 
 
b) Impacts due to pattern of dam operation 
 
 Changes in downstream hydrology 
a) Change in total flows 
b) Change in seasonal timing of flows 
c) Short-term fluctuation in flows 
d) Change in extreme high and low flows 
 
 Changes in downstream morphology caused by altered flow pattern 
 Changes in downstream water quality caused by altered flow pattern 
 Reduction in riverine/riparian/floodplain habitat diversity, especially because of 
elimination of floods 
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A watershed is defined as “the area of land within which all waters flow to a single river 
system” (Heathcote, 1998). Integrated watershed resource management (IWRM) is 
defined as “a holistic area-based planning process, which extends the government policy 
on sustainable resources management and development activities” (Heathcote, 1998).   
 
Even though IWRM has become an increasingly important issue in sustainable 
development, its importance has been recognized already 2,500 years ago. For example, 
Plato (428-348 BC) has graphically noted the impact of land-use changes on river 
discharges. In his book Critias, Plato discussed the conditions of Athens some 9,000 
years before his time: ‘Furthermore it (the land of Attica in ancient times) enjoyed the 
fructifying rainfall sent year by year from Zeus; and this was not lost to it by flowing off 
into the sea, as nowadays because of denuded nature of the land. The land (then) had 
great depth of soil and gathered the water into itself and stored it up in the soil.’ 
The importance of IWRM, however, has become especially relevant in recent years 
because of the increasing realization of long-term management of river catchments.   
 
According to Ratner (2000) conventional policy responses to upland landscape frequently 
fail to address the social and institutional dimensions of resource use and sometimes 
aggravate conflicts, for instance when people are being moved away from their 
indigenous areas due to critical issues of conservation for instance related to logging 
issues, or when government efforts to control flooding and improve water supply have 
suffered from a pure technical emphasis on engineering solutions: dams, flood control 
structures and irrigation schemes. Also Governments have often seen forest communities 
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as sources of problems in resource management rather than as partners in finding 
solutions, sometimes denying them access to key resources or even resettling them. 
Throughout much of mainland Southeast Asia, policies in such sectors as forestry, water 
resources, agriculture, transportation and industry send conflicting messages to resource 
users, due to their aims both to conserve natural resources such as forests and critical 
watersheds and at the same time facilitate strong economic development. These 
difficulties are not exclusive to any political system over the last three decades. Thailand 
under a market economy and Vietnam and Lao PDR in socialist systems have faced many 




2.5 Political Ecology  
 
 
The geographical nature and basis of much political ecology is best explained in the 
works of the geographical nature and basis of much political ecology, the works of 
Zimmerer (1996) and the edited collection by Zimmerer and Bassett (2003) are most 
useful. Forsyth (2002) provides a detailed examination of the theoretical significance of 
political ecology and the need for a deeper critical engagement with the meanings of 
"ecology" and meanings of environmental science as a step to developing in clearer 
examinations of "locally determined environmental problems and development 
objectives" (p.278). Other works that help to inform political ecology theory and methods 
are those by Blaikie (1998) and Watts (2000) whose ideas on political ecology are 
informed by political economic analysis. Studies that are focused on the "Third World" 
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with particular relevance to Southeast Asia, include those by Bryant and Bailey (1997), 
Bryant (1997; 1998), as well as earlier works by Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) and 
Blaikie (1995). Whilst the studies on the politics of the environment are not explicitly 
stating a political ecology approach, in fact they have much to offer as detailed empirical 
analyses that address the complex entanglements of humanly altered environments, 
humanly-induced ecological changes and the power plays of groups with vested interests 
in environmental resources (see Hirsch and Warren, 1998). Similarly, the collection of 
studies in Rigg (1995) addresses the linkages of environmental and social costs to 
broader political economic change at a time of rapid transformations within Thailand. For 
detailed empirical studies that relate to "critical" political ecology approaches refer to 
Forsyth (2002) and Johnson and Forsyth (2002). Further Keil and Graham (1998) address 
multi-scalar politics relating to ecological change and reveal the cross-disciplinary nature 
of political ecology approaches.  
  
My own study of the Se San does not claim to adopt a specifically political ecology 
approach, whether this is "critical" or otherwise, but undoubtedly there is much in the 
literature that is useful to the examination of trans-border environmental resources in the 
Mekong Basin. As this brief literature survey illustrates, there is often a tendency to view 
such resource problems from a perspective of "international law" or "international 
relations" (between States), which tend to demote the significance of "locally 
determined" issues, sometimes ignoring them altogether. All the above-mentioned studies 
are very concerned with problems and politics of scale in relation to ecology, 
environment and resources. This is highly relevant to the study of trans-border problems 
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worldwide, not least of all in the Mekong Basin. As I will show, the Se San's local 
"ethnic" communities are often the last to be consulted regarding developments that are 
radically altering biophysical processes and livelihood securities in the Valley. In this 
regard, Lohmann (1995) has addressed a critical issue of the need to bridge gaps in 
language, tradition, knowledge and understanding between local communities and 
various officials and elites. Throughout the region, these remain critical issues, not least 
of all in the Se San case. 
 
Actually the political ecology literature and related literature on indigenous peoples and 
resources (such as Ganjanapan, 2000; Laungaransri, 2001; Howitt, 2002) suggest 
strongly that we need to focus not only on environmental issues, but on issues of 
environmental, cultural and social justice, particularly as the “physical” and “human” 
dimensions are closely related in all resource conflicts. 
 
The poor people living along the Se San River in North-East Cambodia or elsewhere 
along the Mekong are only happy to get electricity if it means improved livelihood 
conditions for them. Therefore it is important that basic service delivery needs are still 
being taken into account if there is a resistance against dams so that other alternative 
energy sources for supplying electricity can be identified.  
 
Merchant (1980) and Wilson (1992) suggest our view of nature has more to do with the 
society we live in than with any “objective” nature, in other words, nature is a social 
construct. However since at least the nineteenth century it has been claimed that true, 
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objective nature can be discovered using the methods of the natural sciences, most 
notably accomplished by Charles Darwin in his theory of evolution. In this tradition, the 
dominant outlook in the natural sciences presents us with a view of nature as separate 
from society, a machine made up of component parts. One of the many “discoveries” is 
that nature is the realm of scarce resources where competition between and amongst 
species for the resources drives evolution. 
 
The (built) environment, such as hydropower dams and other infrastructure projects is the 
physical aspect of reality. Ecological forces include water level, climate (rainy or dry 
season), flora and fauna and so on. Social forces are a distinct subset of ecological forces 
since humans have the ability to form social relations that affect their behaviour and 
ecological relations, no matter whether they live in a village in Oxfordshire or in a fishing 
town in Northeast Cambodia. Social forces describe the habits, customs, institutions, laws 
(physical or non-physical), modes of reasoning, language and so on which guide and 
limit our actions.  
 
According to Keil et al (1998: 338), social and ecological forces affect one another 
constantly. For example if the water levels in a river change, it impacts village people’s 
livelihoods since they depend on fish in the river. However the fishermen learn to adjust 
and start growing vegetables along river banks, showing that social activity may create 
helpful ecological impacts. However, this does not suggest we have control over or 
determine ecological forces. There are many ecological forces over which people have 




2.6 International Legal Doctrines and Principles 
 
 
International Law governing the utilization of trans-frontier waters has been evolving, 
slowly for the most part, since about 1950. The process is incomplete, and there is still 
uncertainty about its basic elements. The International Law Commission (ILC) has now 
made a notable contribution to that evolution by its adoption on first reading of a set of 
Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, a 
topic that has been on its agenda since 1971. 
 
In its work, the ILC has recognized that the characteristics of a watercourse are often 
unique and that the rational use of its waters may require solutions different to those 
applicable elsewhere, for instance regarding land use. The basic requirements are 
exchange of information, notice, consultation and negotiation (Wouters, 1997: 89). 
  
Mark Twain speaking of fluvial relations in the nineteenth century American West noted 
that “Whisky’s for drinkin’ and water’s for fightin’ over”, but does water really catalyse 
conflict? Do shared freshwater resources separate or unite riparian states? The Mekong 
proves that it unites to some extent, at least no wars have been fought over water in the 
Mekong, but the geopolitical influence from upstream riparians work in relation to 




Disputes between states are governed by international law, though governments do not 
always have recourse to the law in resolving them. They may ultimately settle a dispute 
ex aequo et bono (from equity and conscience), without reference to the law, even if they 
supported their initial positions by reference to the law. Or in rare cases, they may 
respond to a dispute in ways that are contra legem (against the law), such as those 
involving the unjustified use of force. There is thus a range of possible scenarios evoked 
by the term “dispute” in the context of international watercourses. It could be taken to 
refer to nothing more than a mild disagreement between two or more parties, easily 
resolved and not in any way involving violence or threats thereof. This is, after all, more 
often the case than not with water disputes between states. However, it is well known that 
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter requires states that are parties to a dispute that is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to seek to settle it 
by a progression of peaceful means. However, one should note that the development of 
the Lower Mekong Basin has provided a remarkable experience in reconciling the 
interests of co-basin states (Wouters, 1997:203). This is despite the lack of interest of 
Thailand in the Mekong, but exactly because it is a lack of interest, and not a specific 
interest no major grievances have been recorded. 
 
International law governing the use of international watercourses has been developed 
since the 19
th
 century when navigation was the only option to transport people and 
merchandise across riparian countries. Legal principles established during that time 
therefore dealt with navigation and international agreements were thus concluded mainly 
to recognise rights and liability of the riparian states. However, the non-navigational use 
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of international watercourses has become more important when other alternatives of 
transportation like car or train were introduced. The idea of sharing this resource between 
the riparian states thus became significant: the issue of ownership of trans-boundary 
water.  
 
There are four fundamental legal concepts concerning water allocation (for a more  
comprehensive survey of these principles, see McCaffrey, 2001: Chapter 5) 
 
 
a) The Harmon Doctrine 
 
 
This is an extreme concept, which allows a state to use or exploit the water and other 
related resources as much as it pleases without consideration of any adverse effect its 
action might have on neighbouring states. It is based on the theory of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, which means a riparian state has an absolute right to use the water that run 
through their territory. This concept very much favours upstream riparian states since it 
does not impose any responsibility upon them for any adverse consequences of their uses 
to downstream riparian states. The Harmon Doctrine does not acknowledge any duty that 
the state has in relation to riparian neighbours. For example, the duty not to cause harm to 
the internationally shared water resources is a valuable principle aimed to protect the 
environment of the watercourses to all the riparian states which the idea of absolute 
sovereignty does not respect. Other examples could be the downstream implications of 
upstream dam construction and navigation. In relation to the Mekong one could argue 
that China is referring to the Harmon Doctrine in its actions with dam construction and 
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remarks about the ownership of sediment all the way to the South China Sea (remarks 
made to the Vietnam National Mekong Committee in 2003). 
 
 
b) Absolute Territorial Integrity 
 
 
In contrast to the principle referred to above (Harmon Doctrine), this concept supports the 
interests of the downstream riparian states as it guarantees the right to obtain without 
interference or harm, access to all of the natural water flowing from the upstream riparian 
states. The sovereign integrity doctrine, also referred to as a riparian right, has been used 
by downstream countries to exercise their rights over the downstream part of a river. 
Nevertheless it has been rejected by state practice as it only favours downstream riparian 
states and does not have current evidence of being applied in international law.  In other 
words it goes against the geopolitical interest between upstream and downstream 
riparians. 




c) Equitable Utilisation 
 
 
This concept is introduced as a balance reached between the two extreme concepts. It 
endorses the idea of considering international watercourses as common resources shared 
between the riparian states. It is upon this concept that the work of the MRC is based, 
mainly through its Water Utilization Programme (WUP). Although the right to share 
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water between riparian states is equal, the amount of water to be shared under this 
concept is not necessarily equal. Equitable use is however based on relevant factors and 
circumstances that may allow, for example, State A to have a higher share of water than 
State B if the former has more population than the latter. The application of this concept 
is however quite problematic because, for example, its meaning is quite unclear and 
requires interpretation based on a case by case basis. More importantly, the equal right to 
use water of every riparian state makes it difficult to implement if they do not accept the 
interpretation of one another. To apply this concept would require establishing a joint 
organization like the MRC that will maintain the standard of such interpretation and 
secure equitable use between the riparian states. 
 
 
d) Common Management 
 
 
Common Management assumes that all riparian states of a river are collaborating to 
manage the use of water in an international watercourse for the benefit of the whole river. 
This requires the establishment of an institution that brings together all riparian states. 
This does not apply to the Mekong as China and Myanmar are not part of the MRC, but 
could be seen as the ideal management solution. 
 
The evolution of Integrated Basin Management and Watershed Management concepts go 
towards equitable utilisation ideas, but also see multiple stakeholders and sectors as being 
involved in the management of resources. Many natural resource management scholars 
and practitioners favour notions of co-management, which involved public, private and 
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indigenous actors and agencies. In the Se San River Valley, the communities that have 
been most left out of key decisions about the utilization of the water are the villagers, 
including ethnic minority people. Therefore the thesis will examine the interactions of 
multiple actors, agencies and scales in the politics of resources and geopolitics of 
managing trans-border river resources. 
 
2.7 Politics of ‘Scale’, ‘Position’ and ‘Place’ 
 
In their analysis of ‘scaled politics’ over the Yali Falls Dam and Se San downstream 
impacts, Hirsch and Wyatt (2004: 65) have illustrated very relevant examples of how 
community-based groups can ‘up-scale’ their activities through alliances, public forums, 
published reports on impacts, lobbying key players, and so on. These are themes I wish to 
return to later in my discussion of political actions and storylines (in Chapter 7). Hirsch 
and Wyatt (2004) are themselves relevant political actors, for they alongside other 
scholars and researchers, have become embroiled in the labyrinth of Mekong politics. 
Alliances with activist scholars, concerned professionals and practitioners, coupled with 
the established organizing abilities of NGO coalitions and international agencies has 
transformed the political landscape of the Se San, if not yet bringing achieving mitigating 
remedies for adverse environmental, social and economic impacts in the Se San 
watershed. As we can see, scales of action may often be constrained by issues of national 
interest, security and sovereignty at national level. China has certainly tried to play the 
sovereignty card in dealing with downstream complaints about unilaterally decided 
hydropower dams along the mainstream of the Mekong. Vietnam has played a similar 
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game in relation to the Se San cascade of dams. This has embarrassed the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC), provoking debate about the effectiveness of MRC principles, of the 
notion of integrated water resources management, of the organization’s commitment to 
open public dialogue within the region, and it has led to efforts to improve trans-border 
dialogue between the National Mekong Committees directly involved in the dispute (See 
Chapter 5). Thus, the ‘politics of scale’ are having some positive effects, and we must 
view such politics as being ongoing, contingent, with shifting positions and alliances over 
time. ‘Scales’ are never really fixed, and in some instances ‘scaling down’ may be as 
politically effective as ‘scaling up’, much depends on the particular contexts and 
amalgams of power involved (Howitt, 2003; Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004; Lebel et al, 2005). 
The relative negotiating strength of the civil society groups involved depends upon 
capabilities to actually collaborate with other agencies, and issues of ‘social capital’. As 
Jonathan Rigg (2007: 51) has summarized, ‘social capital … is the social ‘glue’ or 
‘fabric’ that holds or knits people together’ involving relations of trust, reciprocity and 
exchange; common rules; connectedness, networks and groups.   Thus, in the context of 
re-scaling’ activities, it also relates to the ways communities are able to organize within 
and amongst themselves, and also with other agencies operating at bigger scales (Rigg, 
2007, also citing the work of Bebbington and Perreault, 1999).  These concepts overlap 
with ideas drawn from political geography, such as the notion of creating ‘spaces of 
engagement’ (1998) and ‘terrains of resistance’ (Routledge, 1996).  
 
Considerations of ‘scale’ are not purely spatial, but require social capital, networks, and 
the capacity to politically engage with other groups. There are other important qualifiers 
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too. In the ‘politics of scale’ we often discuss civil society groups and community-level 
politics, but we should be careful to avoid over-simplification or reifying ‘community’ as 
some ideal basis for resource management (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001). Every community, 
however defined, involves complex inter-personal and inter-groups relationships, degrees 
of social stratification, with sometimes pronounced classes, status groups and patron-
client relations. Similarly, there is nothing sacred about ‘civil society’, which is often 
internally socially, economically and politically divided. Thus, re-scaling politics through 
civil society networks is not always going to lead to unified positions, and may actually 
exacerbate pre-existing hierarchies and schisms, and some people may be excluded more 
than others in political processes. Whilst my own research is not an ethnographically 
detailed study of the forms of social capital and social alliances that have emerged in the 
Se San watershed, these are definitely worthwhile considering in future research 
(Chapters 6 and 7).  
 
In many respects, ‘politics of scale’ provide very useful analytical devices for studying 
the politics of environment within ‘multi-level stakeholder constituencies’ such as the 
Mekong Basin (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004; Molle, Foran and Käkönen, 2009; Sneddon and 
Fox, 2006). However, ‘scale’ is not the only useful political geographic concept in trans-
border contexts such as the Se San watershed. Lebel, Garden and Imamura (2005) have 
taken the discussion of river basin politics and water governance beyond considerations 
of (re)scaling politics. They also discuss ‘the politics of position’. There is a strong 
tendency in human geography, less so in physical geography, to disregard the political 
significance of location in space, and rather to consider how space is constantly being 
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produced and (re)produced, and how politics runs through, affects, influences spatial 
actions (Allen, 2003). For instance, the positioning of political boundaries (discussed in 
chapter 4) are the direct result of complex political rivalries over space, resources, the 
identity and loyalties of people, and they are produced by very time-specific and 
situation-specific treaties, often with very little or no consultation with the people living 
in frontier zones, who are most directly affected by geopolitical partition (Prescott, 1987; 
Grundy-Warr, 1998). Nevertheless, the very presence and positioning of boundaries is 
critical for they generate a whole range of new issues in relation to how people live, 
work, trade, travel, and so on. Furthermore, locations in close proximity to boundaries are 
often scrutinized and monitored by state agencies concerned about issues of loyalty and 
allegiance, national security, and cross-border movements. Questions of ‘trans-boundary 
risk management’ are particularly pertinent to people living in borderlands or along 
politically divided watersheds and rivers. For them, ‘position’ is something to adjust daily 
lives to, to negotiate, and often involves various forms of relational politics to ‘the other 
side’. Physical location in space does matter, and this does not simply relate to upstream-
downstream positions, or positions on either side of a political boundary, but also 
‘positions’ within the national scheme of things. Clearly, in the Se San watershed 
example, decisions have been made at different ‘scales’ but also in terms of ‘position’. Se 
San, Sre Pok, Sekong and Central Highland communities do not benefit from the 
hydropower developments, partly because they are considered ‘peripheral’ to dominant 
sectors, majority populations, and geographically in terms of location away from key 
industrial and urban centres (Chapter 7). Added to these aspects are the problems of 
belonging and politics of identity in the territorialized context of nation-states, which in 
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Southeast Asia may carry with it other forms of racialized or ‘majority’ driven politics 
when it comes to the affairs of so-called ‘minorities’ and indigenous groups 
(Vandergeest, 1996; Scott, 1998; Lohmann, 2000; Keyes, 2008; Forsyth & Walker, 
2008). Thus, the ‘politics of position’ may encompass socio-economic policies and 
processes, geopolitical concerns, cultural politics, and also the historical-geographical 
accidents of physical location.    
 
Finally, ‘the politics of place’ raises many dimensions. (Lebel, Garden, Imamura, 2005) 
argued that it relates to the unfolding power relations among stakeholders arising from 
the special characteristics of places. It also involves complex inter-place relationships, 
such as between places where hydro-electric power is benefiting and those places bearing 
the brunt of negative externalities. However, there is another dimension to the ‘politics of 
place’ that is directly an aspect of the sorts of resistance, alliance and network that is 
developing around the Se San issue.  
 
This is what (Escobar, 1998; 2001) refers to as the cultural politics of ‘cultural difference, 
territorial defence, and some measure of social and political autonomy’, which frequently 
means a whole range of environmental resource management which cannot be ‘reduced 
to the managerial and economizing prescriptions offered by dominant views’ (Escobar, 
1998: 54). Escobar actually discusses the politics of both ‘place’ and also ‘sites’. The 
latter are more than just places for they are defined by processes that take place within 
broader groupings, networks and social movements. ‘Sites’ are created through the 
‘knowledge-power constellations’ which emerge from resistance politics and politics 
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over the defence of customary rights or in protecting rights to particular livelihood 
resources. In other words, ‘sites’ may emerge from place-based ‘local’ actions and 
contexts, although sites could equally be a Mekong Center in Sydney, an NGO Forum in 
Phnom Penh, or a village commune in the Se San. Elsewhere, Escobar (2001: 151) has 
also argued that places produce their own kinds of politics and particular ‘ensembles of 
meaning’ that I believe are highly relevant to the study of trans-boundary environmental 
politics. 
 
In this thesis, I shall try to examine ideas about trans-boundary hydro-politics in relation 
to the politics of the MRC (Chapter 5), and of place, power and position (Chapters 6 and 
7). Finally, I shall explore aspects of the politics of environmental knowledge and the 
production of forms of knowledge in the context of social networks and the multi-
stakeholder dimensions of water governance in the Se San watershed and broader 








































3.1  Questions and Methods 
 
This section attempts to examine the linkages between research methods and central 
questions relating to the thesis, particularly the following ones:  
 
1) Why are trans-boundary politics significant to understanding multiple ‘local 
scale’ environmental, socio-economic transformations relating to specific mega-
projects occurring at different sites in the Mekong Basin? [My main focus for 
primary research is in the ‘scale’ of the trans-border tributary, such as the Se San 
River, and at the larger ‘scale’ of three interrelated river basins, the Se San, Sre 
Pok, and Sekong.] 
 
2) Why are the concepts of environmental and livelihood security critical to an 
understanding of trans-boundary social and environmental impacts? [Based on 
secondary source analysis and personal fieldwork] 
 
3) In what way was the work carried out as an intern (for one year) at the MRC 
helpful to understand the dynamic politics of the Lower Mekong? This question 
particularly relates to understanding the MRC involvement and ‘national 
interests’ of the riparian state members party to the Lower Mekong agreement of 
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1995. At the very least I was privileged to get insights into the day-to-day 
activities of the MRC Secretariat. [My internship was supplemented by 
researching MRC documents and secondary source materials from the MRCS 
Library]  
 
3.2 Research as an ‘insider’ via internships 
 
Being an intern within an institution one is studying poses a number of challenging 
dilemmas, not least of all in relation to potential conflicts of interest that may arise during 
the course of research whilst still undertaking work within a particular agency. My first 
internship was with UN-ESCAP in order to get a better insight into how the governments 
of the Mekong countries (together with UN organizations) view the development of the 
Mekong region. Subsequently I became an intern with the MRC Secretariat, then based in 
Phnom Penh, to get an insight into how the governments of the Mekong countries work 
together on developing the region.  
 
Hyndman (2001: 262-272) mentions how it is not always easy as a researcher (or intern) 
to get access to information in international organizations. I must consider myself 
fortunate that there was such a good environment of learning about the important issues 
facing the Mekong both at UN-ESCAP and at the MRC Secretariat. I was open about my 
PhD research, and issues of access to confidential materials were the same as for other 
people within the organization. I never once breached these rules, and in any case, the 
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documentation centre at the MRCS is open to both staff and visitors. The MRCS library 
became an invaluable resource to me.  
 
The research strategy of becoming an intern is not so different from ethnographic 
participant observation. The researcher must maintain high ethical standards so as not to 
breach trust and confidentiality. However, being an intern allows the researcher to ‘get 
behind’ the academic literature to some extent, and to see things from the perspectives of 
people working within a key agency, which in this research was dealing with issues of 
Mekong Basin development through water resource utilization.  
 
Internships do not necessarily provide access to particularly privileged data, such as 
primary documents relating to the policies and positions of national governments. The 
position of ‘intern’ may not help him/her to find out more information on a particular 
issue than researchers who are on the ‘outside’, and there was never any attempt on my 
part to try to obtain sensitive, non-published confidential material. However, being an 
intern in a key institution means that the researcher is literally integrated within the 
agency allowing him/her to make frequent observations about the way such organizations 
operate, the pressures they face, and to understand better inner bureaucratic processes that 
are often obscure from the ‘outside’. Overall, the internships were useful to me because I 
was able to talk with colleagues, make observations of my own about the importance of 
institutional politics and mandates, and appreciate the fact that there are often distinctions 
to be made between an agency’s position and the multiple informed perspectives of 
professionals working for it.  
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During my internship with MRCS I was also able to delve into the library and 
documentation centre to find out more about ongoing controversies concerning 
hydropower developments. It was here that I became interested in finding out more about 
the contested nature of trans-border resources, not just from an institutional perspective, 
but from multiple stakeholder perspectives. It also became clear that there was a need to 
consider various NGO perspectives on the trans-boundary issues, despite efforts by the 
MRC at the time of my internship to define a holistic approach with civil society through 
its Basin Development Programme, Fisheries Programme and stakeholder consultation. 
Being an intern made me aware of how the MRCS specialists are engaged in their 
respective ‘fields’, their areas of ‘technical’ and ‘scientific’ competence, but they are not 
necessarily deeply engaged with the myriad riparian communities and thousands of 
villages most dependent on the Mekong, its tributaries, and related aquatic resources. I 
realized that more grounded fieldwork would be essential to the thesis to appreciate the 
livelihood and resource politics in the everyday realm of ordinary people. Further, 
fieldwork was necessary to compliment and analyse some of the secondary materials and 
MRCS technical reports I was already familiar with. 
 
Working within the MRCS was a definite eye-opener for it helped to expose me to 
different kinds of information the Secretariat helps generate, and it also gave me some 
exposure to the complex nature of water geopolitics in the Mekong Basin through the 
prism of internal Secretariat discussions. It enabled me to have insights into institutional 
politics through the key resource governance body of the Lower Mekong, but I also learnt 
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that the MRCS is not the whole organization, for real policy is dealt with at the level of 
inter-governmental executive committees. In many respects the MRCS role is to research 
and manage data that then should feed into the decision-making process. Thus, in my role 
as intern I mostly met with scientists, specialists and practitioners from inside and outside 
the Mekong region. Fishery and hydrology specialists may produce important reports, but 
such reports may or may not guide policy-decisions, for there is even within one 
institution a complex politics of knowledge generation. In addition, working ‘within’ 
enables the researcher to appreciate governance issues at one level as an institutional 
process, which requires not just knowledge about resources and the politics of resources 
but how institutions help shape knowledge(s) of those resources and influence discourses 
of development.   
 
Undertaking thesis research often necessitates exploring multiple different perspectives, 
both from existing academic literature as well as personal fieldwork (interviews, 
observations made during the internship and beyond that period). One must be aware not 
to compromise the position of being a researcher with the job of working as an intern 
where one has to follow the codes of conduct of the employer.  But equally, working as 
an intern and a researcher does have cross-over benefits, because the structure and 
bureaucratic nature of the MRC, and particularly the Secretariat, became much more real 
to me. After the internship period I was able to view the MRC as a complex differentiated 
body balancing between its inter-governmental role and role as a supposedly impartial 
water governance institution.  
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Since I worked with the MRC as an intern three CEO’s have moved on. However, my 
internship period was mostly under the auspices of CEO Mr. Joern Kristensen, from 
whom I gained first-hand knowledge about the important issues of the Mekong, and who, 
in my opinion, did much to involve NGOs and civil society in the dam process, although 
he did not find strong support from the respective riparian governments for this more 
‘open’ approach. It is fortunate that Mr. Kristensen was a fellow countryman from 
Denmark, which really did help me to communicate with him. Furthermore, I was able to 
accompany the CEO on a fieldtrip to Ratanakiri Province and the Se San River. The 
fieldtrip was at a sensitive time for the downstream communities were suffering from 
periodic flooding, water pollution and declining fish yields, which some organizations 
were attributing directly as downstream costs of the Yali Falls Dam. From the fieldtrip 
and approach Kristensen adopted, the researcher found out that being the MRCS CEO is 
a delicate position involving considerable diplomatic skills, for it was obvious to me that 
the CEO was uncomfortable with the lack of transparency that laid behind the 
Vietnamese Dam project on the Se San River. Furthermore, the CEO was also concerned 
about issues of food security and the potential damage to fisheries and livelihoods.  
  
One of the most important aspects of my time within the MRC Secretariat was learning 
how much various international officers at the MRC were often very open to working 
with the NGOs and civil society groups. The MRC is often criticized for its perceived 
lack of candidness or for withholding information about social and environmental 
impacts relating to hydropower, for instance, from the public domain (see for example 
Hirsch, 2006a; various issues of Watershed magazine; and criticisms from different NGO 
 57 
networks such as Siam Living River and the NGO Forum of Cambodia). However, I 
became fully aware that the MRC is hardly a monolithic body, and it contains much 
internal debate regarding profound water utilization options concerning the Mekong 
River. Within the Secretariat itself, with its cosmopolitan staff make-up, internal 
discussions often reflect somewhat the ‘tensions between the MRC as a donor-driven 
organization and one owned by the riparian states’ (Hirsch, 2006 b: 193). This is largely 
due to the fact that many scientific specialists are coming into the organization with their 
understanding based upon professional experience beyond the Mekong Basin, and they 
are often dedicated to improving the scientific and technical services of the MRC 
regardless of inter-state politics and partisan national interests. The international staff 
comprised mostly scientists dedicated to working within a non-biased, neutral approach 
based on scientific facts, although admittedly technical reports can then become 
politicized once they are influential as the basis for decisions. In addition to the Danish 
CEO, the MRCS when I was there had Australians working in Fisheries and 
Environment, Japanese staff on Water Management, German hydrologists working in 
Watershed Management and Coordination, a Norwegian official working in the Finance 
Department, a Malaysian responsible for Communications, a Dutch person doing Human 
Resources Capacity Training, a Belgian sea captain working on the Navigation schemes, 
just to mention a few examples.  Thus, the MRCS is a far more international space than 
the MRC inter-governmental committees, and the national MRC committees, for these 
are staffed mostly be representatives from the respective four Lower Mekong countries.  
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Through exposure and contact as an intern I was able to appreciate that the ongoing 
technical and scientific dimensions of the Secretariat were sometimes running counter to 
certain dominant ‘national’ agendas. This thesis is about trans-border resource 
governance and an element of the ‘mis’-management I am interested in is also reflected 
in the way in which some bits of knowledge are privileged over others in decision-
making processes. The MRCS has produced many detailed reports concerning the value 
of fisheries and ecosystem services to millions of people in the Mekong Basin. They have 
produce a publication called Catch & Culture which is always full of real-life 
illustrations and scientific studies that stress the vital socio-ecological-environmental-
human security bonds of the Mekong Basin. Yet it is the private consultancy reports that 
have often been used by national energy ministries as part of the environmental impact 
assessments of hydropower dams, and not the huge outputs of data from the MRCS 
scientists and from independent researchers. Often side-stepped are some of the MRCS 
scientific findings which may in fact be so compelling that the Secretariat’s less 
‘political’ information-dissemination activities are perhaps of greater significance than 
the ‘toothless’ image with which the MRC as a whole is given (Bakker, 2006; Hirsch, 
2006 a, b).   
 
Within the MRC Secretariat, if not the whole institution, there are numerous professional 
perspectives, sometimes pulling in different directions, and this is not always appreciated 
by ‘external’ researchers.  As an intern, you get insights (from state representatives, 
government appointed staff at the MRC) which are not confidential but do help to 
provide supplementary information to the dry technical reports and policy documents. At 
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certain times during the research I had to stand back from my role as intern and to 
appreciate the MRC as a complex institution amongst many other stakeholders within the 
Basin. Importantly international staff at the MRC valued my role as a researcher from a 
university and were mostly available and keen to discuss (though in private) the issues 
confronting the Mekong Basin as they saw them, since they realized that I would not 
violate professional codes of conduct and in any case a dissertation or thesis is 
unpublished, so not immediately in the public domain. This was how I myself steered a 
course through the river of research as an intern.  There were no clashes of interest 
because I was always honest about my own research interests, and the MRCS was a 
relatively friendly and open working environment.  
 
3.3 Official, confidential, and unofficial sources 
 
According to Cloke et al (2004: 54) it is imperative to take into consideration policy 
concerns or political ideas which might have motivated the ‘construction’ of the 
information. As noted in the above section, the MRCS is fully involved in the production 
and making of new ‘knowledge’ about the Mekong River Basin and water resources. The 
policy inputs are at the geopolitical level of the inter-governmental committees, rather 
than the MRCS per se. Thus, it is vital that one engages in discourse analysis of the 
policy-relevant documents and the kinds of information and knowledge that are 
informing the policy-makers, or being used to justify certain decisions, such as the siting 
of a hydropower dam in a particular tributary river.  Furthermore, ‘unofficial sources’ can 
open up social worlds which are inaccessible and relatively closed (Cloke et al, 2004: 
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63). Different kinds of materials, published as well as unpublished, in the MRC 
Secretariat Library became a magnificent resource, providing valuable information both 
on the MRC and the River Basin. The types of ‘unofficial sources’ in my research that 
opened up social worlds were through discussions with MRCS colleagues, and during my 
fieldtrips to Ratanakiri when I learnt much more about the reality of trans-border 
externalities through observations and more anecdotal information obtained from 
villagers.  
 
Occasionally, you cannot use primary documents you come across as an intern because of 
their ‘confidential’ nature, such as recent memoranda from government officials. During 
the time with the MRCS I got the opportunity to read unpublished documents of a 
confidential nature. For example, documents relating to the highly sensitive inter-
governmental Notification Process on the Se San, which has been subject to considerable 
academic discussion (see Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004). This documentation revealed to me 
how the Vietnamese government was trying to prolong and avoid getting into such a 
prior-notification process until the upstream dam developments had become irreversible. 
Thus, whilst these documents were not used directly in the research, they did reveal 
aspects of the often opaque nature of international transparency with potentially harmful 
transnational externalities. I also came across future plans for hydropower development, 
which long before the current debates about mainstream dams in the Lower Mekong 
indicated that all the national governments of the Lower Basin had such plans in the 
pipeline. There were also unpublished reports that revealed scientific and technical 
information about environmental impact assessments, such as China’s EIA relating to 
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upper Mekong navigation improvement, before these documents were leaked and subject 
to external scrutiny. 
 
As discussed earlier, I did not seek to publish sources that are not in the public domain. 
However, internal knowledge of the processes (such as secret memoranda, and the types 
of information they contain) that affect decision-making within an institution is certainly 
useful when it comes to critically examining issues of governance.  
 
Till (2001: 46-56) observes the problem of ‘sharing’ research texts with others, which 
puts the obligations of an intern into perspective. If an intern would choose to reveal 
confidential or unpublished material in his or her research it would not be possible to 
share the research material without causing outrage or possible exclusion from future 
work. A professional relationship has to be maintained and violations of codes of conduct 
are taken very seriously. Thus, I have always sought to use and analyze MRC materials 
already within the public domain, which are significant documents. The MRCS has made 
available to the public all of the workshop and stakeholder meeting materials. To 
supplement this data, participant observations of the MRC Secretariat helped me to frame 
certain ideas about the character of ‘trans-boundary politics’ within and through the MRC 
as well as between the MRC and other institutions and stakeholders.  
 
What became clear was that the MRCS was not the only data source I needed to tap, for 
there were pressing trans-border socio-environmental developments demanding a strategy 
that took me outside the confines of internship. Big questions were left unanswered. Why 
 62 
were the dams being built on the Se San and elsewhere in the Mekong Basin without 
EIAs or with very inadequate ones? Why was it that a major trans-border incident, such 
as the Yali Falls Dam leading to downstream flash-floods and human fatalities had been 
able to happen in spite of significant trans-border protocols being in place? Why had the 
MRC CEO not visited the Se San River when it was clearly a major problem? (I actually 
had opportunity to discuss this directly with him during his actual visit!) Subsequently, 
the CEO, to his credit, sought to implement procedural changes to try to improve inter-
governmental communication and notification procedures. Many of these were 
subsequently adopted by the national-level Mekong Committees. Why was it that data 
collected by important local agencies, such as the Ratanakiri Department of Water 
Resources, with MRC technical assistance, was not taken into consideration by the 
Vietnamese Government when implanting its plan?  
 
3.4 Fieldwork and observations 
 
Fieldwork is here considered as field site visits that were not part of my role as an intern. 
The most important part is interviewing and observing. As mentioned in Fife (2005: 94) 
semi-structured interviews combine a degree of control over the contents that a structured 
interview affords with the flexibility of open-ended questions and being able to bring up 
new issues that may arise during course of the interview, without the need to do closed-
ended questions but being able to bring up new issues depending on how the interview 
develops. Semi-formal allows for a relevant set of leading questions combined with 
flexible follow-up questions. However, it is important still to find people with whom to 
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carry out the interviews. In fact, this is more difficult than it first seems. It is ethically 
very important to speak with people who agree to the process and are comfortable with it. 
In fieldwork settings, it is also useful to try to find relatively comfortable places for 
conducting interviews. So instead of standing under the hot sun you choose a shaded spot 
under a tree. Developing friendly and talkative relations is not easy if somebody is under 
stress (for instance, disturbing a fisherman at labour or a woman fish-trader in a sale). 
Thus, the first tasks are to find people willing to talk and then taking an effort to make 
sure everyone is relaxed about the whole process. Being approachable, frank and 
sensitive are essential attributes of fieldwork within village surroundings.  
 
Another problem I confronted in the fieldwork phase was that there was at the time a 
relative lack of factual data on the Se San, with the exception for water-level fluctuation 
data being collected by community-based groups under the auspices of NGOs from 
Phnom Penh. This oriented me as a researcher towards the range of potential ‘unofficial’ 
data sources (Cloke et al: 2004: 64), including a sample of interviews I conducted with 
villagers from different village sites along the River Se San. I spoke with heads of 
villages, ordinary villagers (men and women), NGO representatives, and other field 
researchers, such as Ian Baird, who was working on fish species, migrations and probable 
impacts of the dams on these fish populations. Ian was particularly insightful for he 
already had been working with local fishers for several years in Laos and Cambodia, 
combining scientific types of understanding with detailed observations, and with an effort 




Other geography field researchers have discussed the need for reciprocity and 
engagement with the people in village settings, which can only come from long-term 
ethnographic associations (Stevens, 2001: 66-73). Given the various strands of my 
research strategy, including working as an intern in the MRCS, fieldwork for my thesis 
did not take on a long-duration ethnographic involvement in particular villages of 
Ratanakiri. Thus, I think this has meant that certain understandings and meanings are lost 
to the researcher. However, fieldtrips have enabled me to gain an insight into the socio-
cultural environment of that part of Cambodia, which is very distinct from Phnom Penh 
life, and to develop a deeper understanding of the real significance of connections people 
have with the aquatic resources, fisheries, forests and land. Finally, I have sought to 
supplement my understandings with a great many materials published by the active NGO 
Forum of Cambodia, particularly about a range of problems confronting rural 
communities, such as land-grabbing, politics of land rights, political and legal issues 
relating to resource access, and particular issues concerning the indigenous ethnic peoples 
of Ratanakiri. So I was able to extend my discourse analysis from the MRCS to the NGO 
and CBO arena.  
 
3.5 Languages and interpretation 
 
In addition to the potential tensions of between intern and independent researcher roles, 
addressed above, there were numerous other research constraints I have had to overcome. 
Social and cultural understanding of indigenous societies requires considerable effort on 
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the part of the researcher. During the fieldwork periods, I visited many so-called 
‘minority’ indigenous groups along the Se San River. A lot often depends on how you 
interact with people, patience, tact, and how well you listen. To me, despite having 
learned Khmer, it was not possible within the relatively short time available to learn the 
indigenous languages as well, and also it was not easy to find a competent translators 
who could speak English, or High Khmer (which I do understand), plus one of various 
indigenous languages, such as Jarai. So in practice, the interviews were mostly done with 
two translators, one of whom translated from Jarai or other vernacular speech into 
Khmer, and the other from Khmer into English. Sometimes it is difficult to capture 
meanings, there is plenty of scope for things being ‘lost in translation’, and there are 
moments when interviews may actually lead to less understanding and clarity. However, 
my knowledge of Khmer did help to reduce some of the complexities, as the Khmer-
English translations did not need to be so precise, as I could usually derive meanings with 
further questioning. Asking the same question in different ways also helped. So, if you 
ask the same question in three different ways and get two identical answers, then they are 
probably correct. This form of triangulation helped in the field, although it does take 
patience with the interpreters and with the respondents. Actually, another advantage of 
the internship period for me was that it helped me to improve my language skills (Thai 
and Khmer) which sometimes make it easier to understand peoples and places. However, 
the prominent Khmer culture does not reflect the needs of the (mostly) indigenous people 
of Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri provinces. There is always a danger of local people 
thinking you are on some official fact-finding mission for the government, and thus they 
become very cautious in their responses.  
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Based in Bangkok prior to moving to Cambodia I learned the attitude of Thai officials 
towards the MRC and Cambodia which gave a better understanding of intra-state and 
intra-cultural relationships. It is important to appreciate the different cultural politics that 
relate to relations between officials of different national backgrounds, particularly within 
Southeast Asia, where politics of often said to be consensual, which is not always the 
case! Equally, my time within regional capitals and large institutions also gave me some 
idea as to how the relations between officials and local people can sometimes be very 
unequal with potential for many misunderstandings to arise. Larry Lohmann (1995) 
recognized this when he examined the fact that officials from the city and villagers are 
not often sharing the same ‘rules of engagement’, which can lead to complete 
misunderstandings and wrong-headed decision-making based on false assumptions. 
Lohmann talked about the ‘orality-literacy axis’ (villagers often having strong oral 
traditions compared to the document-dominated lives of public officials) and the 
‘personality-impersonality axis’ (villagers relying a lot on face-to-face meetings and 
decision-making, whereas the world of public officials is based upon hierarchical 
institutions and many impersonalized dealings). Being aware of these distinctions makes 
the researcher more sensitive not only to real language barriers (Jarai versus Khmer) but 
also to different ways of engaging in village contexts.  
 
Unfortunately there was not sufficient time to develop a deep ethnographic research 
strategy, which could have given me an opportunity to learn additional languages and 
thus avoid the problem of having to work with/through interpreters. Working with 
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interpreters is also an ‘art’ and needs the researcher to appreciate the positionality of the 
interpreter in particular fieldwork settings. For instance, a perfectly good interpreter from 
a city background may actually become problematic if he or she has pretentious notions 
of village life, or even worse, looks down upon the villager being interviewed. Wherever 
possible, find somebody who at least appreciates the context, way of life and language 
well enough to interpret the questions. As far as possible I tried to get decent interpreters 
I could feel comfortable with and who were knowledgeable about the places and 
situations we were researching. There were mistakes and gaps I am sure, but a tactful, 













Chapter 4:  


















4. Geopolitics of Contested Borderlands Space and Resources 
in the Mekong 
 
This chapter shall examine the evolution and significance of inter-territorial state 
boundaries in the Mekong Region, with special attention to relations between Cambodia 
and Vietnam. Understanding the temporal-spatial creation of the boundaries that separate 
the member states of the Lower Mekong Agreement 
(http://www.mrcmekong.org/agreement_95/agreement_95.htm) is relevant background to 
an understanding of the limitations of trans-border cooperation, and the ongoing lack of 
transparency over environmental and social impact assessments relating to projects 
initiated in one state with significant externalities for the neighbouring state. My 
argument is that contemporary political mistrust at state level stems in part from the 
manner in which de jure international boundaries were created in the recent past, and the 
frequent acrimonious disputes over territory that have periodically affected trans-border 
relations in the Mekong basin. Boundary disputes represent only a portion of the complex 
geopolitical relations that affect development and sometimes hinder agreement in the 
Mekong. I shall also briefly refer to the workings of the Mekong Committee (predecessor 
to the Mekong River Commission) during the Cold War era to illustrate how and why 
geopolitics is an essential component of the analysis of hydro-politics and water 
governance in the region.  All of this is at the level of sovereign state relations, and in 
fact, there are a great many multi- and cross-scale issues concerning the Mekong River 
that require us to escape the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995) of dominant 
inter-state relations. So in the final section of this chapter I shall refer to peopled 
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borderlands, permeable borders and alternative geographic imaginations that are also 
highly relevant to resource politics in the Mekong basin.    
 
4.1 Geopolitical boundaries in the Mekong past and present 
 
The Mekong basin has gone through periods of intense geopolitical rivalry throughout the 
20
th
 century, and it was only with the end of the Cold War, the signing of the Paris Peace 
Accords in Cambodia in 1991 and the 1995 Lower Mekong Agreement that the region 
began to be viewed as one in which substantive trans-border cooperation was once again 
possible. The tense stand-offs of the Cold War years gave way to a new so-called  “peace 
dividend” of regional cooperation and integration as first Vietnam was admitted into 
ASEAN in 1995, followed by Myanmar and Laos PDR in 1997, and then Cambodia in 
1999 (Bakker, 1999: 214). This section seeks to highlight some of the key reasons why 
geopolitics has influenced hydro-political relations, and why past geopolitical rivalries 





Historically speaking, the main era of boundary-making was during the 19
th
 century 
colonial rivalries in the Mekong Basin. The French colonial administration eventually 
covered large parts of what are now Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam within Indochina (see 
map 4.1.1. below).  
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Indeed, many of the border disputes arose out of European powers creating frontiers to 
protect their own spheres of resource, trade and investment in colonial territories from 
their rivals (Malay Jr., 2006). This led to numerous significant disputes. For instance, the 
contemporary rivalry between Vietnam and Cambodia over the Khmer Krom provinces 
in southern Vietnam.  
 
The ethnic Khmer minority in Vietnam, known as Khmer Krom (“lower Khmer”), live in 
the southern-most part of Vietnam, bounded by Cambodia, the Gulf of Thailand, and the 
South China Sea. Many Cambodians still refer to the southern-most provinces of present-
day Vietnam as Kampuchea Krom, or “Lower Cambodia” because they see it as part of 
the ancestral homeland of the Khmer people. While many Khmer in Cambodia and in 
Vietnam consider themselves among the indigenous inhabitants of the Mekong Delta 
region, the Vietnamese government strongly refutes such assertions. 
This Mekong Delta region was formerly part of the Khmer Empire (9th-13th centuries 
A.D.), which at various times included parts of Thailand, Laos, and southern and central 
Vietnam.  With the decline of the Khmer Empire, by the 17th century increasing numbers 
of ethnic Kinh, or Viet people, had begun to settle in what is currently the central and 
southern parts of Vietnam. During the French colonial period (1867-1949), the Mekong 
Delta region was incorporated into the southwestern part of the French protectorate 




Another illustration is the contemporary positional border dispute between Thailand and 
Cambodia over Preah Vihear Temple (or Wat Phra Khao Vihan in Thai), which 
continued to create political tensions and even armed skirmishes along the border in late 
2008, has been complicated by different cartographic interpretations of the borderline 
found in colonial French and Siamese records. Whilst the International Court of Justice in 
The Hague found, in 1962, that the actual temple ‘belongs’ to Cambodia, and UNESCO 
in 2008 made it part of its World Heritage List for Cambodia 
(http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1224), there still remains great ambiguity over surrounding 
land and the precise position of the international boundary (Prescott, 1987). Other 
examples relate to disputes over the positioning of boundaries within the Mekong River 
itself, such as the unsettled boundary between Thailand and Laos in the Mekong between 
Chiang Khong and Huay Xai (Houei Sai), which was actually a geopolitical factor that 
led to the Thai Ministry of Defence intervening to stop further reef blasting in the area 
under a navigation improvement scheme (between China, Myanmar, Laos and Thailand).  
Such territorial and boundary disputes are numerous in the Mekong region where 
watersheds and river thalwegs were often used for delimiting so-called ‘natural’ 
boundaries (Prescott, 1987: 223). 
 
Geopolitics has also had tremendous impacts upon different ethnic ‘minorities’ and 
indigenous populations within the region. For example, the Montagnards in Vietnam, the 
Hmong people in Laos, and the Krung, Jarai, and other groups near the Cambodia, Laos 
and Vietnam borders, were all subject to various forms of persecution, exploitation and 
manipulation during the Indochina wars, both within anti-colonial, nationalist struggles 
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defined mostly in terms of the dominant lowland ‘ethnic’ groups, and as pawns during 
the ideological Cold War geopolitics (Hamilton-Merritt, 1993; Keyes, 2008; Winichakul, 
1995).  
 
French Colonial Period 
 
The French saw Vietnam as a springboard for trade with China, and the Mekong was 
long viewed as a potentially important navigational corridor, but with the one major 
impediment of having fairly long stretches where navigation is highly problematic due to 
narrow, reefs, rapids and the Khone Falls (near the current Laos and Cambodia border).  
 
4.1.2 Fisherman Crossing the Khone Falls (Source: www.internationalrivers.org) 
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The French first occupied a large fertile area of southern Vietnam from 1859 and 
extended their rule to all of Vietnam in the 1880s. After having occupied Vietnam the 
French continued their expeditions and conquests into neighbouring Lower Mekong 
territories, including large parts of modern-day Cambodia. The French used Cambodia as 
a sort of ‘buffer zone’ with the Kingdom of Siam, which though not under direct colonial 
rule, had become very active in frontier delimitation due in part to the influence of 
colonial notions of political geography affecting the Siamese ruler’s perspectives of the 
territorial extent of their Kingdom, and due to active Siamese involvement in then 
sending out troops to make territorial claims (Winichakul, 1995). Meanwhile, in the late 
19
th
 century the French maintained their influence in Cambodia by keeping the traditional 
royal leadership intact though under colonial authority rule.  
 
As noted by (Evans, 2002), the country we call Laos today was actually a sort of land-
locked composite of minor polities in the mid-19
th
 century. None of them were able to act 
in a truly independent fashion, and they were often under the patronage of larger states, 
or there were forms of tribute paid to larger polities in return for a degree of autonomous 
rule - also known as Song Fai Fa (tribute to two rulers) or Sam Fai Fa (tribute to three 
rulers). However, it was quite common to have overlapping sovereignties in the era of 
non-bounded kingdoms (McCarthy, 1900, reprint 1994).  Petty states were vassals to 
more powerful overlords and on occasions could refer to more than one ruler.  Siam 
already acted as a ‘buffer’ between rival British (annexed Burma) and French Indochina. 
Nevertheless, this independence came at a price. The British managed to gain substantive 
trading rights for logs from Burma and other resources, and Siam gave up some territorial 
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concessions in areas near to the Mekong River. Between 1885 and 1899, the French were 
particularly aggressive in seizing areas of Laos and in establishing their colonial position 
there.   
 
When the French colonial forces took over Lao space there was little sense then of a Lao 
‘nation’ amongst the diverse population that fell within new colonial borders. It was the 
Lao elite who first received an education in French and higher education in Hanoi, 
Saigon or in Paris. Whilst this education taught them little about their own space and own 
people, French schooling at the time was focused on and influenced by French 
nationalism. Students from the colonies became extremely aware of ideas about the 
‘nation state’ and the significance of nationalism as a political project. (For instance the 
later communist ruler of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, first arrived in France in 1911 and upon 
arrival in Marseille applied for the French Colonial Administrative School, however was 
rejected) Thus, it did not take much imagination to transfer such concepts to new 
‘imagined communities’, such as the Laos ‘homeland’ (Anderson, 1991; Evans, 2002: 
73).  
 
In Cambodia too, French influenced education played a part in forging ideas of a new 
national identity. However, there was a greater sense of ‘Khmer’ identity as a unifying 
force. An independence movement (Khmer Issarak) which had associations with the 
Vietnamese Viet Minh was already active in stirring up rural revolts in 1947. By the end 
of August 1949, a 21 year old student named Saloth Sar (later known as Pol Pot) joined 
twenty other young Cambodians aboard the S.S. Jamaique in Saigon which set sail to 
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France. Before their departure, the students had celebrated with the Democrat Party, an 
anti-feudal group, whose officials were in the Ministry of Education and had secured the 
scholarships in France. Saloth Sar was actually from a wealthy land-owning family from 
Kompong Thom, and had connections with the Royal palace, where his brother held a 
minor administrative post and an aunt, a dancer in the Royal Ballet who had given birth 
to a child of King Monivong. The young Khmer students arrived in Paris during the 
period when the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed. Thus, it is of little surprise 
that several intellectuals began to blend their anti-colonial nationalist ideas with 
communist ideology tinged by the triumph of communism in China, Vietnam and 
elsewhere.  When Cambodia gained her political independence from France in 1953, 
followed by military autonomy after the Geneva Conference in 1954, there were already 
rival national idealisms and forces that had emerged, and would these pro-monarchy and 
anti-monarchy communist forces would later create civil chaos in the country, including 
incursion by the Viet Minh into Cambodia in 1954.  
 
In Indochina, the French colonial power was reluctant to give up her Mekong colonial 
possessions, and it took years of conflict, and the eventual victory of Vietnamese forces 
in Dien Bien Phu in 1954 to see a new era of independent statehood begin. Nationalism 
tinged with communism became a major force for change in the Mekong region, 
particularly leading up to the so-called Second Indochina War. But one thing that all of 
the newly independent states had in common was their fierce defence of territory as a key 
ingredient of their sovereign status, and this aspect of nationalism and inter-state 
relationships has continued until today. 
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New national ‘Geo-Bodies’ 
 
(Winichakul, 1995) has provided very interesting insights into role of political geography 
in the formation of new national ‘geo-bodies’ in Southeast Asia and beyond. As he 
observes, ‘spatial’ politics lie at the heart of definitions of ‘nation’ and meanings of 
‘nationhood’, and to him, political boundaries are ‘the most concrete manifestation of 
nationhood’ (Winichakul, 1995: 17). In my study of ‘trans-boundary’ politics and 
environmental resource governance in the Mekong, there is a strong tendency to regard 
fixed territorial sovereignties as if they are permanent features of the world political map, 
but as political geographers know, the ‘impression of stability is completely false’ 
(Taylor and Flint, 2000: 153). Furthermore, the territorialization of space and resources 
which followed the creation of territorial sovereign states has been one of the most 
important issues in resource politics in Southeast Asia (Fox, 2002; Laungaramsri, 2001; 
Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Vandergeest, 1996; Peluso, 2005a; 2005b; 2008). Political 
territoriality is a critical ingredient of numerous environmental resource conflicts in the 
region, and an analysis of the spatial dimensions of these resource politics is central to 
our discussion in this thesis. This is particularly so in relation to the development of the 
borderland ‘resource frontiers’ (see below)  
 
Whilst nationalism does have a strong territorial dimension, we should also note that 
there are other ingredients to national projects that relate to specific historical and 
political contexts rather than to a ‘universal’ acceptance of modern political geography. 
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Vietnam’s victory in the Second Indochina War in 1975 led to the (re)unification of  a 
country formerly torn apart by an ideological warfare that was truly global, but at heart, 
Vietnam’s struggle against America was deeply nationalistic. In many respects, Mekong 
regional cooperation today must be viewed in terms of the palimpsest political map that 
makes up a complex region, one in which past political and social formations have never 
been completely erased and continue to influence aspects of today’s geopolitics. 
 
4.2 Political boundaries partitioning the Mekong 
The boundaries we see across the face of the political map of the Mekong Region (see 
Figure 4.2.1 below) have remained relatively unchanged since colonial times in spite of 
several ongoing positional boundary disputes. These political boundaries are, a real 
impediment to environmental resource management based on ecological niches (see 
Figure 4.2.2 below after the following map).  
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4.2.2 Bio-geographical zones of the Mekong Basin (AMRC) 
 
In some senses the bio-physical map (Figure 4.2.2. above) better fits the principles of 
Basin-wide development and integrated water resources management (IWRM) that are 
espoused by the current Mekong River Commission (see Chapter 5), but in practice the 
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geopolitical boundaries are extremely important due to member states being highly 
reluctant and to pool sovereignty on many issues deemed to dent ‘national interests.’ 
Even the day-to-day work of the Mekong Secretariat is dependent on data based on the 
artificial political-administrative units rather than by bio-physical or ecological niches, 
and many issues of practical resource management are similarly constrained by 
jurisdictional boundaries that divide watersheds.  
 
As discussed above, the British and French colonial forces were largely responsible for 
carving up the political map, if not the political landscape (which was far more complex), 
of the region. Britain had some success in persuading China to draw a boundary in 
northern Burma in the 1890s. In 1894 the two states agreed on a line which was roughly 
between the headwaters of the Irrawaddy to the upper Mekong River. When China made 
concessions to France in northern Indochina in 1896, Britain demanded and received 
about 1500 square miles north of the 1894 line. Britain also made boundary agreements 
with Siam. When she acquired Tenasserim in Burma in 1826 a formal boundary between 
the eastern province of Burma and Kingdom of Siam was settled. Eventually this 
boundary line was confirmed by formal agreement in February 1868. The process 
involved considerable negotiation, confusion and diplomacy partly because the Court of 
Siam was still unfamiliar with the concept of ‘boundary’ imposed by the British, and 
preferred more open-ended and flexible frontier arrangements that were more akin to a 
frontier zone than a precise delineated line on a map (Winichakul, 1995). One can discuss 
the contrast between the Court of Siam’s previous unfamiliarity with borders and 
Thailand’s current position in its border dispute with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear 
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temple, but the idea of the frontier zone does explain why Siem Reap (and Angkor Wat) 
is often still considered to belong the area of influence of Thailand (Siam). 
 
As British forces penetrated the headwaters of the Salween River it became necessary to 
make a decision on the Shan States of Burma, which were by the end of the 19
th
 century 
almost a frontier between the British and French spheres of interest. After years of 
diplomatic activity regarding a possible boundary in the Mekong River itself, on 15 
January 1896 a common boundary was decided along the Mekong between current-day 
Burma and Laos. After France had gained control of the east bank of the Mekong River, 
France negotiated with China over northern boundaries of Indochina. The New York 
Times Archive provides an article from 22 July 1893 about the British and the French in 





The eastern boundary of Thailand, which extends for 1600 miles from the Gulf of 
Thailand to the upper reaches of the Mekong River, had its historical starting point in 
1862. In that year, France secured a foothold at the mouth of the Mekong in the delta 
region when Annam ceded the provinces of Bein Hao, Gia Donh and My Tho. At the 
same time, Annam renounced any claims over Cambodia. Judging that France had 
inherited Annam’s rights in Cambodia, French officials signed a treaty with the 
Cambodian ruler which provided for French protection of that state in return for France 
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being given exclusive influence over Cambodia’s foreign relations. Because Emperor 
Napoleon III delayed ratification of this secret treaty, the Cambodian ruler hastened to 
sign a treaty with Siam which stated that she was a tributary state of Siam’s. This treaty 
was ratified in 1864 (Prescott, 1987: 234). When France eventually ratified the secret 
treaty in April 1864, Cambodia was in a position of having two conflicting treaties with 
its powerful neighbours, a form of shifting diplomacy. Eventually, France and Siam 
attempted to resolve matters through the signing of another treaty which recognized 
France’s protection and which ceded the Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Siem 
Reap to Siam. The treaty made provisions for a boundary delineation, however, this was 
only partially achieved in the vicinity of the Tonle Sap or Great Lake. In July 1870, a 
treaty giving people from both sides, Siamese and Khmer, equal fishing rights in the 
Tonle Sap and identifying rivers in Battambang and Siem Reap for marking boundaries, 
indicates the territorial confusion of the time.  
 
A map drawn in 1888 by James McCarthy, a British surveyor and cartographer who 
worked for a while in the service of Siam, showed different versions of the Franco-Siam 
boundary and a large area of dispute between the two powers of about 4,800 square 
miles. Three main physical features stand out on the McCarthy map – the Mekong River, 
the Dangrek Mountains and the Cardamom Mountains. There is not much evidence that 
the French officials set themselves the target of establishing the western limits of 
Indochina along watersheds in these two mountain ranges, but if that was the case it 
would not have been so unusual for the concept of les limites naturelles (natural 
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boundaries) flourished in France to a greater extent than in other European states 
(Prescott, 1987: 235).  
 
The fragmented political structure of Laos allowed France to annex individual chiefdoms 
on a piecemeal basis as opportunities arose. British colonial authorities kept on 
monitoring French territorial expansions towards the Mekong River (United Kingdom, 
Foreign Office, 1895-96). Meanwhile, to the south, French forces acted after France 
accused Siam of aggression against Annam in February 1893. After a period of French 
military and diplomatic pressure, Siam eventually signed a new peace treaty on 3 October 
1893 (Prescott, 1987: 236), which ceded territory east of the Mekong to France. Siam 
was not allowed to have naval vessels on the Mekong River or the Tonle Sap, and Siam 
also agreed to have no military posts in Battambang and Siem Reap. France was 
guaranteed depots of coal and wood which she may require along the west bank of the 
Mekong River.   
 
On March 23, 1907, another treaty was signed which provided for an exchange of 
territory and a final boundary agreement. Siam gained a small area in the north at the 
head of the Nam Huang Valley, a large area around Trat on the Gulf including the islands 
of Koh Chang and Koh Kut. France gained complete control over Battambang and Siem 
Reap. A Joint Boundary Commission decided the number of boundary points and 
demarcated the boundary by June 1908. Subsequent efforts by the Japanese occupiers 
during World War II to alter the boundary in favour of Thailand failed.  
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It is important to recognize the arbitrariness of geopolitical space created by numerous 
treaties, and that many of the boundaries of the Mekong Region were the result of 
warfare, geopolitical rivalry, particular historical circumstances and even more specific 
treaties.  At best, boundaries involve indigenous polities in often unequal treaties with 
colonial powers, but several boundaries were ‘internal’ ones of French Indochina. It helps 
to keep in mind the temporal dimension of the Mekong Region’s political map and to 
understand that many formerly fairly autonomous polities, a great many places, and large 
numbers of people from a wide variety of ethnic communities were not consulted or 
represented in boundary-making processes. As Thongchai (Winichakul, 1995: 94) puts it: 
‘The pre-modern polity with its conception and practice of territory and sovereignty 
became the loser. The modern polity was established as the new legitimate mode of 
interstate relations, not only for the Westerners but also for the indigenous elite.’ 
 
4.3 Boundary clashes between Cambodia and Vietnam 
 
Given the specific historical context and ad hoc delimitations of many boundaries, it is 
not surprising to see the emergence of post-colonial positional and territorial disputes. 
The main one between Cambodia and Vietnam relates to the Kampuchea Krom in the 
Mekong Delta of southern Vietnam, as well as historic waters disagreements in the Gulf 
and the disputed island of Koh Tral.  
 
Khmer rule over the Khmer Krom lands dates back centuries. A Khmer Constitution, 
known as “Kram Srok”, promulgated in 1615 (Grand Era 1693) under His Majesty Chey 
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Cheystha Reamea Eysaur clearly lists Khmer Krom provinces and their governors and 
titles. A French official cartographer in documenting the region in a map dated 1686, 
designated the delta territories and Koh Trol as parts of the Kingdom. British 
cartographer, John Crawfurd, did the same in 1828. In an internal British official 
memorandum (1778) sent to Governor-General Hastings, Charles Chapman, a British 
envoy to Cochin China, rightly advised Hastings that ‘Donai … is properly a province of 
Cambodia.’ When the French arrived in the late 19th century, Cambodia’s front-line was 
at the Vinh Te Canal, and the delta region up to Dong Nai province still appeared on 
Southeast Asian maps as part of Cambodia.  
 
Cambodia has never renounced historical claims to the Khmer Krom territories or to Koh 
Tral. For instance, a few months before France landed in Saigon, King Ang Duong sent a 
letter to Emperor Napoleon III on 25 November 1856, stating that Khmer lands had been 
seized: ‘those of Saigon, Long-Ho, Psarded, Mi-Tho, Pra-Trepang, Ongmor, Bassac, 
Moatchruk, Cramoun-Sa, Tiec Khmau, Pean [Hatien], and the islands of Koh Trol and 
Trelach [Puolo Condore]. If by chance, the Annamese [Vietnamese] would offer any of 
these lands to Your Majesty, I beg him not to accept them, for they belong to Cambodia. I 
beg Your Majesty to have compassion for me and my people so that we may see an end 
to our loss rather than suffocate in this narrow kingdom.’ (Martin, 1994: 30) In February 
1859, King Duong attempted to retake the territories by force, but his troops were 
defeated.  Almost 100 years later, King Duong’s great-great-grandson, King Norodom 
Sihanouk continued to make claims to the Khmer Krom territories. Following 
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Cambodia’s independence, there were various memoranda sent to Vietnam to claim the 
territories, but these did not lead to any ceding of territory back to Cambodia.  
 
During the period of Khmer Rouge control in Cambodia during the late 1970s there were 
violent border skirmishes and frequent conflicts over the position of both the terrestrial 
and maritime boundary, with frequent Khmer Rouge claims that land had been stolen by 
the Vietnamese. Such events, perhaps more than the civil strife and genocidal events in 
Cambodia, were very influential in prompting Vietnam to send in troops to clear out the 
Khmer Rouge in December 1978. Subsequently, the Vietnamese sponsored Heng Samrin 
/ Hun Sen regime in Cambodia signed treaties in 1983 and 1985 which gave all the 
disputed territories to Vietnam. The so-called Historical Waters Treaty of 1982, signed by 
Hun Sen and Nguyen Co Thach, gave to Vietnam a large zone of territorial waters off 
Cambodia’s coast.  
 
4.4 Ratanakiri as a Khmer Rouge base 
 
The leaders of the Khmer Rouge were considered more nationalist than communist (since 
they started to incorporate Khmer nationalism into their ideology as well as anti-
intellectualism and by their persecution of non-Khmer ethnic groups) and therefore less 
of a danger to the government in the early 1960’s. Prince Sihanouk began to purge young 
opposition leaders during the mid-1960s. By 1967 all the prominent figures of the Khmer 
Rouge had abandoned the capital for the jungle and a war of resistance, mostly locating 
to Ratanakiri in Northeast Cambodia. Few people knew anything about the Khmer Rouge 
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and they themselves promoted their illusionary image by exercising their power behind a 
united front army in the countryside, and via a government-in-exile (following the Lon 
Nol coup) based in Beijing from 1970, and theoretically headed by Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk who had started the witch hunt against them back in 1963. What appeared as a 
weakness – the communists’ inability to claim straightforwardly why they were using 
Sihanouk as their movement’s figurehead – proved a master strategy (Becker: 1986:3) 
clouded in secrecy since the communists could hide their real intentions behind the 
prince, and later king, and get the support of all his supporters.   
 
The borderland jungles of Ratanakiri were ideal for guerrilla bases. The terrain was 
nearly impassable and the thick malaria-infested jungles were feared by the people of the 
plains and considered very hostile by the Khmers from the city.  Life in the hills had 
changed little since the famous French naturalist Henri Mouhout first explored the region 
100 years earlier, but even in the 1970’s periphery of Cambodia it was seen as a ‘wild 
frontier’ inhabited by natives and not being part of the centre. In his diary he described 
the primitive almost prehistoric state of the hills: 
 
‘We are surrounded by forests, which are infested with elephants, buffaloes, rhinoceros, 
tigers and wild boars…..Scorpions, centipedes and, above all, serpents were the enemies 
the most dreaded and against which precautions were chiefly requisite, but the 
mosquitoes and the leeches, though less dangerous, were the most troublesome and most 
inveterate plagues. During the rainy season you cannot be too much on your guard, going 
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to bed or getting up, you are ever in the peril of putting hand or foot in some venomous 
snake…’ (Mouhout, 2000:183-4).  
 
Typical of other colonial explorers, scientists and officials, (Mouhout, 2000: 185) creates 
a somewhat romanticized notion of ‘noble savages’ of the Khmer Leou and other 
indigenous folks he came across, but at the same time comments on the relative political 
autonomy they still enjoyed at the time. He writes: ‘The most perfect equality and 
fraternity reigns in these little (tribal) communities….Quite alone and independent amidst 
their forests, they scarcely recognize any authority but that of the chief of the village. 
(The Cambodian King’s) emissaries scarcely dares pass the limits of the kingdom, so 
fearful are they of the arrows of the savages and fevers which reign in their forests.’  
 
At the end of the 1960s, with the American War in Vietnam raging across the border, 
Khmer Rouge cadres depended on the goodwill of the various hill people, and for once, 
these allies responded generously, never betraying them, guiding them through the forests 
and protecting them from Sihanouk’s attacks on their headquarters. By January 1968, the 
communists launched their first “dry-season offensive” with ten guns to protect their 
leader Saloth Sar (later know as Pol Pot) and other central committee members, including 
Ieng Sary and Son Sen. By the end of the 1960s, many borderland locations were already 
being bombed by B-52s and other aircraft as the war in Vietnam was deliberately brought 
to Cambodia.   
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The Khmer Rouge used the three years to build up their army from 15,000 to 40,000 
soldiers. They captured weapons, bought medicine, gasoline and other necessities from 
corrupt officers and merchants on the Lon Nol side. They paid for many of these supplies 
with hard currency they earned in a semi-official rubber selling arrangement with the 
Phnom Penh government itself. The Khmer Rouge had won control over the rubber 
plantations in Ratanakiri at the start of the war. The former French owners and overseers 
of the plantations brokered a deal with Phnom Penh and the rebels whereby the rubber 
latex was “sold” to Phnom Penh, where it was processed and then sold on the world 
market with the profits shared more or less equally between both of the warring factions. 
The French built new processing plants in Phnom Penh and kept them operating for 
twenty-four hours a day, the only enterprise that earned hard currency during the war. In 
the last two years, when Phnom Penh had to import virtually all its needs, rubber brought 
in at least 10 million USD a year. Also the Khmer Rouge took advantage of the greed of 
Lon Nol government officials (including military officers) and merchants who sold the 
Khmer Rouge arms and ammunition.  
 
Despite the strength of the North Vietnamese army close to the border of Ratanakiri, the 
Khmer Rouge congratulated themselves for their self-reliance and independence. In 1971, 
the Khmer Rouge began a “purification” programme by first attacking Vietnamese 
nationals living in their areas of eastern Cambodia, disarming them, arresting some and 




By 1973, the Khmer Rouge fought on all Cambodian fronts. They adopted the 
Vietnamese communist strategy and stayed as close as possible to Lon Nol’s soldiers 
during the American B-52 bombing campaign to avoid being targeted. The Khmer Rouge 
mounted a three-sided attack on Phnom Penh the same year and only heavy US 
bombardments saved Lon Nol’s soldiers from heavy defeat. By April 1973, the Khmer 
Rouge was within artillery and mortar range of the capital, prompting the first major 
evacuation of foreigners from Phnom Penh. Gas and electricity began to be rationed in 
the capital, with frequent Khmer Rouge attacks on the Mekong River, particularly on 
convoys that supplied Phnom Penh. On December 3 1974, the Khmer Rouge warned over 
the radio: “If the Lower Mekong is ever blocked, the clique (in Phnom Penh) would be 
choked to death”. On April 16, after having taken over Phnom Penh, the years of the 
“ultimate revolution” began. It was also the beginning of almost twenty years of relative 
isolation from Mekong River collaboration (see below). (Kiernan, 2004). 
 
Whilst this section cannot do justice to the complex geopolitical history of Ratanakiri and 
other border provinces during the Cold War, it does reveal three related stories: first, that 
the indigenous peoples were found to be ‘geopolitically’ useful in guerrilla war situations 
whereby frontier zones were being utilized. This is very much a theme of (Lim Joo-
Jock’s, 1984) book concerning ‘territorial power domains’ in mainland Southeast Asia. 
Second, lowland authorities perceived the frontiers as ‘wild’ and presumably the 
inhabitants too. Third, as soon as the ‘minority’ populations and peripherally located 
power domains become less significant in the broader geopolitical game, then they are 
 93 




4.5 Mekong Committee and Cold War geopolitics 
 
 
From the 1950’s until the late 1980’s the politics of the Mekong Basin were governed 
heavily by the Cold War. The United States was already interested in geo-strategically 
and geo-economically blocking the advance of Communism in Southeast Asia, when it 
became interested in influencing hydro-developments along the Mekong River in the 
1950s. A report by the US Bureau of Reclamation in 1956 highlighted the Mekong River 
as a potential site for engineering works similar to those of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) in the US during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The United 
Nations was also interested in developing the Mekong’s hydropower potential. In 1957, 
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) produced a report calling 
for large mainstream dams and water flow regulation. Soon afterwards, the Mekong 
Committee was established, with four riparian member states (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, 
and South Vietnam). Burma refused to join, and the People’s Republic of China was not 
even a member of the United Nations at that time. The US became a ‘determined’ 
influence on the Committee, as a major aid donor, supplier of technical assistance, and an 
American became the administrative head (Chomchai, 1987; Osborne, 2001). ECAFE’s 
Bureau of Flood Control and the Mekong Secretariat, based in Bangkok, started to 
develop ambitious plans for hydropower, flood control, water regulation, irrigation and 
navigation (Jacobs, 2002: 356). By the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, Thailand, the 
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HQ of the Mekong Committee, was crawling with American advisors, including 
hydropower specialists and experts from the US Bureau of Reclamation.  
 
During the early years of the Mekong Committee a number of reports were very 
influential, including one by a senior retired officer of the US Army Corps of Engineers, 
Lieutenant-General Raymond A. Wheeler, which recommended the collection of a lot of 
technical data in advance of hydropower dam development, and his report called for 
investments of US $9.2 million (Mekong Secretariat, 1989). Mekong historian, Milton 
Osborne, has observed that the enthusiasm for large-scale hydro-developments in the 
Mekong was not purely Cold War thinking, because at this time, hydropower was viewed 
very positively. As (Osborne, 2001: 192-3) notes: ‘This was a time when big dams were 
seen as a good in themselves on all sides of the global ideological divide”. Observing the 
work of the Australian engineers who began work in Cambodia in 1960 and 1961, in 
relation to the Sambor site (a hydro-dam project), I readily admit that I shared with them 
the expectation that this was a job worth doing.’  Geographer Gilbert White headed a 
small team that made 14 specific recommendations concerning human development, 
hydropower, basin resources, economic issues, flood control, and agricultural 
improvements (White et.al., 1962). As with other reports, numerous potential sites for 
hydro-electric power were enthusiastically discussed (Jacobs, 2002: 357).  
 
The early hydro plans of the Mekong Committee were soon to be displaced by hot war in 
the Mekong region. During the 1960s a ‘secret war’ in Laos accompanied the American 
war effort in Vietnam, and increasingly Cambodia, as the decade wore on. By 1965, the 
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Johnson Administration attempted to make Mekong development a central component of 
an effort to persuade the North Vietnamese into cooperation. In a speech at Johns 
Hopkins University on 7 April 1965, President Johnson stated: ‘We would hope that 
North Vietnam will take its place in the common effort … The vast Mekong River can 
provide food and water on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA (Tennessee Valley 
Authority – a federal US corporation to provide navigation, flood control, electricity 
generation and economic development in the Tennessee Valley) (US President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1965, in Raskin and Fall, 1965: 346). Eventually, warfare put large parts of the 
Mekong Basin and numerous projects off-limits (Jacobs, 2002: 357), which left the 
Mekong Committee, according to (Osborne, 2001: 195) ‘a shell of an organization’. 
However, the Mekong Secretariat continued to make studies of water flow, water quality, 
hydraulic modelling, and provide technical advice. And at the height of the warfare, the 
Mekong Committee issued a 1970 Indicative Basin Plan with 17 proposed mainstream 
hydro-dams, and even as battles waged, the Laos Nam Ngum Dam was completed in 
1971. 
  
According to (Jeff Jacobs, 2002: 358): ‘The enthusiasm for cooperation on Mekong 
development, long referred to as ‘The Mekong Spirit’, carried the Committee through the 
war and was to help them through an extended period without Cambodia’s participation.’ 
Another interpretation is that the ‘Mekong Spirit’ is another geographical imaginary 
conjured by proponents of hydropower, including state representatives, donors, 
consultants and members of the Secretariat, but it has little to tell us about the multiple 
places, localities and people who would be adversely affected by the costs of such 
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projects. Also, in the context of the Second Indochina War, the idea of a ‘Mekong Spirit’ 
was like seeing the Mekong through rose-tinted spectacles viewing a corpse of virtual 
cooperation.   By the mid-1970s, the disastrous Khmer Rouge years had begun in 
Cambodia (following a devastating period of civil conflict exacerbated by the US 
bombing campaigns (Kiernan, 1986), which eventually meant the loss of a member for 
the Committee. From January 1978 the ‘Interim’ Mekong Committee continued to 
provide various kinds of hydrological data, and field studies continued in areas that were 
relatively conflict free, although the ability of the organization to implement hydropower 
projects remained severely constrained by ongoing warfare, insecurity and inter-state 
mistrust.  
  
The 1991 Paris Peace Accords signalled an end to full-scale conflict in Cambodia and 
even though insurgency by the Khmer Rouge, banditry by other groups and poor 
discipline within the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces continued, it did so without 
support of other regional players. ASEAN expanded regional membership into the former 
‘battlefields’ of Indochina, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) promoted various 
ambitious regional infrastructure and integration projects under the geographically-
enticing banner of ‘the Greater Mekong Sub-region’ (GMS) which also included 
Myanmar and China. As the over-riding geopolitical tensions disappeared it became 
possible to consider large-scale development of the Mekong and its water resources, 
something which was previously touted by American advisors, but was now viewed as 
desirable by leading politicians in the region opening their economies to inward 
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investments and neo-liberal market forces, with backing from overseas donors, corporate 
partners, and the resurgent influence of the ADB. 
 
With the end of the Cold War, the good ghost of Mekong Past was evoked once more in 
the form of a thriving ‘Mekong Spirit’. As Prachoom Chomchai writes in (Blake et 
al.,1995: 259): “With long years of cooperation, a Mekong spirit has evolved”. This 
positive ‘Mekong Spirit’ was often mentioned when I was an intern with the Mekong 
Secretariat. It is the Spirit which helps carry on the long-term cooperation in spite of 
hardships and geopolitical difference, but one could also argue that the cooperation is 
mostly or even sometimes only confined to this Spirit, meaning that it is easy enough to 
sit down and talk in a friendly atmosphere and share donor money, but much harder to 
agree on big projects that have major trans-boundary impacts, such as the Yali Falls Dam 
(see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). As researcher Ian Baird notes, this ‘Mekong Spirit’ has not yet 
reached the villages along the Se San River in North-East Cambodia: ‘The present 
situation along the Se San River is critical. Villagers, including a large number of 
indigenous peoples from various ethnic groups, are suffering from hydrological changes 
caused by the Yali Falls dam in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, and ecological and 
social systems in the Se San River Basin have apparently already been seriously impacted 
by the project’ (Baird, 1999: 28). 
 
4.6 Regional ‘resource geopolitics’ and hydropower markets 
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On April 5, 1995 an important Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin was signed in Chiang Rai by Thailand, Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Lao PDR, opening the way for a resumption of cooperation between the 
riparian states. Thailand’s Prime Minister, Chuan Leekpai, presided over the signing 
ceremony. Dr Nay Htun of Burma, who was then the regional representative of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), hailed the agreement as an 
achievement which ‘captures the new political environment in Southeast Asia in an era of 
new development opportunities and thinking’ (Watershed, July 1995: 24). The first issue 
of Watershed magazine produced by the organization Towards Ecological Recovery and 
Regional Alliance (TERRA), with a distinctly pro-non-governmental stance on the 
politics of the environment in the region, reported on the beginnings of a parallel process 
to the state-centered initiative, involving various parties, ‘journalists, environmental and 
rural development groups, academics, students, and farmers from villages opposed to 
large-scale diversion projects in the north and north-eastern Thailand, where rivers flow 
into the Mekong’ (Watershed, July 1995: 24). TERRA’s argument was that the so-called 
“New Era” of Mekong politics was also carrying with it the ‘same old plans’ for massive 
hydropower expansion, water diversions, and other large-scale projects that could 
adversely affect many riparian community livelihoods, environment and food security 
(See Chapter 6).   
 
The overall effect of former Cold War generated geopolitical tensions in the Mekong 
Basin had been numerous Mekong Committee plans for hydro-power potential, but 
relatively limited actual hydropower development, as well as relatively fragmented 
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environmental resource collaboration across international borders. Nevertheless, 
resources were definitely being extracted during the Cold War, helping to fuel 
insurgencies, support guerrilla battles, bolster communist resistance, and maintain 
‘peripheral power domains’ (Le Billon, 2002; Lim, 1984). However, the Mekong River 
was, in many parts of its course, a geopolitical frontier, which meant that mainstream 
river development was largely unfeasible.  
 
As (Hirsch, 2000) has observed, the 1990s witnessed a ‘convergence of mainstream 
development models’ (such as doi moi in Vietnam, chintanakan mai  in Laos, and the 
United Nations Transitional Authority or UNTAC / international community influenced 
(re)opening of Cambodia). Furthermore, Thailand sought to exploit cross-border timber, 
water and gas resources as part of a geo-strategic vision of the country’s pivotal role 
within a growing ‘regional resource economy’ (Hirsch, 1995; 2000), whilst China was 
becoming a major trading partner and investor with numerous Southeast Asian 
neighbours. Thus, an era of relative peace, more permeable borders to trade and 
investment, and increasing commercialization of resource bases, has opened up many 
possibilities for hydropower, irrigation and navigation projects on both tributaries and the 
mainstream.  Thus, the Mekong River is now much more open to alteration in water 
flows, hydrology, and ecological characteristics than it was in the previous decades. Once 
again, border zones are targets of lowland power interest, and as we shall discuss in the 
chapters that follow, the Se San watershed has become a complex battleground of 
resource politics, involving issues of national sovereignty, multi-scale and multi-sector 
hydro-politics, and cultural politics of environmental and livelihood security.   
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Trans-border hydropolitics is very complex in the Mekong Region. It is not simply a 
question of upstream – downstream ‘politics of position’, nor is it simply old geopolitical 
cross-border tensions that are important. It is important to recognize that whilst Vietnam 
already has considerable hydropower capabilities, Cambodia is definitely considering its 
own hydropower potential. The discourse of hydropower(ed) ‘development’ is powerful 
in the Mekong Basin, especially with more and more projects coming on stream, and with 
an expanding cross-border grid of transmission lines creating a genuine regional 
electricity market.   
 
Hitherto, the sole operating hydropower station in Cambodia has been the Ochum power 
station. The decade-old 1MW plant was designed to cater to the electricity needs of 
Ratanakiri. However, according to the Cambodian Ministry of Industry, Mines and 
Energy (MIME), the country’s hydropower potential could reach one-sixth of that of the 
Mekong River in its entirety. MIME believes that half of Cambodia’s hydropower 
potential of 10,000 MW can be generated ‘on the Mekong mainstream, 40 per cent on the 
tributaries and 10 per cent outside the Mekong Basin.’ The government has located about 
40 potential sites for hydropower development. It is also seeking international financial 
assistance to harness this, however at present the demand is not backed by the economic 
growth needed in a country to back large infrastructure investments. An option is 
financing by development banks or agencies provided the Cambodian government can or 
is willing to participate in the financing. 
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Economic growth and industrialization has pushed Vietnam’s demand for electricity up, 
at an average annual rate of 14-15 per cent in the past few years. The demand is project to 
grow yearly at 13-15 per cent to year 2010. By then, the government estimates, around 
70-80 billion kilowatts of power will be needed. Thereafter the demand is expected to 
reach between 160 and 200 billion in 2020. To meet the country’s rising energy need, the 
Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) will have to add 600-800 MW of power capacity to the 
national grid annually. As a subsidiary of the Ministry of Industry, the EVN assumes the 
important role of the country’s only electrical energy provider. Plans are underway for 37 
power plants to be completed by 2020 to meet the country’s expanding energy demand. 
These projects total USD 19.1 billion and are largely funded by foreign loans and bonds. 
EVN has committed itself to pay about 30 per cent of the investments. Meanwhile, 
Vietnam has signed an agreement with the Lao PDR to purchase about 1,000 MW of 
electricity annually between 2006 and 2010 and up to 2,000 MW annually in the 
following period. Hydropower energy constitutes 64 per cent of Vietnam’s electric 
supply, but limited capacities and the annual dry season pose problems for energy 
production. Thus, there are plans to expand capacity still further, including more plants in 
the Central Highlands.  
 
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 we shall discuss the dilemma faced by riparian communities who 
continue to face most of the direct social, economic and environmental costs of 
hydropower, but who are not the main recipients of any benefits in increased power 
output. Clearly, one major issue is the fact that hydropower planning processes are geared 
towards global players, consultant firms, plant builders and operators, as well as 
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increasingly regional markets, and are often protected as strongly ‘national interests’. It is 
the multi-scalar and multi-sector geopolitics of hydropower that will be a main focus of 
the thesis. However, we should also note that watersheds do not only contain rivers, and 
resource geopolitics also relates to terrestrial environments which should be considered 
as integral parts of the complex life of the river basins.   
 
4.7 Geopolitics, ‘resource frontiers’ and indigenous peoples 
 
 
The creation of boundaries and national spaces has had immense implications in terms of 
‘the politics of place’, ‘scale’ and ‘position’. People who belong to a certain area 
culturally or otherwise and have their livelihood in a specific area can be considered 
‘indigenous’ to the area, yet due to the placement of geopolitical boundaries, these people 
become ‘resident strangers’ within the nation-states they reside within (Grundy-Warr, 
1998; McVey, 1984).  
 
The conventional definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ by governments as well as by large 
multi- and international development agencies is a non-dominant group of people with a 
shared history, language and culture residing in a common geographical area. Indigenous 
people are defined as non-state people (people who do not belong to the large populations 
groups of a country and sometimes even do not have the right to carry a passport of the 
nation state they live in) not participating in an industrial mode of production and are thus 
vulnerable in relation to modernization and the state (Eriksen, 1993: 125). Some would 
argue that, in practice, the unwritten but guiding definition for developer perceptions and 
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actions towards indigenous people is: primitive, backward, less civilized people, who 
must be ‘modernized’ and ‘integrated’ into the national socio-economy and the state on 
the terms of the state and the majority population. Indeed, governments and large 
development organizations alike either strongly oppose, or are reluctant to employ the 
term ‘indigenous people’, probably due to the connotations of ‘original’ rights 
(McCaskill & Kampe, 1997: 4).  
 
In Cambodia indigenous peoples are often referred to as ‘ethnic minorities’. In Laos they 
are variously called ‘tribal people’ or ethnic groups and administratively put into either of 
these depending on their geographical location, upland Lao or highland Lao. In Thailand 
indigenous peoples are considered to be ‘hill tribes’. Whilst there are other 
indigenous/ethnic minority groups, especially in the southern provinces and those 
bordering Cambodia in the East of the country, they are all generally speaking excluded 
from official recognition as indigenous peoples, probably due to political considerations. 
In Vietnam, indigenous peoples are often called ‘nationalities’ to give them a measure of 
status as well as recognition of their individuality, albeit many have often been treated as 
second-class citizens. On the whole, the socio-economic status of the indigenous people 
is significantly lower than the majority Kinh (Vietnamese) population, due both to their 
more remote location and a tendency to favour the Kinh (despite the fact that minority 
rights and privileges are guaranteed by the 1992 constitution). Furthermore, there is much 
evidence that state officials often scapegoat highlanders for watershed destruction 
(McElwee, 1999; Sowerwine, 2004; To Xuan Phuc, 2007; 2008), which has also 
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provided further reasons to relocate indigenous groups to make way for ‘national priority’ 
projects, such as hydropower dams.  
 
Territorialization and resource politics  
 
In this section, I would like to briefly highlight a ‘double whammy’ (Hirsch & Wyatt, 
2004: 52) scenario for the people of the Se San watershed and similar trans-border river 
basins where the majority of people belong to different indigenous groups. This relates to 
the increasing pressures these indigenous people are facing towards their livelihood and 
food security, not simply as a result of mega-projects, but also in relation to the complex 
processes of territorializing resources, claiming land, allocating concessions, and denying 
access to local people. Most of this thesis concerns hydropower, which directly turns 
rivers into power-generating commodities, but is also symbolic of expanding state 
territoriality in peripheral rural areas as important dams and reservoirs become under the 
control of state electricity and partner agencies. As (Bakker, 1999: 212) argued, ‘enabling 
this expanding territorialization of state power is a web of discursive strategies, 
simultaneously producing and policing boundaries.’ However, territoriality as a ‘strategy 
of control’ is frequently also a cause of dispossession for other groups, whether it is 
people becoming totally dispossessed of land and rights to utilize particular resources, or 
it is a partial loss of control, such as the problems of fisheries along dammed rivers. If we 
consider that losing parcels of land and access rights to forests is happening at a time of 
numerous reported negative impacts due to trans-border dam construction then we can 
see that riparian communities reliant upon both river and forests for their livelihoods may 
be facing considerable crisis.  
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During one of my research visits to Ratanakiri province I met with Gordon Paterson, who 
had been working with the Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) NGO, particularly on 
projects to help village peoples maintain land rights and customary practices in areas of 
forest. Gordon was particularly passionate about the notion that the province had since 
the mid-1990s become a sort of ‘resource frontier’ on the edge of becoming much more 
materialistic and commercialized due to a surge of interest in opening up the province 
with new roads, increasing cross-border trade with Vietnam and Laos, land-grabbing, 
illegal timber trade, and the spread of cash crops. Whilst NTFP has been very active in 
trying to get user boundaries and indigenous resource rights officially accepted, there are 
many stories of state officials, military personnel, and corporate cronies becoming the 
key beneficiaries of speculative and corrupt land-grabbing activities (Global Witness, 
May 2000).   
 
The Royal Government of Cambodia claimed that following a Hun Sen 17 Point 
Declaration in January 1999 and a subsequent timber moratorium in January 2002, illegal 
logging had been virtually eliminated and that only small-scale forest crimes are taking 
place. However, as detailed reporting by Global Witness has shown, utilizing field 
investigations, photographic evidence, including aerial photos, detailed maps, and citing 
precise incidents supported by global positioning, there have been many illegal logging 
actions throughout Cambodia. It is also clear that the concessionaires and illegal loggers 
have become more skilled in concealing their crimes. Many protected areas have become 
accessible in the last few years, with numerous roads being built by the Royal Cambodian 
Armed Forces and private entrepreneurs.  
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In Ratanakiri, encroachment, conversion of forest land, poaching, logging and other 
potentially unsustainable resource extraction activities are all made possible with this 
construction of large roads, corruption and the almost complete absence of enforcement 
or willingness to enforce laws. The biggest obstacle for sound forest management in 
Cambodia remains the flawed concession system, which, with its political backing from 
the highest levels, continues to fuel the system of corruption, secrecy and fear that 
hampers progress in the sector. According to Global Witness, illegal logging in each 
Military Region of Cambodia, including wildlife sanctuaries, is an aspect of 
‘institutionalized corruption’ that has even penetrated the offices of the Forest Crime 
Monitoring Unit (FCMU) and Department of Forestry and Wildlife (DFW) whereby 
illegal actions are often ‘legitimized’ by ‘locally issued permits’ (Global Witness, May 
2000; July 2002; November 2004). In Ratanakiri, indigenous groups face intimidation 
and pressure from colluding partners in timber extraction, sometimes including officials, 
businessmen and the military. As (Colm, 2000) has argued, it is necessary to consider 
how rural communities and indigenous groups can defend culturally significant rights and 
continue to play a role in resource management, whether it is ‘commons’ or forms of 
‘collaborative stewardship.’   
 
A critical aspect of resource geopolitics relates to the manner in which environmental 
resources have not only become incorporated into the territories of states, but have 
subsequently been subject to a whole range of new ‘territorial’ claims, representations, 
and practices. This is particularly so with forests, which have been further sub-divided 
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them into national parks, conservation zones, concession areas, reserves, watershed 
zones, and so on (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; McElwee, 1999; To Xuan Phuc, 2008).  
Such territorial attempts to control large forest zones has often been coupled with military 
power, which seems great in remote areas where civic society and local leaders often do 
not carry enough weight to enforce traditional land practices, local forms of community 
ownership, and indigenous rights. And in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere (Escobar, 1998), 
the defence of forms of customary rights to land, to non-timber forest products, to areas 
of traditional rights to fish, hunt or gather, and the politics of multiple forms of 
community control or stewardship, have tended to become ‘territorial’ (Peluso, 2005a: 8). 
Going beyond the ‘blame game’ of thinking through the causes of environmental 
destruction involving many different communities in rural society, it is important for us 
to consider the complex cultural politics of protecting degrees of indigenous resource 
sovereignty, food security, and bundles of rights, often in the face of rapid exploitation 
and competition from different stakeholders (see Chapter 6).  
 
The next chapter returns to a key dimension of water governance politics in the region, 
and that is the Mekong River Commission in the current era of relatively porous and 






























5. The MRC negotiating the obstacles of political sovereignty 
and trans-border politics 
 
The Mekong River Commission, which addresses water utilization and water sharing 
issues relating to the Mekong River, has as its members the four downstream countries of 
Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam, while the two upstream countries China and 
Myanmar (Burma) are not members but they have become observers with the 
Commission. The MRC is a highly intricate regime which has attracted considerable 
attention from researchers across disciplines (AMRC, 2008; Backer, 2006; Bakker, 1999; 
Browder & Ortolano, 2000; Hirsch, 2007; Hirsch, 2006 a, b; Jacobs, 1995, 2002; Dore, 
2003; Ratner, 2003). As noted earlier, the Mekong River main-stream and tributaries 
have managed to remain relatively free of major hydro-developments in spite of the 
ambitious plans for such by the pre-MRC institution, the Mekong Committee. However, 
since the 1995 Lower Mekong Agreement  
(see: http://www.mrcmekong.org/agreement_95/agreement_95.htm) and a period of 
relative peace after the wars in the region there has been a growing emphasis on mega-
projects with significant environmental, social and economic impacts, both on the 
tributaries and along the mainstream. 
 
So far the MRC has been somewhat constrained as a mechanism to advise on policy 
matters see (Backer, 2006), and the body has not been able to influence actions along the 
entire length of the river (especially the Lancang portion in Yunnan), and along many of 
the tributaries and associated wetlands as expected by most of the MRC donors. Part of 
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the problem lies in the MRC’s somewhat limited mandate for ‘tributaries’ of the River 
and the latitude for unilateralism in the ‘observer’ status upstream states. Furthermore, 
the member states do not really consider the MRC as a policy-influencing institution. 
Indeed there are numerous strong criticisms of the MRC, covering its lack of real policy-
making and policy-influencing ‘teeth’ (Dore, 2003; Lebel et.al., 2005) in tackling 
upstream-downstream issues or having ‘blunt regulatory teeth’ (Hirsch, 2006a: 193) and 
reservations concerning MRC actions and responses (or the lack of them) to a whole 
range of socio-environmental impacts associated with intra-state and inter-state 
externalities (Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004; Wyatt & Baird, 2007). After a very detailed report 
of the MRC’s regime ‘effectiveness’ by (Backer, 2006), using a theoretical model by 
(Underdal, 2002) based on detailed analysis of regime outputs, outcomes and impacts, the 
author concluded that the MRC is a largely ineffective but regionally necessary ‘White 
Elephant’. In this chapter, I wish to address these issues with particular reference to 
trans-border scale issues and problems. 
 
The MRC was reformed in 1995 putting the emphasis on sustainable development and 
equitable water usage, however as it is pointed out in (Straub, 2001:232), reforming the 
Commission itself is not enough. No matter how efficient the MRC Secretariat and 
National Committees become, they will not be able to carry out their mission if they are 
not given the political backing of the member states and the backing and the government 
agencies of the member countries. There is often a very fine balance between member 
state desires for cooperation and their own assessments of what is in the national interest. 
If the member countries of the MRC really choose to use the MRC and its mandate for 
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sustainable development and equitable water usage instead of bypassing it both at 
national and sub-regional levels (as Thailand often does, see below) the MRC may 
succeed in safeguarding the trans-boundary resources of the Mekong River: the 
environment, social and economic sustainability and equitable usage in line with the 
issues of environmental security and sustainable development. If the four countries of 
Lower Mekong can agree on these principles, the donors would likely give strong support 
for this and Myanmar and China might find it worthwhile joining the organization or at 
least in taking the MRC more seriously, otherwise the MRC is likely to lose its 
geopolitical and political significance. At the current time, political authority lies in the 
hands of each member state, using the MRC mostly as a scientific and data-generating 
body with inter-governmental support for certain capacity-building and data-sharing 
activities, but key water-use decisions are made by relevant ministries and departments of 
each member state.  
 
From a realist political perspective, emphasizing the role and centrality of states and state 
sovereignties, the MRC is somewhat hostage to a form of regional geopolitics that is in 
long-term recovery from decades of warfare and political mistrust, and states who 
strongly value the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-interference in ‘political’ 
affairs. In addition, within the Lower Mekong Basin there are pronounced asymmetries of 
geopolitical power if we consider that realist politics has dominated the last few decades 
in the Basin. For instance, the relative strength of Thailand, economically, militarily and 
politically in the region should be reckoned with. Since the end of the Cold War, 
Thailand has been committed to turning ‘battlefields into market-places’ (statement by 
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PM Chatichai Choonhavan in 1988), and there seems to be a strong notion of Thailand 
being the centre of a regional resource market (Hirsch, 1995). Also, Thailand has long 
considered Vietnam to be asserting its political influence into both Cambodia and Lao 
PDR, both during and post the Cold War (especially after the second Vietnam war, or the 
American war in Vietnam) in Indochina. And there is evidence to show that Thailand has 
actively sought to strengthen its control of parts of the Upper Mekong through its 
navigation and trade agreements with China.   
 
5.1 Politics of ‘scale’ and the role of MRC in trans-border water         
governance 
 
The issue of scale has received considerable attention in the political geography literature 
(Howitt, 2003), but here I would like to outline particular aspects of ‘scale’ as it is 
applied to notions of international river management and trans-boundary resource 
problems. One of the most important issues is that whilst international rivers incorporate 
multiple stakeholders and involve inherently complex, multi-scaled problems, they are 
often dealt with by institutions which are primarily dealing with these issues at an inter-
governmental level through institutions made up of representatives of the member states. 
Thus, trans-boundary issues are already seen to be primarily the responsibility of 
sovereign states, which is often a gross simplification of the realities. As (Hirsch, 2007: 
20) points out, water governance involves ‘complex accommodations, management, 
negotiation and conflict.’ Whilst certain sovereignty and border issues are best dealt with 
by states, many trans-border problems should be addressed at ‘societal level.’ This level 
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is not simply that of various ‘local’ communities, but rather a complex of multi-sector 
issues involving riparian communities and different non-state agencies and actors at 
various different cross-cutting scales. This occurs due to the way in which different 
community groups, non-governmental organizations and other concerned institutions are 
able to cooperate, collaborate and network across political space (Cox, 1998; Hirsch & 
Wyatt, 2004; 3SPN (Rivers Protection Network), August 2007).   
 
In the Mekong, state interests are often reflected in the strongly ‘developmental’ 
discourses that tend to dominate new projects along the tributaries and increasingly the 
mainstream of the river (Hirsch, 2007: 21). These are particularly relevant issues to the 
analysis of the MRC because of the MRC’s inter-governmental composition which has 
produced some tensions between international donors, riparian stakeholders and various 
issues of so-called ‘national interest’. With regard to the latter, (Hirsch, 2007: 22) 
suggests that “in the national interest” ‘is a discursive strategy often invoked to legitimize 
large infrastructure projects whose environmental and social consequences may in fact be 
quite disastrous.’ A similar argument has been advanced by (Woods, 2005), who 
highlights tensions between concerns over regional governance, national sovereignty, 
hydropower, navigation and other developmental projects on the one hand, and the costs 
of such transformations, including social upheavals and ecological destruction on the 
other. 
 
With specific reference to the MRC and trans-boundary governance, we should note 




5.1.1 MRC Governance Structure (MRC) 
 
The MRC comprises Ministerial Council, Joint Committee and Secretariat. The Council 
is essentially a political body that has particular ministerial representations from each 
riparian state. However, in tackling trans-border issues there are restrictions on the 
effectiveness of the Council dues to occasional clashes of perceived ‘national interest’ 
and due to the fact that the particular ministries involved in the Council may not always 
be primary movers and shakers within their respective state hierarchies. Furthermore, the 
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national components of the MRC called National Mekong Committees (NMCs) are 
similarly tied by government and ministry level priorities, and NMCs have limited 
connections at the relevant legislative and juridical levels of state authority (AMRC, 
2008). Also see http://www.mrcmekong.org/about_mrc.htm for full details about the 
structure of the MRC. 
 
 As the MRC has often been primarily regarded as a ‘technical’ and ‘scientific’ body 
providing data and advice, but not as a policy-making institution, other governmental 
priorities may affect water utilization decisions more than the MRC is able to. The MRC 
Council’s bureaucratic arm is called the Joint Committee which has permanent 
secretaries from the most relevant ministries of each country, which raises similar 
questions about its ability to truly tackle multi-sector problems from a trans-border 
perspective when conflicts of interest arise between sectors or between ministries and 
departments of the same government. Some scholars have raised additional questions 
about the MRC’s ability to break out of purely state-centered concerns and to consider a 
variety of civil society, non-governmental and multi-sector concerns such as water flow 
regulation, fisheries, farmers needing irrigation for fields, biodiversity issues. (Hirsch, 
2006 a; Woods, 2005).  
 
The MRC Secretariat has a more cosmopolitan make-up as it encompasses specialists 
from various donor countries, many foreign scientific and technical personnel, and Chief 
Executive Officers drawn from outside the region, as well as staff drawn equally from the 
four member states. However, the Secretariat is no way a supra-national entity for it has 
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been primarily devised as a body which services information for use at the inter-
governmental level. Furthermore, some authors have argued that the Secretariat’s 
‘impressive technical expertise’ has rarely been applied to the resolving of actual trans-
border conflicts and major socio-environmental conflicts (Dore, 2003; Hirsch, 2006 a; b; 
2007; Sneddon and Fox, 2006). According to (Hirsch, 2006 a: 198) ‘There is little sense 
of a political identity of the Commission that can set and enforce agendas based on basin-
wide interests that transcend national concerns.’ 
  
According to the MRC mandate, the Commission is not a regulatory instrument or 
authority. Nevertheless, what is significant is that the MRC has definitely facilitated a 
massive amount of research concerning trans-boundary environmental and social impact 
assessments (see for instance: 
http://www.mrcmekong.org/programmes/Hydropower/ECSHD.htm); a variety of issues 
relating to water sharing; and valuable scientific and ecological knowledge of the river 
and basin. Furthermore, the MRC has subscribed to many of the principles of integrated 
water resources management (IWRM) in its plans for ‘sustainable development’, 
although these principles may sometimes be given lower priority by the member states 
due to their ‘national interests’ (Hirsch, 2007). Even so, it is important to note that the 
MRC is a major institution that pulls together state members who were formerly at war 
with each other. (Bakker’s, 2006) conclusions were that it was perhaps better to have the 
MRC as a ‘white elephant’ and ‘paper tiger’ that is supported by the four Lower Mekong 
states and helps to promote peaceful collaboration, than have bitter rivalries over every 
project that involves externalities of some kind. Furthermore, there it is clear that the 
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MRC’s roles are not static over time and are definitely evolving. The MRC has to 
contend with other highly influential ‘regional’ programs, including those relating to the 
Asian Development Bank’s Greater Mekong Region (GMR) infrastructure initiatives 
which include China and Myanmar, as well as increasingly coordinated campaigns by 
various NGOs and community-based organizations working in loose but effective 
lobbying ‘networks’. Thus, there is scope to see the MRC evolving into a body that 
becomes a more effective trans-boundary resources management body that is able to 
incorporate multiple voices and sectors in its efforts to sustain the 1995 Agreement. The 
following sections shall examine various aspects of the MRC’s role and relationships 
within the Mekong basin. In particular I shall focus on geographical and political aspects 
that are particularly relevant to the MRC as a critical, if sometimes flawed, trans-
boundary resource regime.      
 
5.2 Political definitions of ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ limits to the MRC   
mandate 
 
The geographical scope of the MRC is defined by the river basin, but ‘Nature’ is open to 
many contending social definitions and human-nature conceptions that are not without 
dispute (Braun and Castree, 2001). (Escobar’s, 1998) reference to living within ‘a highly 
trans-nationalized nature / cultural field’ with reference to the multi- and cross-scalar 
influences on the environment, natural resources and ideas about biodiversity, could not 
be more apt for the Mekong Basin. This is particularly relevant with regard to the way the 
Mekong River Commission has defined the ‘natural’ boundaries and institutional scope 
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of the MRC within the Mekong Basin as a whole. How such boundaries are defined and 
how different parts of river basins are defined in terms of agency roles and 
responsibilities is extremely important. For example, the MRC has a set or obligations 
within its 1995 Agreement framework ‘to optimize the multiple use and mutual benefits 
of all riparians and to minimize harmful effects’ (Article 1), which necessarily means 
such adverse affects as radical changes in flow regimes, environmental damage, and 
activities that lead to degraded and declining fisheries. Also, the MRC has tremendous 
ecological responsibility written into Articles 3 and 7 ‘to protect the environment, natural 
resources, aquatic life and conditions and ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin’,  
‘making every effort to avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful effects that might occur.’ If 
the MRC restricts its basin-wide geographical role then it also limits its ability to address 
a whole plethora of trans-border problems resulting from various human developments 
and activities within that basin.  
 
As (Sneddon and Fox, 2006: 189) noted, ‘the Mekong is ultimately limited to the water 
flowing through its primary and secondary channels, despite the oft-repeated references 
to the ‘basin’ and its resources.’ The authors basically try to interpret the core of the 1995 
Agreement Article 5 defining “reasonable and equitable utilization” ‘solely in terms of 
the water flowing in the main channels and tributaries. Article 6 focuses on “the 
maintenance of the flows on the mainstream from diversions, storage releases, or other 
actions of a permanent nature” underscoring the geopolitical importance in the river’s 
main channel.’ This way of stressing the significance of the mainstream and water-
flowing parts of the river basin provides a rather restrictive view of the hydrological and 
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ecological richness of the basin as a whole, and tends towards limiting the potential remit 
of the MRC within that basin. As (Sneddon and Fox, 2006: 189) argued: ‘The result is a 
rather one-dimensional ‘basin’, one that neglects crucial hydrological and ecological 
aspects of the Mekong’s identity as a drainage basin.’ They develop a detailed 
examination of the 1995 Agreement’s emphasis on international legal language of 
‘international watercourses’ as opposed to utilizing biophysical scientific language of 
‘watershed ecosystems’ which incorporates ‘geological, hydrological, chemical, and 
biological linkages’ (Sneddon and Fox, 2006: 190).  
 
Other observers too have highlighted some of the self-imposed ‘natural’ boundaries on 
MRC activities. For instance, the MRC Joint Council (MRC, 2003: section 1) has left the 
definition of ‘tributary’ open to interpretation, ‘for the purposes of the present 
Procedures, a tributary as decided by the JC is a natural stream of the Mekong River 
System whose flows have a significant impact on the mainstream.’ As (Backer, 2006: 38) 
correctly notes, ‘What is to be counted as significant, is, however, not specified. The 
upstream countries want a more limited definition than the downstream ones.’ 
Furthermore, one member state’s perspective of significance may differ from another, 
particularly when trans-border impacts may be concerned. Bakker states further that: 
‘The limited definition of tributary the MRC uses implies that the MRC has made itself 
irrelevant to much of the development work financed through other channels such as the 
ADB or Chinese private sector … It also gives the member countries incentives to 
develop tributaries because they are excluded from the Agreement of 1995, and hence no 
notification of other MRC members is required’ (Backer, 2006: 39). The artificial 
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distinction between ‘mainstream’ and ‘tributary’ has tended to facilitate a whole plethora 
of development projects on tributaries (particularly in Laos, but also in Vietnam), which 
member states tend to view as being primarily their national concern and not a primary 
issue of the MRC, but which has led to trans-boundary externalities that do affect the 
mainstream and downstream ‘basin’. Thus, we see the politicized character of defining 
aspects of the ‘natural’ system and differentiating between components of the 
hydrological ‘basin’.        
 
Geographical factors, particularly the upstream/downstream position of each member’s 
total territory within the MRC regimes ecosystem boundaries, affect each member 
countries’ efforts (or lack of efforts) to achieve sustainable development (as per the 1995 
agreement).  In a regime of cooperation such as the MRC, which is defined more by 
physical criteria than national boundaries, the geography of the regime and its members 
will have important consequences for extent, scope and effectiveness of cooperation 
efforts (Backer, 2006: 33). This is pertinent to virtually all trans-border issues in the 
Mekong which incorporate the politics of ‘position’ (upstream-downstream), ‘scale’ 
(multi-tier) and ‘place’ (relative to other places) (Lebel, Garden & Imamura, 2005). 
Geography matters precisely because complex bio-physical processes and linear 
ecological systems literally flow through and pass over geopolitically organized spaces, 
national sovereignties and numerous other jurisdictions. The MRC’s internal governance 
structure tends to prioritize only the inter-national over other complex ‘social’ and 
‘ecological’ trans-border scales (Sneddon & Fox, 2006; Hirsch, 2006 a; AMRC, 2008).  
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The 1995 Agreement reinvented ‘the Mekong’ in order to focus on sustainable 
development and equitable water use. However the historical lack of focus on the 
Mekong ecosystem means that the natural environment and biophysical relations are still 
not given the attention necessary to achieve basin-wide sustainable development in a way 
that the large MRC donors have envisaged. States favor certain political scales and 
geographical definitions over others, which has implications for trans-border affairs. In 
other words, one can argue that the geographical and ecological realities of the Mekong 
Basin as a whole are being institutionally sidelined allowing for mega-projects to 
continue on tributaries irrespective of broader eco-, bio- and geo- linkages. A politics of 
economic development has become the order of the day. Furthermore, the incentive of 
states to work on the Mekong seems to be nationally motivated in order to reach national 
gains, such as with the export of electric power from dams in Laos to Thailand. The role 
of the MRC seems to remain, despite many efforts to the contrary, at a level of data 
collection and capacity building in order to achieve a good cooperative working 
environment on the Mekong between the countries, which helps avoid inter-state conflict, 
but does little to prevent problems at other scales (AMRC, 2008; 2003; Backer, 2006; 
Hirsch, 2006 a; 2006 b; Sneddon & Fox, 2006). 
 
5.3 Clashes in conceptions of the MRC’s ‘social’ role and 
responsibilities 
 
According to the Mekong Brief No 10 of the Australian Mekong Resource Centre 
(AMRC, November 2008: 4): ‘While the MRC is a ‘governed’, rather than a ‘governing’ 
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organization, this is not always understood by civil society groups in the region who have 
called on the MRC – and the Secretariat in particular – to intervene in its own right to 
address concerns or resolve grievances arising from developments with trans-boundary 
impacts.’ Herein lies a central paradox confronting trans-border water governance within 
the Mekong Basin, for the MRC is through its basin development plans  trying hard to 
increase its relevancy, accountability and transparency whilst simultaneously being 
constrained by its essentially inter-governmental character serving the interests of Lower 
Mekong riparian states, which themselves are often less than open to public scrutiny and 
having varying degrees of tolerance for non-governmental civil society groups. The fact 
that various groups such as Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance 
(TERRA) in Bangkok, Cambodia’s NGO Forum and the 3 Rivers Protection Network (3 
SPN), amongst many others, continue to criticize the MRC for apparent lack of openness 
with regards certain vital information on environmental impact assessments for 
mainstream dams, or on the MRC’s failures to promote riparian community perspectives 
and active participation ahead of major decisions along key trans-border tributaries, 
means that there is a great expectation that the MRC can play a role more in tune with 
civil society concerns. 
 
One of the problems is structural in that the MRC as an inter-governmental and inter-state 
agency often leaves ‘societal matters’ to the respective national committees (NMCs). 
(Hirsch, 2006: 197) highlights this as a fundamental governance problem: ‘The MRC 
shies away from representing or advocating societal concerns within countries, deferring 
to NMCs that are only loosely linked to established administrative and governance 
 123 
systems beyond the ministries and departments in which they are located.’ Under the 
1995 Agreement, stakeholder participation was identified as an ‘essential process’ of 
NMC activities.  In practice, however, NMCs are ineffectual in reaching out to social 
groups and NGOs due to national government restrictions. For instance, Laos and 
Vietnam hardly recognize independent non-governmental organizations in any event, and 
NMCs are not particularly influential or close to centres of decision-making within the 
pecking orders of state administrative hierarchies (AMRC, 2008). In spite of structural 
deficiencies and lack of regulatory teeth, there are other ways in which the MRC is trying 
to become a more effective agency that promotes dialogue and cross-sector participation 
within basin-wide programmes (MRC, 2007). Indeed, this should be an essential element 
of the professed objectives to promoted integrated water resources management (IWRM) 
in basin-wide development plans (Hirsch, 2006 a).  
 
Undoubtedly, the MRC as a whole, and the MRC Secretariat in particular (see next 
section) have been sensitive to the criticisms of various NGOs, civil society forums and 
networks within the basin. My experience as an intern revealed a Secretariat that was 
often self-critical and self-reflexive in response to perceived trans-border problems such 
as those in the Se San in the wake of the Yali Falls Dam (see below), and the desire to 
become more in touch with broader civil society concerns is reflected in various MRC 
reports and within several documents on the MRC website (http://www.mrcmekong.org). 
Whilst the (AMRC’s Mekong Brief, November 2008) argued that the MRC lacks ‘a clear 
commitment and strategy for involving civil society’, the same document noted that the 
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MRC Secretariat is deeply concerned about such perceptions ‘to the credibility of the 
organization’ (MRC, 2007: 20).   
 
It is important to understand that the MRC functions a delicate balancing act as both an 
inter-governmental technical agency and think-tank primarily for the riparian member 
states on the one hand, and as a primary agency that also has roles and responsibilities for 
basin-wide, trans-border developments that affect multiple stakeholders and 
communities, on the other. In 1999, the MRC Joint Committee adopted a set of principles 
encouraging civil society participation, with stakeholders being defined as ‘any person, 
group of institutions that has an interest in an activity, project or programme’, including 
beneficiaries and ‘those involved / or those who are generally excluded from the 
decision-making process’ (MRC, 1999: 2). These roles were further elaborated as part of 
the (MRC’s Basin Development Plan Phase 1, 2000-2006), within MRC public 
documents on the necessity of ‘public participation’ (MRC, 2005), and most recently 
within the MRC’s Basin Development Plan Programme Phase 2, (BDP2, 2007-2010) 
(MRC, November 2008). (see Appendix 2). These plans are based upon protocols and 
ideas for multi-stakeholder planning forums at regional, national, trans-national and sub-
area levels through BDP working groups, underpinned by IWRM principles. Furthermore 
the MRC Secretariat was in the process of outlining a communications strategy (finalized 
in year 2009 - http://www.mrcmekong.org/download/free_download/MRC-
communication-strategy-250110.pdf) to clearly elaborate the roles of the MRC to 
government decision-makers, people whose livelihoods are dependent on Mekong and 
tributary water resources, and scientists and technicians who help to shape policies and 
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develop projects in the basin. Defining disclosure of information policies, communicating 
more regularly with civil society groups online and in forums, and building the capacity 
of the MRC and NMC levels for implementing IRWM planning and facilitation are 
defined as key objectives (MRC, November 2008).  
 
Even so, the sincerity and ability of the MRC to promote greater public participation and 
multi-stakeholder mediation remains a hotly debated issue amongst concerned relevant 
NGOs, academics and community-based groups (TERRA, 2008). Sometimes IWRM 
principles are sacrificed due to naked ‘national interests’ and ‘specific relations of power’ 
(Hirsch, 2006 a; b). Good water governance is not a quality or thing that can be easily 
achieved for it always involves complex socio-economic differentiation, economy-
environmental trade-offs, multi-stakeholders with differing needs, and various amalgams 
of power around different issues such as the pro- and anti-dam camps. In the next section 
I wish to address the role of what is very often ‘the public face’ of the MRC, the 
Secretariat, and also to consider the influence that CEOs may have in relation to the 
relative openness and accountability of the organization.    
 
5.4 Role and influence of the MRC Secretariat and of MRCS CEO’s  
 
Historically, governance of the Mekong has been dominated by an institutional regime 
that stressed the rapid collection of hydrologic data in order to convert the Mekong into a 
“working” river (White, 1995). This is in contrast with the 1995 Agreement which put the 
focus on sustainable development and equitable water usage, much more oriented 
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towards the goals of the donor countries. The overall historic goals of Mekong 
cooperation and the foundation upon which the Mekong Secretariat, later to become the 
MRC, was built, (such as the UN ECAFE report in 1957 and later the US Geographer 
Gilbert White’s study in 1962 on the mainstream Pa Mong dam) were and arguably 
remain the production of hydro-electricity. This also became clear after the CEO of my 
internship, Mr. Joern Kristensen had left the organization and the new CEO Olivier 
Cogels took charge (he was to be CEO from 2004 to 2007) and the emphasis very much 
changed to hydropower development. The situation may alter under Cogels’ successor, 
Jeremy Bird). CEOs have three year terms with little chance of extensions, and they are 
initially selected by the MRC Joint Committee then endorsed by the MRC Ministerial 
Council, which means that member states are able to restrict the potential political 
influence of the MRC Secretariat and the CEO. Nevertheless, my view (both gained from 
being interned at the Secretariat, and subsequently following events under new CEOs) is 
that different CEOs have been able to influence the relative sensitivity and openness of 
the MRC to civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, and especially 
international donor agencies. This was very clear in Cogels’ term of office which many 
civil society and NGO forums perceived as being one that brought in the old Mekong 
Committee obsession with hydropower, investment facilitation favoring private capital 
and considerable secrecy in relation to certain MRC activities, such as undertaking 
environmental impact assessments in relation to potential hydropower projects (TERRA 
Press Release, 27 March 2008).  In a (Bangkok Post, 7 October, 2006) article entitled 
‘Mekong Commission reassesses role’ Olivier Cogels argued that member states were 
mature enough to promote their own economic development through Mekong projects, 
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such as hydro-power, in spite of concerns from international donors. ‘The donor 
community is too cautious, and afraid of environmental catastrophes, and believe 
countries are not mature enough to handle it by themselves and I think that is wrong.’ As 
(Backer, 2006: 37) observed, the new CEO in 2004 ‘brought noticeable changes to the 
profile of the organization, shifting emphasis from knowledge and capacity building to 
development and investment facilitation’ leading to criticisms of the MRC for its 
perceived ‘lack of openness to public participation’ (Backer, 2006: 59; Hirsch, 2006a). 
 
Nevertheless, during the period that I was interned at the MRC Secretariat when it was 
based in Phnom Penh (from 1 March 2003 to 1 March 2004) there seemed to be a very 
different ethos and operational flexibility in evidence under the then CEO Joern 
Kristensen, even though that was also a period when the MRC was coming under intense 
criticism due to the Yali Falls incident (see below). Kristensen had a strong awareness of 
the significance of fisheries to livelihood security issues, and he tried to create a balance 
between the needs for preserving resource bases and biodiversity and the needs for socio-
economic development. Interviewed by the environmental NGO influenced regional 
magazine, (Watershed, Vol 6, No.1, July-October 2000: 11), Kristensen outlined what he 
viewed as the MRC’s position and role.  
‘The challenge is to move forward and create supports to people living in poverty – 
support them in order to improve their standard of living – at the same time as this very 
important source of their livelihood is preserved. I see this as being the major challenge 
for the MRC in the cooperation between the four countries.’ He viewed the MRC as one 
essential body helping to advance regional cooperation to promote environmental 
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sustainability, enhance food security and reduce poverty within the basin. These 
objectives were to be advanced through participatory basin development plans and 
various programmes, particularly relating to the catchment approaches to fisheries, 
agriculture, irrigation and forestry. ‘The overall programme development objective is to 
achieve “cooperative sustainable development and utilization of land and water resources 
to the benefit of the basin community, and to contribute to poverty alleviation and food 
security’ (Kristensen, 2001: 22).  
 
Kristensen viewed the MRC as an essential communication channel for encouraging the 
finding of solutions to problems between member states, but with full regard for different 
sectors of activity and of society. Subsequent communication with Kristensen after he left 
the MRC confirms this perspective. He believed that many external critics of the MRC 
often lacked an understanding of the internal dynamics of the institution and also the 
inherent problems of promoting open dialogue and participatory principles when the 
member states may not be promoting this themselves (Pers.comm., October 6, 2006).   
 
Under the most recent CEO, Jeremy Bird, the MRC Secretariat has become more active 
again in different public forums on Mekong affairs, and Bird himself has spelled out 
‘four R’s for Mekong cooperation’ (namely regional dimension, relevance, 
responsibilities, and reducing risks), arguing that the Secretariat is committed to hosting 
discussions and listening to the views of different sectors of society so that decision 
makers are better informed on water resources issues (MRC Press Release, 8 April, 
2008).  He has also responded directly to various civil society critics and shown more 
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willingness than his predecessor to address the issues of accountability and public 
participation. I shall return to these specific criticisms and debates about the MRC’s 
relevance, responsibilities and roles in the final section of this chapter.     
 
5.5 Major state players, national economic interests, nationalism and 
sovereignty hindering genuine trans-border MRC cooperation 
 
Undoubtedly there is an important national element of Mekong politics, and this is 
reflected in the interests of member states, the importance of sovereignty issues in the 
geopolitics of mainland Southeast Asia, and the relative roles of the National Committees 
of the MRC. There are key differences concerning the relevance of the Mekong River as 
a source of livelihoods, resources and trade; its importance as a river flowing through and 
as a border of member states; and the relative position as upstream or downstream states. 
While Lao PDR and Cambodia are wholly or mainly within the Mekong Basin, Thailand 
has a more peripheral location with much of its heavily populated north-east being within 
the basin. Vietnam to a lesser extent is linked geographically to the rice growing Mekong 
Basin, mainly through the Mekong Delta in the South and the tributaries. This situation 
creates a different picture of the river in terms of resources and political capacity and the 
different states have rivalries and numerous difficulties with each other which are related 
to the past geopolitical events (Jacobs, 2002; Nguyen Phuong Binh, 2006). Furthermore, 
in terms of the way in which the MRC operates, the national committees of the 
Commission often reflect differing national perspectives and priorities (Hirsch, 2006 a: 
192). This has generated further problems for the MRC in dealing with donors, for as 
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Hirsch puts it, there are ‘tensions between the MRC as a donor-driven organization and 
one owned by riparian states.’  
 
Outside the group of MRC member countries China is a major player whereas Myanmar 
only has little importance with regard to the Mekong River. China has developed its 
Lancang (Chinese name for the Mekong) upstream hydropower plans unilaterally and has 
declined to become a member of the Mekong River Commission (Goh, 2004: 4).  
 
According to some observers, China does not wish to lose the advantages of her upstream 
status and sense of absolute sovereignty, which may jeopardize domestic hydropower and 
water diversion plans (Darrin, 2006; Dore and Yu, 2004; McCormack, 2001). 
Conversely, as (Backer’s, 2006) research on the international regime notes, there are 
some views within MRC member states and within the Secretariat to the effect that it is 
better to strengthen links through China’s observer role rather than risk domination from 
within with China becoming potentially the most influential member state. 
 




Approximately a third of the country, 36 % (182,000 km2), lies within the Mekong River 
Basin (Dore, 2003: 423) and Thailand apparently prefers a loosely defined framework for 
cooperation (Backer, 2006; Hirsch, 2006 a), however 42% of the people living in the 
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Mekong Basin, a total of 21 million people, as a whole live in North East Thailand (Isan) 
so one can argue that this represents a demographically and culturally highly significant 
part of the Mekong Basin. Bangkok is concerned that cooperation and cross-country 
regulations could restrict her freedom of action, particularly related to future water 
diversion projects. It does not need the capacity of the MRC as much as some of the other 
members, in particular Lao PDR and Cambodia. Thailand is for instance not keen on a 
very detailed or strict flow management scheme as wanted by the downstream riparians, 
partially because she claims that this has no purpose without Chinese participation. 
Thailand would rather see the MRC as facilitator than as body imposing regulations upon 
its members, possibly for sovereignty reasons. 
 
Thailand has repeatedly shown its stance on Mekong issues. In 1992 the Thai Deputy 
Foreign Minister was quoted as saying:  
‘If joining the Committee means the loss of Thai sovereignty (through the veto rights by 
the downstream countries) we can go it alone. It is the three Indochinese countries  
[Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos] who will benefit from joining the committee in the 
future’ (Chaipipat, 27 March 1992). 
 
When Thailand was still a poor developing country it participated in the creation of many 
possible projects related to the Mekong. In 1957 American involvement in the original 
plans for developing the Mekong river were strong and Thailand was very much a major 
partner for the US and continued to be so during the wars in Indochina. Thailand’s 
interest towards the Mekong started around this time. In the original plans of the 
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(Mekong Committee, 1961), (see Appendix 5), there were several dams planned that 
would be used to irrigate North-East Thailand, the location of the Korat Plateau, which is 
still a very dry region with only one rice harvest per year and also the poorest part of the 
country. However the dams could not be build due to the Indochina wars. Thailand is still 
interested in such dams (therefore also its interest in the Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos) and 
already in 1973 the King of Thailand inaugurated the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos. This was 
the last time he officially left his country, except in April 1994 to make a few symbolic 
stops across the Mekong River into Laos. 
 
Since Thailand could not have its way with the original plans, its participation on the 
Mekong therefore more and more took shape as a political (wartime) interest. Later its 
interest has changed into a commercial one (using its economic weight for instance to 
achieve the best business deals), but to some extend it still guards its national interests 
towards the countries of Indochina, especially towards Vietnam and Cambodia and to a 
lesser extent towards Lao PDR with which they share a very similar language and 
culture.  
 
The Thai North-East is the part of Thailand most dependant on agricultural development 
and it is frequently prioritized in terms of development investment, especially under the 
Thaksin government, but also subsequent governments such as the one who won the 
national election in late 2007. The faction, called Friends of Newin, of the current 
government (since December 2008) which provides the government its majority in 
parliament has as a major priority to “spoil” Isaan as the North-East is also known, in 
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order to get much needed votes from a region where people traditionally feel they are not 
given as much attention from the central government in Bangkok as they should, and also 
considering that the people of the North-East make out the largest proportion of the Thai 
population.   
 
Thai scarcity of water in the Thailand North-East frightens planners due to the high 
number of people living there and supply of water to the area is essential to Thailand 
reaching a leveled country-wide development. Besides the production of hydro-electricity 
for industrial development, the other overall historic goals, which one could consider the 
actual goals of the MRC member countries still today are storing of water for the 
expansion of irrigated agriculture and control of annual floods (Sneddon and Fox, 2006: 
187).  
 
 5.6.2 Lao PDR 
 
Lao PDR, which has 97% of its territory within the Mekong River Basin (Dore, 2003: 
423) has an abundance of unexploited water resources in the Mekong River tributaries 
that drain her territory. There are indications that the Laotian government prefers to have 
the liberty to develop the Mekong tributaries according to its own preferences without 
having to adhere to regime recommendations. Some MRC policy recommendations, 
perhaps especially those regarding public participation, seem unacceptable to the Laotian 
government (Backer, 2006: 40). They do not want to adopt such policies as public 
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participation requires more time and resources without providing any benefits. However 
the country is interested in the funding, data and competence available through the MRC.  
Lao PDR has the lowest GDP amongst the Lower Mekong countries but is only sparsely 
populated. Laos contributes about 35% of the water to the Lower Mekong River and, due 
to its economic status, the country’s only bargaining power seems to its natural resources, 
such as water and forests.  
 
The country will for a foreseeable future depend on external funding for its development, 
whether it comes from powerful neighbours such as Thailand (for business opportunities) 
or Vietnam (for historical communist political links) or whether it comes from the 
international donor community. Thailand’s need for electricity to its national grid 
matches Laos potential in that sector. After tense political relations in the 1980’s the 
countries have again come very close out of commercial interest. This does not seem a 
difficult thing to do for the peoples of both countries, since all they share a culture, 
history and language which are quite similar. 
 
As an illustration of the importance of hydropower to the country, hydropower 
investment stood for 76.5 % of all foreign investment during 1988 to June 1995, whereas 
tourism, a growing sector, stood at only 7 %. 
 
Laos looks both east to Vietnam, mostly politically – since the Vietnam War where 
Vietnam had helped set up the Laos People’s Revolutionary Party in 1975, the ruler of 
Lao PDR since then, and west to Thailand. It looks to Thailand for trade and cultural 
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relations – the language being very similar and with Thai television programmes reaching 
much of Lao PDR and with products of similar taste being produced and exported from 
Thailand. Laos seems to seek a continued protection from power politics in exchange for 




Cambodia is emerging from decades of civil war and conflict and although a democracy 
on paper, it is still plagued by political violence and lack of respect for human rights 
(Amnesty International, 2006). A total of 86% of its territory is within the Mekong River 
Basin and the Cambodian people depend on the resources, particularly fish which the 
wetlands have to offer (Oejendal, 2000: 138 and Badenoch, 2002: 3). Cambodia was 
outside Mekong cooperation for more than 20 years due to wars until 1995 which did not 
help its leverage towards its neighbours.  
 
For Cambodia the direction of the development of the Mekong River Basin is perceived 
to have a more direct and serious impact on the well-being of the country than what is 
likely for certain others of the regime members, which might make Cambodia more eager 
to see a strict regime than other members. Incidents in the past such as the Se San River 
‘Yali incident’ (relating to the building of Yali Falls Dam inside Vietnam on the trans-
border river) have made Cambodia disappointed with what the MRC can achieve for her. 
This is despite the reason for Vietnam’s supreme status is to be found in bilateral 
relations – due to the special relationship with the current strongman Hun Sen of 
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Cambodia who fought alongside Vietnam against the Khmer Rouge. There are some 
clear indications that the Phnom Penh government does not seem very interested in its 
people living in peripheral areas such as Ratanakiri, and indeed does not seem interested 
in securing the country’s natural assets for the benefit of the majority of its own people 
(Osborne, 2004: 43). 
 
Compared to Laos, Cambodia only has little (which it is possible to develop) hydropower 
potential, but still many forests. Its economic weight is still small, but newly found huge 
mineral oil resources offshore within its maritime boundary might change the picture 
complete in the long-term. So far the economy is depending on agriculture and fishing 
employing 85% of the working population. The two sectors are the ones that give most 
Cambodians food on the table. The country is in 2010 still one of the poorest in the 
world. 
 
The most important fishing ground is the Tonle Sap Lake, the largest lake in the Lower 
Mekong Region (Mak Sithirith, 2007). Fish is the primary source for protein intake in the 
country (most through fermented fish). Pra Hok is a fermented rice and fish porridge 
which can be stored for long periods, thus increasing food security. The lake is fed 
through upwards flooding from the Lower Mekong towards the Tonle Sap Lake which 







Approximately 20% of Vietnamese territory lies with the Mekong River basin. The 
Mekong Delta has a population of 17 million people (Browder, 2000:241) and produces 
90% of the rice and 53% of the shrimp and fish export from the country (Quang, 2002: 
263). This area accounts for approximately 27% of the country’s GDP and is vital for 
Vietnam. The delta is plagued by salt water intrusion during the dry season which inhibits 
agricultural production in a little below half. Historically Vietnam considers itself as the 
victor of the Indochina wars and therefore has a degree of political arrogance towards 
Cambodia (and Lao PDR) and only rarely listens little to their arguments. There are also 
the former provinces of Cambodia called Kampuchea Krom given to Vietnam by the 
colonial French authorities in June 1949. This political arrogance is occasionally reflected 
in MRC meetings and dealings, particularly those involving one-sided benefits for 
Vietnam and negative socio-economic trans-border impacts for Cambodia. The 
Vietnamese government is by many considered relatively nationalistic and unwilling to 
share information. However, we should note that fierce national pride in regional 
relations is exhibited by all the MRC member states, and it can often surface during MRC 
negotiations and internally sometimes within the MRC Council, JC and Secretariat.   
 
The Western Central Highlands region of Vietnam is home to important Mekong 
tributaries such as the Se San and the Sre Pok. Due to high population pressure in coastal 
areas (Vietnam has the highest population amongst the Lower Mekong countries), much 
of its population has been moved to the highland areas creating a need for hydropower as 
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the areas develop. Initially development took place through coffee plantations among 
others which has now made Vietnam the second largest coffee exporter in the world. 
 
As the country furthest downstream, Vietnam is vulnerable to changes in the water levels 
of the mainstream Mekong River. Too much hydropower development upstream or other 
factors due to exploitation of natural resources might endanger Vietnam’s interests 
downstream in the Mekong Delta. Nobody knows how much exploitation of resources it 
takes before water level changes become evident, but there is no doubt that Vietnam’s 
own cascade of dams on the Sre Pok and Se San Rivers might risk tipping the balance. 
Vietnam is therefore interested in both regulation (as Cambodia) but also upstream 
exploitation on the tributaries as long as there are no harmful effects downstream.  
 
Vietnam has had very strong economic development and is successful in eradicating 
significant levels of poverty in the country through both industrial and agricultural 
development. Since the early 1990’s the GDP has grown between 5 and 10 percent 
annually (World Bank: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/vnm_aag.pdf), mostly due to 
exports. This gives Vietnam leverage but it has not been very skilful in exploiting 
economic influence in the Lower Mekong Region since it has focused more on exports to 
overseas such as America and Europe. It sees its exploits purely as historical and political 





5.6.5 China: The dragon of absolute sovereignty 
 
The Mekong Basin in geographical terms is rather insignificant to China, being only 3 % 
of its total territory, however important to the region through which the Lancang 
(Mekong) runs in China’s Yunnan province. The Chinese stretches of the river have large 
hydropower potential, estimated 25,000 Megawatt (compared to 18,200 Megawatt for the 
Three Gorges Dam) (Magee, 2006: 29). 
 
In gross terms the Lancang contributes 16% of the Mekong’s total water discharge but in 
real terms it contributes 100% of the flow at the Laos border and 60% as far downstream 
as Vientiane, 20 % at Pakse in southern Laos (due to the vast amounts of water 
originating from Laos itself), 15-20 % in Vietnam and 16% at Phnom Penh. It also 
provides an important component of the crucial minimum dry season flow along most of 
the mainstream of the Mekong in Laos and Thailand – even in Cambodia the Lancang 
contributes almost 45% of the average flow in April (World Rivers Review: 2001). 
 
At the national level Yunnan province possesses the second greatest workable hydro-
energy resources in China. The provincial government envisages that the province will 
become an energy depot not only for China but also for Southeast Asian countries. In 
2001 the province exported 900,000 Kw electricity to Guangdong province and from 
2002 to Lao PDR. From 2013 it is planned to start exports to Thailand in the range of 1.5 
million KW per year.  
 
 140 
Especially Cambodia and Vietnam have serious concerns about the impacts of Chinese 
hydropower plans. However such concerns cannot be addressed in the MRC but only be 
dealt with bilaterally besides a range of other bilateral issues. The Chinese view the 
development of the Lancang as a national issue and do not take a basin-wide view, 
concentrating only on the impacts within Chinese territory when it is its downstream 
riparians who will suffer most disproportionately from the country’s plans.  
 
China has been increasing its aid and investment in Cambodia considerably in later years, 
thus increasing its influence and leverage through investment in roads, bridges, sewerage 
systems, often in return for Chinese involvement in natural resource exploitation, such as 
rubber in Mondulkiri province and numerous other developments. This will dampen 
Cambodian criticism of issues upstream on the Mekong where the impacts are much 
more long-term and thus difficult to compare with short-term benefits of Chinese money 
pouring into the country. 
 
5.7 The MRC in relation to the Se San and Sre Pok Rivers 
 
The 1995 agreement on which the work of the MRC is based, stipulates that countries 
should give notification when building dams, also on tributaries, however, due to the 
looseness of the 1995 agreement and countries national interest, such notifications seem 
not to give any opportunity for reaction. The hydropower projects on the Se San and 
future plans for the Sre Pok River are handled solely by the Vietnamese government and 
neither the MRC nor the Cambodian government exert any influence.  
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The MRC has tried to work with NGOs such as Oxfam on the Se San but due to the MRC 
being a inter-governmental organization, there are expectations from the side of NGOs 
and civil and local society that the MRC is able to influence national governments, which 
is not the case since the countries are likely to make the decisions in their own sovereign 
interest.  
 
The MRC has been providing data for its member countries which includes water levels 
on the Se San River, collected through the Cambodian government, however this is only 
data and does not influence decision making if there is no national interest on behalf of 
the Vietnamese government to take into account Cambodian concerns.  
 
The Se San 3 project was notified to the Mekong River Commission in accordance with 
the rules of notification. The issue was discussed at a closed session due to national 
(Vietnamese) political sensitivity at the MRC Joint Committee in Phnom Penh on 6-7 
June 2003 and before the meeting took place Vietnam had already started construction of 
the Se San 3 in June 2002. What should the MRC do in such a situation? International 
organizations including the UN are based on first accepting views of the countries they 
are hosted by whereas NGOs have a free hand to pursue their aims, however often with 
little influence over the government even if they wield influence at the local level.  
 
The situation of the MRC is clearly a sensitive one. It cannot go public with the issues 
since politics between the two countries are involved. It has tried hard to convey the 
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views of Cambodia to Vietnam but the latter considers Cambodia within its area of 
geopolitical and historical influence and is unlikely to act against its own national 
interest. The MRC has as its mandate (upon which donors have given funding) to 
promote sustainable development in the Lower Mekong Basin but has to do so in 
agreement with its member countries. The interest of the member countries comes first, 
and it is clearly harder to influence a country which does not strongly need donor funding 
for its development, as is the case with Vietnam and Thailand, as opposed to Cambodia 
and Laos, which are more reliant on donors.  
 
There are clearly issues between Cambodia and Vietnam as countries, but the current 
Cambodian government (led by Hun Sen) has a traditionally accepting role of Vietnam’s 
views due to their close cooperation in ending the rule of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 
(http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/27/weekinreview/cambodia-s-hun-sen-in-phnom-
penh-vietnam-s-puppet-is-finding-his-voice.html). However Vietnam has annexed an 
area that formerly belonged to Cambodia called Kampuchea Krom (handed over by 
colonial France in June 1949) which consists of 21 former Cambodian provinces along 
the border in South Vietnam. The issue is still contested and in December 2008 a member 
of the European Parliament as well as an Italian Senator were not allowed to travel from 
Phnom Penh to Ho Chih Minh City to meet with representatives from the Khmer Krom 
population. Further Cambodia for many years continued to supply resources when 
occupied by the Vietnamese Army from 1979 to 1989, as part of the Vietnamese 
Cambodian War, to present-day Vietnam, with little or less development of its own 
industrial and public sectors. 
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Some officials and many people in civil society might be frustrated that Cambodia has no 
influence over Vietnamese hydropower development on the Se San and Sre Pok Rivers, 
but all the MRC can in fact do is to mitigate possible differences, but in the end the 
decision is taken at the highest level between the two countries, the Cambodian Prime 
Minister for one reason or the other decides to accept the wish of the Vietnamese 
President. 
 
The Se San dams are located in Vietnam owned and operated by Electricity of Vietnam 
(EVN), (see Appendix 3). This state owned company has received approval from the 
Ministry of Finance for the issue of bonds for further hydropower construction such as 
the Se San 4 and is also planning expansion into Laos. The jurisdiction of the dams is 
entirely with Vietnam but International Law needs to be applied when dealing with trans-
boundary issues. The issue however is that there is no enforcement in international law 
such as there is in national law. It seems that parts of civil society want the MRC to act as 
enforcer of International Law, but based on what regulation? The 1995 agreement leaves 
decisions to the member countries, including the activities of the MRC. Each country 
according to the 1995 agreement commits itself to “avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful 
effects”, which is a very broad definition that leaves much room for interpretation. 
 
According to (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004: 51-68) the Mekong River Commission has been 
involved in a two-track process, which has allowed little space for negotiation over the Se 
an River on the part of those most directly affected. According to them the blame goes 
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back to the MRC but one can argue that the 1995 agreement is to blame for being too 
loosely defined and failing to provide mechanisms for stopping states from pursuing their 
national interests. All decisions and work carried out by international organizations 
depend on the agreement with the host country, such an approach can be criticized but 
what is the alternative? Clearly NGOs can influence communities to a much larger extent 
than an organization which has to be in line with the national interests of the host 
government which is constructing dams. The strategy of the MRC was to work with 
NGOs in order to mitigate the concerns. 
 
Under the terms of the 1995 agreement, the principle of prior consultation does not apply 
to projects on the tributaries, only notification of the proposed activity does. Prior 
consultation is only required for inter-basin diversions from the mainstream during the 
wet season and intra-basin uses of the mainstream during the dry season. Prior 
consultation is clearly a stronger legal principle than notification which just asks the 
country to state what its plans are. Prior consultation means that the riparian states would 
have to agree on a water project before it can proceed, this is not the case with projects on 
tributaries such as the Se San and Sre Pok dams. 
 
Efforts to clarify or even amend the rules of consultation and notification between the 
countries have proven difficult. Thorny issues include data sharing and collection, mostly 
determined by a lack of political willingness to give away any information which could 
potentially endanger national sovereignty, as well as biophysical dynamics. Countries 
 145 
might want to overwrite hydrological complexity with geopolitical simplification to 
facilitate autonomy of decision making.   
 
The principle of prior consultation which is not being applied on the Se San and Sre Pok 
would be to ensure minimum mainstream water flows in the dry season. It remains to be 
seen how much water can be taken from the Mekong River and its tributaries before the 
mainstream water flows are affected and the water levels in the Mekong River as such 
start to decrease. It is almost like Global Warming, once it has happened it cannot be 
proven who explicitly is to blame, only that we are all responsible, and that it is very 
difficult if not impossible to reverse. Interestingly, the MRC has become a key regional 
body wishing to stress issues of Global Warming in recent forums, which may be 
developed into arguments for or against hydropower depending upon the constituency. 
 
In the case of the Se San and Sre Pok Rivers it is not possible for the MRC to mitigate 
efficient sustainable development since the 1995 agreement nearly erases the complex 
biophysical processes that constitute the basin’s socio-ecological networks, despite the 
agreements references to maintaining ecological balance of the river system. Instead the 
biophysical relationships are altered in the name of sovereignty where national borders 
become more important and the trans-boundary nature of the Mekong Basin no longer 
applies to tributaries, even crossing national borders such as the Se San and Sre Pok 





5.8 Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA’s) 
 
Ratanakiri province or Northeast Cambodia, also home to the Cambodian part of the Se 
San River Basin, has a problem which according to (Oejendal, 2001:11) is its anarchic 
approach to Natural Resource Management (NRM). The “cowboy mentality” of the 
people and politicians active in the area does not value the importance of natural 
resources to its people. The kinds of development taking place in Ratanakiri (and 
Mondulkiri, another “Wild East Province”) are not in line with sustainability and large 
areas of forests have been disappearing day-by-day. Indigenous communities continue to 
fight for access rights to vital forestry resources, and land-grabbing by external agents is 
a feature of new frontier developments, which may also compound the problems of 
resource degradation and fisheries decline along key rivers such as the Se San and Sre 
Pok (see chapter 6).   
 
On the Se San River no EIA was carried out on the Cambodian side for the Se San 3 
project since the Vietnamese already, without telling its neighbour, had started dam 
construction of the Se San 3 in June 2002.  The attitude of Vietnam was that the country 
wished to move ahead and implement the project as soon as possible due to increased 
electricity demand. The unnamed official accused Cambodia of being slow in replying to 
Vietnams’s proposals for EIA and argued that in any case the dam would lessen flooding 
and drought (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 22, 2002). 
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Indeed Vietnamese officials are under considerable pressure to build quickly. Mass 
protests shook Vietnam’s rapidly growing Central Highlands in 2001 as ethnic minorities 
claimed they were victims of land theft and religious persecution. Vietnamese leaders 
have blamed foreign agents for stirring unrest, but also blame public dissatisfaction with 
slow development in the area. Vietnam is well aware of the politics of dam-building, that 
you need to sometimes push the projects through communities (districts), which in 
Vietnam are often well organised and linked to regional and national administrations, 
since the impacts on the environment and local communities can be huge, however also 
the benefits in terms of increased electricity supply are huge, but often in completely 
different and urban locations such as Ho Chi Minh City. 
 
So far only national Vietnamese EIA’s have been carried out on the Se San and Sre Pok 
Rivers in very limited cases such as for the Yali Falls Dam, despite support from 
international aid agencies such as SIDA on the Sre Pok, and no information, consultation 
or official copy was shared with Cambodian counterparts (Wyatt and Baird, 2007:430). A 
framework for trans-boundary EIA’s could not be agreed upon. In Thailand, however, for 
the Pak Mun Dam (on the Mun River, a tributary of the Mekong) a full EIA was 
conducted completely on Thai national initiative mostly influenced by overriding 
electricity generating needs, resulting in much criticism of the dam and its operation. 
Based on the Pak Mun EIA and recent impacts, the flood gate nowadays is only kept 
open four months a year in order to allow the passage of fish for local livelihoods 
(Sneddon and Fox, 2006: 196).  
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Environmental priorities and standards have been put aside and construction of dams 
starts without EIA’s being carried out resulting in unexpected impacts on livelihoods and 
ecology.  Since operations began at the Se San Yali Falls Dam in June 2000, irregular 
releases of large amounts of water from its reservoir are thought by the vast majority of 
villagers along the river to have significantly changed the downriver hydrological regime 
and water quality. These unusual and dramatic fluctuations in river levels have caused 
major negative downstream environmental and socio-economic impacts in Northeast 
Cambodia, especially for the indigenous communities living along the Se San River in 
Ratanakiri province. Until 2001 the impacts of the Yali Falls Dam in Stung Treng 
province were largely unknown outside of the affected villages.  
 
The Pak Mun Dam has become a showcase of what happens when an EIA is carried out, 
here the local communities have been informed about the consequences. In the 1981 EIA 
a feasibility study on a fish way was recommended and later a fish ladder was installed, 
however it has not been performing well in terms of upstream fish migration. But an EIA 
was possible since the Thai government agreed to it being carried out. This they have not 
demanded for instance from power supplying dams to Thailand in Lao PDR, simply 
cause it was easier not to and since the jurisdiction of the Thai government does not go 
across the border with Lao PDR. If the Thai government were really environmentally 
oriented they could have pushed more for it.  
 
The national Vietnamese EIA carried out for the Yali Falls Dam had a very limited 
definition of the downstream project impact area. Project impact boundaries were 
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confined to upstream resettlement areas and the powerhouse (Wyatt and Baird, 2007: 
430).  
 
Until 2005 the Vietnamese government had provided only a copy of the national EIA for 
the Se San 4 dam to the Cambodian government for comments. For that dam they 
released an English-language version of the feasibility study and EIA in August 2005 and 
requested comments from the Cambodian government by December 2005. However 
because construction actually began in January 2005, the purpose of seeking comments at 
such a late stage is irrelevant. The comments that were provided certainly had little, if 
any, bearing on the project. 
 
The EIA in question lacks any baseline information on downstream fisheries and other 
fauna. It states that no fisheries information is available or was collected and suggests 
that downstream fish will be able to adapt to the changes caused by the dam.  
 
International standards (and now regional Mekong practice for the Nam Theun 2 project 
in Laos) for EIA’s have recently required the assessment of cumulative environmental 
impacts where there are several dams affecting the same water course (such as on the Se 
San and Sre Pok Rivers). For example, the ADB and Lao government carried out such an 





5.9 Multi-scaled cross-border politics, civil society and the MRC 
 
The observations carried out by various scholars such as Baird, Wyatt, Hirsch and by 
NGOs such as the 3 S Protection Network are correct to highlight the plight of many 
indigenous riparian communities and those affected locally by the construction of Se San 
and Sre Pok dams. However, to place most of the blame squarely on the MRC and not the 
national governments is like shooting the messenger. With the existing 1995 agreement 
on which the MRC (and its donors) bases its activities there is no room for the MRC to 
request agreement prior to the start of projects on tributaries. It remains a bilateral or 
national issue of the countries involved. Where EIA’s have been carried out in full, like at 
the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand and the Nam Theun 2 in Laos, criticism has been heavy 
when the facts came onto the table, and that seems to have been the only way to address 
the impacts to the local environment and livelihood security. 
 
The MRC is a regional inter-governmental organization not much different from the UN 
and is similar in the way it operates, based on agreement between the organization and 
the host countries. If there is no agreement with the approach from the host country, in 
the case of the Se San Vietnam and Cambodia, there is little the MRC can do except to 
facilitate mitigation on dam projects and their impacts to as large an extend as possible 
with civil society, such as NGOs and local communities. This was also done actively 
during the reign of CEO Mr. Joern Kristensen who sought dialogue at all levels (and also 
visited the Se San River in person with me) in order to understand and address the needs 
of the villagers.  
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The lack of interest of the central government in Phnom Penh is quite significant. The 
Prime Minister has never officially visited Ratanakiri (and neighbouring Mondulkiri) 
province despite many years in power. In recent times, this deliberate marginalization of 
those provinces has been lessened due to the active engagement of NGO networks and 
new UN development initiatives for the people living there. Even so, the lack of official 
interest has made it easier for “cowboy capitalists” to exploit the resources of the 
provinces. Furthermore, corruption in the provincial government resulted in artificially 
close links across the border to Vietnam (where the bribes partly seem to have come 
from). The former provincial governor (Mr. Khamkuan) for many years has been issued 
with an arrest warrant relating to issues of timber logging scandal and is said to be on the 
run either in Lao PDR or Vietnam (as per personal observation in January 2007 and visit 
to the said ex-governor’s private house). Apparently, the ex-governor used considerable 
amounts of World Bank money to log for timber in Virachey National Park in 2004/5. 
During my fieldwork, I met with people who said that he was able to utilize old 
connections within Laos and Vietnam for he carries a Vietnamese passport in addition to 
his Cambodian one, and he had historical links with officials on the other side of the 
border (in Vietnam) where he spent a decade during and just after the Khmer Rouge 
period. This corruption tale also reveals something about the borderlands, which can be 
remarkably open to certain agencies and agents with political connections and money, but 
extremely closed to ethnic and civil society groups fighting for economic compensation 
due to negative trans-border externalities (see chapter 6).  
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Another key dimension of the geopolitics and trans-border politics of the Mekong Basin 
today is in relation to the role of various civil society groups, non-governmental 
organizations and environmental lobbying groups, as well as international rivers 
networks (Dore, 2001; Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004; Hirsch, 2006 a; various issues of 
Watershed magazine; various issues of Mekong Update & Dialogue). A key illustration 
of this type of political involvement and the importance of networked political action is 
seen in the letter to the MRC in November 2007 by no less than 201 citizen groups and 
individuals from 30 countries (to which the MRC never replied) deeply concerned by the 
apparent lack of transparency of the MRC and the socio-environmental and livelihood 
security impacts relating to the intensification of hydropower projects in the Basin. See: 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/Regional%20letter%20to%20MRC%2027.3.08.p
df for a mentioning of this letter in a letter from 27 March 2008 addressed to the new 
MRC Secretariat CEO Jeremy Bird by 51 Mekong Region based citizen groups, NGOs 
and individuals, including such diverse agencies as the Burma Rivers Network, the NGO 
Forum of Cambodia, the Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT) of Cambodia, the 
Chiang Khong Conservation Group in Thailand, Friends Without Borders, Living River 
Siam project (Southeast Asian Rivers Network, SEARIN) of Thailand, Salween Watch, 
Center for Water Resources Conservation and Development (WARECOD) of Vietnam, 
and numerous others. A key coordinating body for this letter of concern to the MRC was 
the organization called Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA) 
which operates out of Bangkok and has extensive environmental group linkages. 
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The March 2008 letter (see Appendix 7) specifically challenges the MRC to respond to 
civil society concerns about the dangers posed by hydropower schemes and on ‘trans-
boundary impacts on fisheries, with serious consequences for food security of riparian 
communities, as well as commercial fishing activities.’ The letter is very blunt in its 
message:  
 
‘The MRC must unambiguously and publicly state the detailed procedures for 
notification and agreement on mainstream projects, in particular rules on public discourse 
of project documents and related MRC analytical work, processes and timelines for trans-
boundary public consultations, and the current status of each proposed Mekong 
mainstream dam project in relation to the notification and agreement procedures’  
 
(TERRA, 2008: Letter of Concern, 27 March 2008, emphasis in original). A follow-up 
Press Release from TERRA was entitled ‘MRC’s looming crisis in legitimacy and 
relevancy’, and has provoked considerable debate amongst researchers, activists and 
professionals concerned with Mekong affairs.  
 
One of the key concerns of the NGO forums and networks challenging the MRC in the 
period 2008-2010 to open up further and address their concerns for basin population’s 
livelihood security and to address issues of ecological security, environmental and social 
justice, is the Lao PDR plans to develop a controversial mainstream dam on the Lower 
Mekong at Don Sahong in Champassak province just 2 km from the Cambodia border. 
This dam is apparently to be sited in the Khone Falls network of narrow channels, reefs, 
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rapids and water-falls, and it has attracted substantive opposition not only from various 
NGO river network activists but also from ichthyologists, river ecology and fisheries 
specialists within reputable backgrounds who are supporting an immediate construction 
moratorium to prevent any construction plans, and various Mekong-based organizations 
have called for transparent and independent environmental impact assessments. This is in 
response to the leaked knowledge that a Malaysian engineering firm called Mega First 
Corp Berhad has carried out a feasibility study which came up with a run-of-river facility 
with a potential capacity to generate between 240 and 360 megawatts of electricity, most 
of which would be exported on regional grids (Nette, 2008). Not surprisingly, various 
groups have subsequently become alarmed at the potentially huge impacts on fisheries, 
for the vast majority of Mekong fishes are migratory in nature and the Khone Falls are 
critical in the Lower Mekong migrations (Baird, 2007). The Rivers Coalition of 
Cambodia comprising the NGO Forum, Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT), the 3 
SPN Network, and other bodies, called for the MRC ‘to publicly release its study of the 
Don Sahong’s draft Environmental Impact Assessment report’ (see Appendix 4), arguing 
that the Commission is deliberately withholding vital scientific information which should 
be made public.  This Statement made on 24 September 2008 implies that the MRC is 
essentially a partner in the highly secretive electricity planning processes of member 
states. The MRC is thus considered to not living up to its 1995 Agreement duties ‘to 
make every effort to avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful effects’ (Article 7) of projects 
with clear downstream impacts, whether actual or potential.  
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The MRC has also received sustained challenges concerning the issue of flooding along 
the Mekong River during the monsoon season of 2008. In an article entitled ‘Mekong 
Flood Warning System Failed’ (IPS, 18 August 2008) the Thai environmental 
organization called Living River Siam accused the MRC of avoiding to provide 
information about unusually high flood waters at Chiang Saen in northern Thailand and 
its potential linkages to water from run-offs and from dam releases in Yunnan province of 
China. In another report, the Thai People’s Network for the Mekong which involves the 
Foundation for Ecological Recovery, Living River Siam, Chiang Khong Conservation 
Group, Loei Foundation, Tan Mun Project, and the Pak Mun Dam Affected People’s 
Network. They argued forcefully that the MRC made misleading statements about the 
severe floods by arguing that they were ‘entirely the result of the meteorological and 
hydrological conditions’ at the time, including the prolonged effects from tropical storm 
Kammun producing higher than average rainfall and run-offs in the upper basin (MRC 
Statement, 15 August 2008). However, the NGOs were skeptical, believing that the MRC 
has for various political reasons been quite wary of putting any blame on water releases 
from Chinese mainstream dams during the wet season. The NGO network statement 
provides harsh criticism: ‘MRC’s assertion that Chinese dams have storage volumes far 
too small to affect the Mekong hydrology is shameful, as it misses an issue central to the 
present disaster and suffering faced by people living in the lower Mekong countries, 
whom the MRC is supposed to serve.’  
 
Quite apart from the difficulties of examining the merits of the claims and counter-
claims, the fundamental problem of mistrust and suspicion relating to the MRC is worthy 
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of further analysis. It relates to fundamental dilemmas noted in this chapter in relation to 
the MRC’s essential trans-boundary resource management functions, particularly the 
tensions between issues of national sovereignty and regionally integrated management; 
between donors, member states and civil society; and also clashing conceptions of the 
MRC’s mandate and activities. As Carl Middleton of the International Rivers Network 
quoted by (Nette, 2008) put it: ‘If the MRC provides advice to government agencies that 
is perceived as critical of proposed hydropower projects, this advice could be unwelcome, 
ignored, and then no longer sought, undermining the MRC’s relevance in the eyes of the 
government agencies it considers itself primarily answerable to. Yet, by not providing 
this objective analysis and releasing it into the public domain, as it should do, the MRC 
faces a crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of the wider public that it is also intended to 
serve.’  
 
As I have tried to show in this chapter, the MRC is far from being a monolithic, 
unchanging and static agency. Its character has and is being transformed from without 
and within. It is a body that may blow hot and cold in relation to openness, sometimes 
due to new priorities being pushed by the member states, and to changes at top level such 
as CEOs, and also in response to particular events, such as the Yali Falls incident and the 
more recent concerns over Lower Mekong hydropower plans or the severe flooding 
events in the middle reaches of the Mekong in August 2008. In the following chapter, I 
shall focus on particular social and environmental trans-border problems in relation to my 
fieldwork and observations in Cambodia following the Yali Falls incident.  In addition, I 
shall further develop the issues of public participation, focusing on the relevance of 
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combining both indigenous and scientific knowledge, open dialogues, information 






















































6. Sovereignty, trans-border ‘local resources’ and indigenous 
knowledge 
 
‘Before the Se San was like our parent, now it has become our enemy’ (Interview, 6 
January, 2004, fisherman of Andoung Meas District). 
‘We have never seen the dam and we don’t know how far away it is. But at night we can 
see the lights from the dam in the sky’ (Mr. Glandun, Chief of Bor Kham village, 
Andoung Meas District, 8 January 2004). 
 
This chapter is based on primary research in the Se San Valley and prolonged periods of 
research in Cambodia, both as an intern with the MRC Secretariat and subsequently as an 
independent researcher. It is also based on subsequent visits to the same areas two years 
after the original research (in December 2006 and January 2007), and on additional 
readings of secondary materials. As noted in chapter 3, on methodology, qualitative 
research is extremely important in the absence of useful baseline data, statistical 
information and time-series data (except for data on water levels) of different kinds. The 
fact is that for many of the tributaries of the Mekong River there is very little solid 
hydrological, ecological and social data to begin with. Thus, the efforts of different 
organizations, including the MRC and concerned NGOs to undertake systematic data 
gathering on different aspects of the human and physical landscape is extremely 
important. For example, (Baird and Meach, 2005) have produced a highly informative 
report on fisheries based primarily on indigenous knowledge sources along the Se San 
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River. They incorporated fishery data based upon methods that enabled complex local 
information about fish catches in various local vernacular languages to be translated into 
a report that detailed social and environmental issues in a language readily 
understandable to outside agencies.  In many respects my own research effort has been 
informed by studies that seek to elevate ‘local knowledge’ and so-called ‘traditional 
ecological knowledge’ in ways that may help to inform policy interventions and natural 
resource management at different levels (Berkes, 1999), or at least treat such forms as 
‘local knowledge’ as being of relevance to issues such as environmental management and 
also as a means of negotiating with or even challenging ‘official’ and state-centric 
perspectives (Laungaramsri, 2001).   
 
In this chapter I wish to focus on the ongoing problem of environmental and social 
impacts in relation to various villages and communities along the Se San River Valley. I 
wish to do so with reference to the broader significance of these issues to debates about 
water governance and the politics of environment within the Mekong Basin, which 
incorporates debates about the roles and responsibilities of different agencies, such as the 
MRC (chapter 5), of the riparian states in relation to trans-boundary matters, and issues of 
democracy and governance in relation to civil society groups. An added dimension to the 
cultural politics of the environment relates to the many different indigenous groups who 
are often directly affected by mega-projects in river systems. This chapter is mostly a 




6.1 Peripheral and marginal within and between nation-states   
 
One of the issues that was most relevant and oftentimes in the background of discourses 
and developments in the Se San Valley is the way in which provinces such as Ratanakiri 
were officially viewed as and treated to be ‘peripheral’ by key agents and actors, 
including and perhaps especially so by state officials within Cambodia. Indeed, had it not 
been for the Yali Falls dam incident (see later) it is very likely that many of the concerns 
of the multi-ethnic communities living along the Se San River would have remained 
almost completely ignored by key decision-makers and by organizations such as the 
MRC. For as (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004) have observed, the indigenous peoples of the Se 
San and Ratanakiri Province (including the Lao, Jarai, Kachok, Tampuan, Brao, Kreung, 
Khmer, Kavet and Chinese) are often in an unenviable ‘double whammy’ position of 
being peripherally located within Cambodia yet needing to rely upon state agencies and 
working through them as soon as they face trans-boundary externalities caused by 
activities within Vietnam. In many respects this marginality within the nation-state 
framework is the result of the way in which former smaller polities and chiefdoms were 
incorporated into the larger ‘geo-bodies’ of nation-states, which meant that many 
indigenous people and ethnic groups fell into a ‘territorial trap’ after (Agnew and 
Corbridge, 1994) becoming ‘minorities’ within the new national geographic order 
(Winichakul, 1995). Being ‘peripheral’ within a mainland Southeast Asian context is also 
usually in relation to lowland powers and capitals in delta and low-lying locations. In this 
sense, Ratanakiri has much in common with other upland, forested parts of the Mekong 
region, such as Mae Hong Son in Thailand, or the Central Highlands of Vietnam. 
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However, being ‘peripheral’ is not simply an accident of modern political geography, far 
more important are the specific sets of relations and amalgams of power that mediate, 
circulate, and affect the politics of place, scale and position within the Mekong region 
(Lebel, Garden, Imamura, 2005).    
 
Another key concern about the Se San is the way in which it has materialized into a very 
relevant site for discussions about the pros and cons of water governance (Hirsch, 2007), 
particularly trans-boundary scale governance (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004), and the problems 
of environmental (and social) impact assessments (Wyatt and Baird, 2007). As such, the 
Se San River has become valuable in discussions about the politics of scale, place and 
position within Mekong environmental and social movements. Indeed, parts of the 
Mekong such as Pak Mun (Thailand) and Se San (particularly in Cambodia) have become 
highly symbolic cases within the broader politics of the environment and governance 
battles of the entire Mekong region (Hirsch, 2006a).  
 
6.2 The question of environmental and social impact assessments 
 
The question of environmental and social impact assessment is an important one since 
such assessments can help include the social needs of the local population and their 
environment in dam projects. Such assessments are infrequently carried out at the 
national level, no agreements have been made internationally to carry out trans-border 
assessments. Even the previous MRC CEO until 2004 Joern Kristensen tried to develop a 
framework for it with the help of internal experts in the MRC Secretariat, among others 
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with the Se San dams in mind. As part of this project, riparian officials from the Mekong 
Countries went to Europe, among other destinations, to study trans-border assessments, 
studying for instance the trans-boundary Danube River. However, so far no agreement 
has been reached between the Mekong countries which can help facilitate trans-border 
assessments even the Mekong and many of its tributaries are trans-boundary, and also the 
countries have no national legislation in place which requires environmental and social 
impact assessments for large dams or other infrastructural projects. National assessments 
have been carried out only on a limited scale in the Mekong region. The most successful 
(in relative terms which unfortunately does mean much in the Mekong region) is often 
deemed the Thailand Pak Mun Dam EIA which recommended the feasibility study of a 
fish way and later a fish ladder was constructed (the first of its type to be built by 
authorities to allow fish travelling up the river – which however in practice did not work) 
to ascertain the availability of fish for the local population and the river environment. 
China has also carried out an (not very comprehensive) EIA on the upstream Mekong.  
 
In some countries Environment and Social Impact Assessment is required in the Terms of 
Reference for the Dam project. It seems like a double standard when international donors 
are not requesting the Mekong countries to carry out a mandatory assessment for each 
major dam project. The choice of the site of a dam is mostly only decided by economic 




However often EIA’s globally are carried out late in the project cycle when the dam site 
has already been selected and initial engineering studies already have been carried out. A 
truly useful environmental and social assessment would need to be carried out so that it 
will impact the selection of the dam site. 
 
One essential factor is that other agencies than the environmental agency must be ready 
to share their information and data with those carrying out the assessments. Without 
support from other agencies (mostly focusing on engineering and economics) the 
environment people will have a hard case to solve. 
 
Social and environmental assessments will often result in recommendations such as for 
instance re-housing and removal from the area around the dam site. Since assessments are 
considered essential to a successful dam project they have been implemented in many 
developed countries around the world.  
 
6.3 ‘Local’ downstream impacts and questions of ‘scale’ along the Se 
San River 
 
The chapter’s opening quotations by a fisherman of Andoung Meas District and by a 
local village chief reveal the indigenous perspectives of the river as a living entity with 
enormous cultural and livelihood meanings. However, they also show a sudden and 
dramatic transformation in the way this indigenous fisherman perceived the river, turning 
security into insecurity and nurture into danger. This direct and simple way of perceiving 
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the river and the changes that mega-developments have brought to it lie at the heart of the 
socio-economic and environmental impacts relating to trans-border developments. Many 
of the villagers have never seen the Yali Falls Dam yet they feel its impacts on a daily 
basis. The geopolitical boundary somehow manages to produce a false sense of distance, 
and the sovereignty shield it produces helps to deflect the growing voices of despair away 
from those responsible for hydropower policy and dam construction. Yet the linearity of 
riparian ecosystem brings with it both benefits and harm depending on actions taken 
upstream. 
 
Numerous excellent empirical studies in the Mekong have shown the vital connections 
between ecology and society based on the aquatic resources of the watercourses and the 
livelihoods linked directly to the river. Some of these have shown considerable negative 
ecological and biological downstream impacts of hydropower dams on aquatic life and 
fisheries (Khao et.al., 2005; Roberts, 2001; Baird, 2001; Dudgeon, 2000). Other studies 
have examined particular social and environmental costs of hydropower dams in 
considerable detail, particularly in relation to Laos (IRN, 2008; 2004; Blake, 2005; 
Schouten et.al., 2004), Chinese dams on the Lancang (Chinese for Mekong mainstream) 
(Daming and Linhui, 2002; Dore and Yu, 2004), and in relation to the Yali Falls dam 
(Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004; Baird and Dearden, 2003; Fisheries Office and NTFP, 2000). 
The Se San River is an excellent example of the closeness and dependency people 
develop in relation to their immediate environments and the resource or environmental 
services natural capital provides. As such, there is much we can learn from the direct 
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experiences and knowledge of local fishers and communities in the aftermath of a major 
hydropower project along its upper reaches (Baird and Meach, 2005).    
 
When I undertook my primary research in the Se San I realized that trans-boundary 
projects (such as the Yali Falls dam and other dams on the Se San) were creating 
numerous changes and challenges for ordinary villagers and that decision-making relating 
to the construction and operation of upstream dams was something very remote to the 
very communities that were being most adversely affected by the new trans-border 
developments. At the time of my initial interest I was still an MRC Secretariat intern, 
which meant that my perspective was at least partly informed by the documents and 
discussions within that organization about the Se San. However, as noted in chapter 5, 
these were by no means one dimensional nor were the confidences I received within the 
Secretariat necessarily reflective of the MRC at member state levels. In addition, lively 
debates began to circulate both within and between relevant agencies in response to 
important research examining the direct socio-environmental impacts on the people (for 
instance in the bulletin put out by the Australian Mekong Resource Centre, Mekong 
Update & Dialogue, and through the community-linked NGO called the ‘3 S’ (Se San, 
Sre Pok and Se Kong Rivers) Protection Network). In order to become more acquainted 
with what was happening within the Se San Valley I undertook fieldwork at different 
times, which has provided additional material on socio-economic and environmental 
impacts of the Yali Falls dam discussed in this chapter.  
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In the following sections I use the term ‘trans-border ‘local’ impacts’ to describe some of 
the key problems the communities of the Se San have faced following the construction 
and operation of the Yali Falls Dam. Whilst the issue of hydropower dams with 
downstream effects felt in more than one country is undoubtedly an ‘international’ 
problem, the difficulties faced by the indigenous Se San communities are at one level 
‘trans-border’ (emanating from Vietnam across the border with Cambodia) but at another 
level they are profoundly ‘local’ (affecting specific localities, districts, places and 
communities). The success or failure of community-based organizations to elevate ‘local’ 
problems to broader national and regional levels is clearly related to the ‘scaled’ politics 
of the environment involving key civil society groups and non-governmental 
organizations. One of the most important political effects of the Yali Dam (and later 
dams) was the spur this gave to the development of local coalitions based around the 
NGO called the 3 SPN (an anti-dam protection network based on three rivers, initially the 






6.3.1. Map of the Se San, Sre Pok and Se Kong Rivers in the Cambodia, Vietnam Border 
Area (3 SPN) 
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To analyze the political geographies associated with trans-border impacts, I have found 
that we can incorporate a useful schema developed by (Lebel, Garden and Imamura, 
2005), in which they discussed the ‘politics of scale’, ‘politics of position’ and ‘politics of 
place’ in the governance of water resources in the Mekong. As (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004) 
have argued, water governance is very much a multi-stakeholder and multi-scaled issue, 
and one of the key issues relates to the ability and capacity of so-called ‘local’ 
community-based groups to successfully combine, collaborate and communicate via 
bigger social and environmental networks. Particularly important here is the ability of 
groups such as 3 SPN to develop degrees of trust and support from national governments 
and relevant organizations such as the MRC. Through political mobilization and 
community/NGO coordination it is possible to ‘rescale’ ‘trans-border local’ into central 
concerns at national and international level. ‘The politics of position’ is valuable as it 
specifically relates to geographical upstream-downstream politics within international 
river basins. It also relates to the relatively marginalized socio-economic and political 
‘position’ of so-called ‘minority’ groups, such as many communities of Ratanakiri.  
 
Finally, ‘politics of place’ relates to places in relation to one another. In considering 
‘place’ it is useful to note that the concept involves many different groups, stakeholders 
and ‘tangled arrangements of power’ (Allen, 2003). Thus one place, village or 
community is not monolithic or static, but may also contain internal contests and great 
socio-economic differentiation. However, the ‘politics of place’ also concerns relational 
politics between places (Lebel, Garden and Imamura, 2005). For example, 
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hydroelectricity is often a critical component of national economic and energy agendas, 
and in considering the costs and benefits of hydropower some places are given priority 
over others. This is clearly the case with the decisions to develop hydroelectric potential 
in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. For instance, power from Yali is destined for the 
southern industrial regions around Ho Chi Minh City via a 500 KV transmission line that 
was funded as part of a $ 575 USD million World Bank loan (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004: 
54). Thus, Vietnam’s national and regional energy program is designed to benefit 
particular stakeholders and places more than others, and given the economic significance 
of the industries and cities to benefit most, it means that in the national mindset other 
negative impacts and externality costs, including ‘trans-border’ ones, are considered less 
of a priority. The downstream communities of the Se San, whether in Vietnam or 
Cambodia, must develop their own counter politics in order to overcome their marginal 
positions within national interests and energy policies. This necessarily means that 
environmental politics often incorporates the overlapping issues of scale, position and 
place.     
 
6.4 Trans-border ‘local’ impacts of dams on hydrology and water levels 
 
Since operations began at the Yali Falls Dam in June 2000, irregular releases of larger 
amounts of water from its reservoir have been argued to have altered downstream 
hydrology and water quality (Kim and Tep, 2006; Baird and Meach, 2005; Hirsch and 
Wyatt, 2004; Baird and Dearden, 2003). Unusual and dramatic fluctuations in river-water 
levels have caused numerous negative externalities and downstream impacts in north-
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eastern Cambodia, especially for indigenous communities living along the Se San River 
in Ratanakiri province. Until reports started filtering out in 2001, the impacts of the Yali 
Falls dam in Stung Trung province were largely unknown outside of the affected villages. 
Local people had made their own observations about irregular water levels but they had 
not received any official reports regarding the existence of the Yali Falls dam and 
therefore did not blame water fluctuations on the dam. However, in June 2001, the 3
rd
 
Vice-Governor or Stung Trung province, His Excellency Phao Hom Phan, and the district 
chief of Se San District, Mr. Nhiem Samon, plus members of the international non-
governmental organization, Partners for Development (PFD) visited a number of villages 
situated adjacent to the Se San River in eastern Se San district. During their official 
reconnaissance trip they observed for themselves some of the serious downstream 
impacts that the dam was having on livelihoods and environmental resources. Following 
the trip, critical voices within the provincial government started to raise their concerns 
over negative consequences and economic costs relating to the upper Se San dam 
construction and operations. This was a watershed point in national politics concerning 
trans-boundary impacts, as the provincial authorities pushed the national ones to take 




6.4.1. Map of the Se San River Basin (AMRC) 
 
Prior to the Se San becoming a political concern at provincial level, several communities 
were already making important observations about significant local level changes in 
water-levels. The seasonal unpredictability of water flows and levels started to confuse 
local fishermen. Villagers started to notice that even when it was clearly raining upstream 
local water-levels were not swelling or were sometimes dropping unexpectedly 
(Interviews with villagers of Andoung Meas, and O Yadao district, fieldwork, January-
February 2004). Villagers of O. Yadao District, which is near the border with Vietnam, 
claimed that water-levels would sometimes suddenly rise or fall as much as seven or 
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more metres in one day. Such water-level changes are extremely dangerous to people 
living by the river, particularly if they occur at night or just before dawn because they are 
just not prepared for such sudden large changes.  Night time changes in water-levels are a 
serious concern particularly to those fishermen who sleep along the banks or on sandbars 
or rocks along the Se San River. As one Veun Sai villager told me: ‘High is too high and 
low is too low’ (24 January, 2004). In Andoung Meas district, an elder told me: ‘We have 
to tie our boats strongly to a tree, we cannot fall asleep in the boat while in the river due 
to the risk of floods, and we cannot let our children play alone along the river any more’ 
(Interview, 9 January, 2004).  
 
Between 2000 and 2003 various testimonies attributed some 39 deaths to unpredictable 
and sudden changes in water flow (Lerner, 2003). Many boats and nets have also been 
lost due to sudden floods in Andoung Meas district which was linked by villagers to the 
extraordinary rise in water-levels during a period from 16-19 October 2003. Two people 
almost drowned. Whilst the rainy season produces occasional floods, the villagers blamed 
the Yali dam (Fieldwork, December 2003). On 13 November in the same year there were 
further flash floods which accounted for a boat being lost and parcels of land becoming 
flooded. A villager from Veun Sai district mentioned that his village (Ka Chon) 
experienced quite sudden fluctuations of up to three metres in both wet and dry seasons. 
Such stories have become very common in the Se San Valley (Baird and Meach, 2005; 
interview with Mr. Gordon Paterson, NTFP NGO based in Ban Lung, 21 December 
2006; Kim and Tep, 2006). See figures 6.4.2 and 6.4.3, for simulated and observed water 




6.4.2. Simulated and observed water levels at Andoung Meas – dry season, December 
2003 (3 SPN) 
 
 
6.4.3. Simulated water levels at Andoung Meas – rainy season, July 2001 (3 SPN) 
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In Lum village along the Se San in a district with mostly Jarai, Tombun and Lao people, 
prior to the Yali dam people remember only rare flooding events every several years, but 
following the construction of the dam, people started to experience more flooding after 
1997. According to one respondent, Mr. Kamduan, 2
nd
 District Head of Andoung Meas 
District, water-levels in the dry season were highly irregular, and the incidents of floods 
is now more frequent than before the dam (see Appendix 6). ‘Before 1996 the floods only 
lasted three days every seven years, but after the dam started operating, floods during 
August-September 2001 and 2002 lasted up to 20 days’ (Interview, 8 January, 2004).   
 
Even in the absence of significant flood events, there are large monthly variations in 
water-level to contend with, as I discovered in January 2004, when levels recorded by the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology local station in Ratanakiri varied between 
0.2 and 0.8 metres.  As (Wyatt and Baird 2007: 432-433) noted: ‘Such fluctuations in 
river levels and flow occur sometimes on a diurnal basis, and at other times days apart. 
These fluctuations continue to pose problems for Se San communities by washing away 
boats and fishing nets and by affecting communities’ ability to employ fishing practices 
that rely on stable river levels.’ Discussions with Mr. Jiang Lun, head of a commune 
incorporating ten villages, confirms the unpredictability problem for ‘the water levels of 
the Se San now changes daily in the dry season depending on when the dam closes and 
opens’ (Interview, 22 December, 2006). Mr. Si Phat, a commune chief for two villagers, 
said that he had made official complaints at District level in Veun Sai concerning the 
continuing problem villagers face with water fluctuations, particularly economic losses 
associated with damaged nets (Interview, 24 December, 2006). 
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Many villagers complain about the lack of proper warning in advance of water releases 
from the Vietnam based Yali dam. Sometimes the villagers receive information via I-
Com, which has been the practice since my first visit to the Se San in 2004. Usually this 
happens three days before the reservoir gates are opened. However, previously 
information about water-level changes due to dam operations was not passed on to 
villagers (Pers.comm. Ian Baird, researcher, December 2006).  Furthermore, as Mr. Jen 
Pol of the 3 SPN NGO informed me, the I-Coms were supplied to villagers courtesy of 
the National Police in Phnom Penh, one for each commune along the Se San River, but if 
an I-Com is damaged or stolen, as has occurred in some places, the villagers often do not 
have the 125 USD to replace them (Interview, 24 December   2006).  
 
Based upon fieldwork conducted at different times, December 2003, January 2004, 
December 2006 and January 2007 I have found that villagers from different districts are 
virtually unanimous in attributing changing water-levels to the activities of the Yali Falls 
Dam. Data from the Department of Water Resources and Meteorology in Ratanakiri 
province (see Figure 6.4.2. based on readings by Mr. Pen Kamduan, 3
rd
 District Head) 
shows some recordings in the dry and wet seasons in the critical two years post the Yali 
dam becoming regularly operational in 2001. Irregularities in water-level are particularly 
significant during the rainy season from May to October, with exceptionally high 
readings recorded, whilst dry season levels have suggested that levels are sometimes 
higher and sometimes lower than prior to the dam. The key problems for ecology and 
livelihoods are the more frequent, non-seasonal fluctuations of water-level that are 
affecting everyday livelihoods, such as fisheries (see below). Nevertheless, we should be 
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cautious about utilizing this data, which in some places relies on readings by ordinary 
villagers. Data is sometimes unreliable due to human error, and villagers sometimes 
record both the morning and afternoon data at 6am to avoid having to walk a distance 
back to their homes in the dark (Pers.comm. Ian Baird, researcher, December 2006).   
Thus, in addition to the limited water-level data available we need to rely upon 
qualitative information based upon local understandings.  
 
During research in December 2003, I met with villagers from Ksaich Thmey Thom in 
Stung Trung province who recalled the sound of surge waters in the river ‘like the sound 
of a heavy wind or an oncoming storm’ but actually it was water flowing in the river 
itself and nothing to do with the weather (Interview, Mr. Yorn, villager, Ksaich Thmey 
Thom, 5 December 2003). Villagers in Ratanakiri province often reported that when 
water-levels first rise it makes the river water smell bad, ‘like stagnant water in a hole 
where buffaloes wallow’, and that this was also considered ‘unusual’. Furthermore, other 
villagers (from Andoung Meas) have noticed foam on the water surface, which may be an 
indicator of pollution.  
 
More seriously, the alterations in water-level and possibly in water quality have major 
implications for human security, and there are many villagers, like the fisherman of 
Andoung Meas, who are now feeling insecure and are actually frightened of the river that 
has previously been so vital for their lives. (Kim and Tep, 2006) of the 3SPN reported 
that villagers were abandoning their villages along the Se San River to move into the 
uplands because they were ‘tired of living with fear that the dam may break or their lives 
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will be swept away in a water surge or flood. One woman in Pawdal village along the Se 
San River summarized her feelings by stating, “Everyday people are scared of the water, 
the same feeling as if they have just seen a cobra or a tiger.”’ Such a psychological and 
cultural change in the human/nature relationship is an extremely profound result of 
upstream mega-projects on the numerous ethnic groups living along the Se San River. 
Much of this is related to growing evidence of the huge impact the Yali Dam has had on 
downstream fisheries.  
 
6.5 Trans-border ‘local’ impacts upon fisheries and fish-based 
livelihoods 
 
In Ratanakiri and Stung Treng provinces there were initially many reports of catching 
large amounts of fish the first time water-levels began to reach unprecedented low levels 
after the opening of the Yali Falls dam, but once those fish were caught, fishers found 
that they were not able to catch nearly as many as they had previous to the dam opening 
(Information from fieldwork, December 2004, also see Appendix 6), photos 1 and 2). 
Sometimes the water-level may drop so much it is difficult for some species to survive, 
and other fish migratory patterns may be adversely affected. Fishing activities may be 
directly affected. For example, sudden water surges damage equipment and boats, whilst 
sudden water drops may leave gillnets literally hanging ‘high and dry.’  
 
So part of the problem for fisheries relates to sudden or unusual water-level changes, but 
this is not all that is of concern. In a detailed study of indigenous fisheries and fish 
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species along the Se San, (Baird and Meach, 2005) highlight a whole set of biophysical 
and ecological downstream impacts that relate to the Se San. For instance, they highlight 
the increased turbidity of waters and riverbank erosion resulting from what villagers call 
‘hungry water’ and the silting of deep-water pool refuges and breeding sites for fishes. 
Silting up holes in underground rocks is another source of damage to fish habitats, just as 
silt and sand deposits affect rock algae. As one example of the rich empirical material 
found in their report, and the way in which local forms of knowledge contribute to 
scientific ecological understandings of the river, they found: ‘Fishers from Kanat Toich, 
Talao and Bokham reported losses of Labeo erthopterus, Mekongina erythospila, 
Gyrinocheilus pennocki, Morulius spp., and other species as a result of silt and sand 
being deposited on algae growing on rapids. This algae represents important sources of 
food for these species and others’ (Baird and Meach, 2005: 12). Their methodology and 
research involved painstaking efforts to relate various vernacular languages with the 
scientifically ‘universal’ Latin names for fish species utilizing photographs of fish in a 
binder provided to all the local fishers who were recording information from their own 
observations and catches. As the authors note, ‘the analysis of villagers, based on local 
ecological knowledge, seems quite reasonable when considered in the light of what is 
known about these sorts of impacts by biologists and ecologists’ (Baird and Meach, 2005: 
14). The relevance of these findings and this approach and my own observations is that 
obtaining and understanding ‘local trans-border impacts’ require field research and 
understanding of the everyday geographies of intense social and environmental linkages 







6.5.1. Impact of Dam on Se San River Ecosystem Structure (Community Based 
Environmental Studies in Northeastern Cambodia and in Northern Thailand, by (Mekong 
Watch, Feb 2007: 18) 
 
The decline of fisheries along the Se San River are not all attributable to the Yali Falls 
dam, as there has been a steady rise in population, increasing market pressures leading to 
certain destructive fishing methods being introduced, including fish poisoning and illegal 
very fine-mesh gears, which is a trend throughout the Lower Mekong (Pers.comm. Mak 
Sithirith, Fisheries Action Coalition Team, 14 November 2008). As Mr. Jiang Lun told 
me: ‘Last year a group of soldiers had killed all the fish in a nearby stream, and now 
private tour groups were arriving to kill fish on a large scale’ (Interview, 22 December, 
2006), since it is easier to kill large amounts that way, even larger than they might be able 
to consume. Thus, there is growing competition for the aquatic resources of Ratanakiri. 
Nevertheless, (Baird and Meach, 2005) and various subsequent reports put out by the 
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3SRN group provide plenty of rich anecdotal evidence for declines in fish yield, species 
reductions reported in catches, as well as catch-per-unit-of effort (CPUE) data along the 
Se San River mainstream, which they argue is the result of changes in hydrology and 
ecology due to hydropower dam operations. (Baird and Meach, 2005) monitored 1,969 
fishing operations, covering 27,362 fishing hours, with 14,847 fish landings weighing 
2,250 kg and perhaps as many as ‘120 biological species’ within their fishery impact 
study, and they reported ‘the average decline’ in fish catches of ‘26.7%’ from pre-dam 
catches (based upon actual fish-catch data and the reports of fishers from interviews). 
Whilst the precise percentage drop is probably impossible to ascertain due to the 
variability in fishes and fishing activity along the Se San’s course, what is important is 
that the dramatic decline seems mostly attributable to the negative impacts of the Yali 
Dam. For instance, ‘increased turbidity and sediment loads (from increased riverbank 
erosion) have reduced the light available for algae growth, or smothered bottom-growing 
algae, which is an important food source for some species. High sediment loads have also 
damaged important fish habitat, such as deep-water pools, through sediment deposition, 
and in-filling’ (Wyatt and Baird, 2007: 433). Such evidence is consistent with other 
fishery and biodiversity studies of adverse downstream consequences of both so-called 
run-of-river dams and reservoir dams in the Mekong region (International Rivers 
Network, 2008; 2004; Blake, 2005; Schouten et.al., 2004; Roberts, 2001; Baird, 2001; 
Dudgeon, 2000). 
 
During my own research, I was frequently told about declining catches. For instance, Mr. 
Peng Kamduan from Andoung Meas district, informed me: ‘In the dry season before 
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1996 a fisherman could catch 10 kg in one afternoon. Now they can only catch around 1 
kg with the same gear and effort in one afternoon’ (Interview, 8 January, 2004). 
Fisherman Aim Cheah from Lum village took me on his fishing boat in the early morning 
on 9 January, 2004, and he caught some small fishes. He was happy that day because he 
said sometimes he did not catch any fish at all for two or three nights in a row.  Another 
meeting with Peng Kamduan, 54 years, on 20 December 2006, almost three years post an 
earlier meeting with him, revealed that fisheries were still very depressed on that stretch 
of the Se San River. He said: ‘All the villagers go to fish for their own consumption, but 
there is much less fish than before the dam. They only fish in the dry season and keep 
fish as   fermented fish for up to one year. In the rainy season they prefer to fish in small 
streams.’ Further confirmation of declining fisheries was provided by Mr. Glandun, 58 
years, Chief of Bor Kham village in Andoung Meas district: ‘There are no big fish in the 
river. We cannot use big mesh size nets anymore and so we are trying smaller mesh sizes. 
We still have boys and girls in the village, but we say: “Where there is water there is fish, 
and where there are boys there are girls”, but now there are no fish’ (Interview, 20 
December, 2006). Mr. Tanh, another local fisherman, aged 39 years, also recalled that 
before the Yali dam was built he would probably catch about 5 kg of fish in one hour, but 
now he hardly catches fish in the Se San mainstream, preferring to fish in the smaller 
tributaries where he catches about 1 kg in one hour of effort (Interview, 22 December, 
2006). Indigenous fishers are very knowledgeable about local spawning grounds, habitats 
and refuges of fish. Mr. Hut Men, a Tamboun fisher, observed: ‘The water levels in the 
Se San change too frequently for fish habitation. If the dam is closed for longer periods 
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during the rainy season the fish cannot breed as there are no deep cool pools’ (Interview, 
24 December, 2006). 
 
Similarly, fieldwork in Bor Kham, a Jarai village, which is located near to the Vietnam 
border, revealed a local fishery in distress with villagers complaining that they could not 
catch enough fish to meet the needs of their community, and that they were resorting to 
alternative sources wherever possible. The village used to be much bigger but divided up 
as some villagers wanted to farm paddy rice due to the many floods in the area. The 
increase in rainy season water-levels in the area has occasionally led to loss of homes and 
boats. In nearby Dan Lau village I met with Mr. Bun Lam, a guide from the Se San NGO, 
working with local fishers, including people of Jarai, Khmer, Lao and Vietnamese origin 
in this borderland zone. We met with local fisherman, Mr. Baang Khan, who revealed he 
had been fishing the Se San since he was 15 years old (so about 35 years). He argued that 
the Yali dam operations since 1997 were responsible for periodically blocking water 
which was detrimental to local fisheries. With less reliance of fishing, people had to 
collect non-forest timber products, wild vegetables and to grow more of their own. 
However, Baang Kham indicated that wild vegetables were also in decline near the 
riverbanks due to water-level changes (Interview, 23 December, 2006). Thus, there are 
apparent broader negative   ecology-livelihood impacts to consider.    
 
Species variety and the effects of the dam on different species, particularly migratory 
ones, is a key concern. During the period from 7 July to 11 December 2003, seven local 
fisher reporters from Andoung Meas district reported 58.8 kg of fish catches divided 
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between 35 different species. In Ta Vaeng district, three fishermen caught 43.6 kg with 
41 species in the same period. Elsewhere there is considerable evidence of great species 
variety within catches. However, important changes to the river’s natural rhythms seem 
to be happening that are now affecting particular fish species. One artificial alteration 
may be the effects of more unreliable rising and falling waters, and fluctuations within 
seasons, on the ‘migration triggers’ for different migratory fishes. For instance, scientific 
studies have found particular fish, such as the Pangasilidae catfish have regular 
migrations between tributaries and the Mekong River in Laos (Hogan et.al., 2004; 2006), 
and fish migrations are common between the Se San, Sekong and Mekong rivers (Baird 
and Meach, 2005).  Se San fishers have reported that certain fishes have suffered serious 
impacts with big declines in catches, and others have largely disappeared from river since 
dam operations Baird and Meach, 2005: 35-6). Their study also found plenty of evidence 
for broader ecological disturbance, including reported reductions in various species of 
earthworms, shellfish, other aquatic creatures, and various seasonally inundated trees and 
bushes located near riverbanks.   
 
6.6 Trans-border ‘local’ impacts on riverbank gardens  
 
The hydrological changes wrought by the upstream hydro-power dam have major 
implications on food security, fisheries, and potentially negative ones on public and 
animal health. For instance, many villagers, in addition to relying on river fish as a major 
source of protein, also rely on small riverbank garden plots which are a familiar site, 
especially in the dry season, along many parts of the mainstream and tributaries of the 
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Mekong Basin. Sudden water-level changes, or alterations in seasonal patterns due to 
artificial withholding or releases of water, have very damaging implications on riverbank 
agriculture of all kinds. Several villages have experienced level fluctuations (Fieldwork 
observations, December 2006, also see Appendix 6, photo 13). Protection of riverbank 
plots was definitely one of the key objectives of the Rak (Love) Chiang Khong campaign 
in the middle reaches of the mainstream Mekong against the Chinese reef blasting to 
improve navigation.  Similarly, along rivers such as the Se San and Sre Pok there are 
many community-based horticultural and riverside garden activities within the river 
landscape. Riverbanks grow various native edible vegetables, as well as crops such as 
chillies, eggplant, tobacco, cabbages, and others. Indeed, given the fact that many of the 
local people in the Se San still rely largely on food sources rather than money for 
survival, the transformation of environmental resources due to the upstream hydropower 
dam takes on deeper significance in terms of livelihood and food security.  
 
6.7 Indigenous livelihoods and food security 
 
Indigenous peoples in Ratanakiri, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, face numerous 
problems in terms of protecting and managing their environmental resources. The 
challenges posed by hydropower and other developments are placing the various ethnic 
groups of the Se San in similar positions to other indigenous peoples in the region. 
Researchers examining indigenous practices and swiddening systems in other parts of 
Southeast Asia have shown that indigenous knowledge systems are often quite flexible 
and adaptable in highland environments (Ganjanapan, 1998; Laungaransri, 1999 and 
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2001). However, there are increasingly diverse pressures on upland agricultural systems 
associated with the extensions of forest reserves, national parks, lowland cash crop 
systems upwards, and the efforts by State authorities to resettle upland peoples into other 
areas, often due to watershed conservation schemes (Ganjanapan, 2000). 
 
Hydropower has forced people downstream on the Se San River to change their way of 
life from previously being mainly fisherman to now focusing more and growing 
vegetables, however not on riverbanks immediately next to the river since these will be 
flooded by the sudden water level rises due to the water outlets from the Yali Falls Dam. 
Therefore one now sees vegetable gardens on small streams linking the Se San River with 
adjacent towns and other areas. 
 
The indigenous people of Ratanakiri have always tried to preserve natural resources and 
manage them in a sustainable way. This despite the debate over the sustainability of 
swidden culture, if managed carefully it only supports nature and does not harm it. 
 
One of the main arguments against swidden agriculture is that it degrades the land since it 
is left without being used for a number of years during changes between different crops. 
However indigenous knowledge says that leaving the land fallow is for the benefit of the 
fertility of the soil. (See for instance Laungaransri, 2001; Watershed, various issues). 
 
Pressure has long been on the people of the Se San River area, both from logging and 
hydropower, interventions made from outside the local community in order to facilitate 
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so-called development in one way or another. On both sides of the border most of the 
people along the Se San River are ethnic minorities, mostly Jarai, and their activities are 
similar based on mostly agricultural and forest production (previously also fisheries, but 
now less and less). People rely primarily on swidden agriculture for their livelihoods 
without much chance of other occupations, non-timber forest products, some cash crops 
on a small-scale, and fishing activities. 
 
The Jarai people call their cultivated land for hma, consisting of three categories: 
 Hma rung or hma ro, which is the rice-milpa (cleared by burning) used for only 
two crops and then is left fallow for ten years 
 Hma mnai, the milpa used for multiple cropping, generally situated by a river or a 
stream and used for growing cereals, fruit trees and beans 
 Hma dnao and hma ia are submerged rice-fields reserved exclusively for the 
cultivation of rice, hma dnao is the marshy rice-field and hma ia the “field 
waiting for rain”, cultivable thanks to rainwater 
 
The Jarai do not follow the pioneer swiddening approach, but instead pursue a kind of 
cyclical swiddening (secondary forest cultivation) that is also a type of slash-and-burn 
cultivation which allows the vegetation to degenerate for subsequent clearing. Contrary to 
what is sometimes said, most swidden farmers live in long-established villages and use 
temporary camps when cultivating distant fields (according to IDRC/UNDP/CARERE 
Report on Ratanakiri). 
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Villagers along the Se San mainly work on “slope land”. They don’t have paddy rice 
fields, but instead areas of flat land near the Se San River, but use it to grow the same 
kind of rice as they would do on slope land, which is often located far away from the 
village and therefore not easy to get to without being away from home for prolonged 
periods of time. The infrequent water levels of the Se San after construction of the Yali 
Falls Dam, however has made use of these flat fields near the river difficult and 
sometimes simply impossible. 
 
The Jarai and other highlander groups begin preparing their fields as early as January 
(long before the rains arrive). The first job is to find forested land suitable for cultivation. 
Older males will go out into the forest and identify good places for cultivating. The 
qualities of good sites including having good soils (red is preferred), few rocks and a 
good forest cover. Sites also should not displease “the spirits”. Once a good site is found, 
males will take handmade axes and cut down all the large and medium-sized trees there. 
One family’s plot usually covers from one to three hectares of land. As the dry season 
progresses, land to be cultivated is burnt by men. After that, both men and women will 
make further preparations for planting and by the time the first monsoon rains arrive 
around May their fields are ready for planting. 
 
Land degradation is widespread in highland swidden field areas in both Vietnam and 
Cambodia. Throughout the uplands, erosion and leaching of nutrients have reduced soil 
quality. Yields in swidden fields have declined to as low as 400 to 600 kilograms of rice 
per hectare (compared to six or seven tons now frequently achieved in the Red River 
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Delta of Vietnam). As a result of population pressure and loss of forestland in Vietnam, 
the fallow period in swidden farming is steadily declining. In many places fields are 
cultivated for three or four years, then allowed to lie fallow for only the same period 
when a rest of 10 to 15 years is needed to fully restore productivity. Decreased soil 
fertility and increased weed competition are the consequences of a shortened fallow 
period. The result is that farmers, primarily women, must work longer and harder for 
ever-decreasing yields. 
 
Cultivation remains the main livelihood of the indigenous peoples in the Se San 
watershed. Apart from those who can practice wet rice cultivation, most people’s lives 
depend on upland rice field cultivation and nowadays that means often far away from 
their village if the village rice fields are located in flooded areas of the Se San River. 
Besides swidden agriculture, agro-forestry in general is becoming more and more 
important to secure peoples livelihoods, especially now after most of the fish are gone 
from the Se San River and much of the logging from previous days has ceased since most 
of the attractive trees for logging companies are gone, at least from major areas of 
Ratanakiri province.  
 
Forests are important resources to all households, both for personal consumption and for 
cash. The jungle is utilized to provide essential dietary supplement by hunting and 
gathering. Women and children collect dead wood for fuel and building materials, 
mushrooms, bamboo shoots, saffron, roots, wild fruits and berries, leaves, ginger and 
other wild plants. Non-timber forest products (NTFP’s) provide villagers throughout the 
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region with a large percentage of their disposable incomes, although incomes are 
generally low and subsistence-level hunting, gathering and farming are still the most 
important activities for locals. Most NTFP’s are harvested seasonally and on a small scale 
and sold on markets in Pleiku, Vietnam and Ban Lung, Cambodia.  
 
The Jarai people do not rely much on plants as medical herbs, but are satisfied with the 
availability of forest vegetables for food consumption, however especially Jarai women 
are often very knowledgeable about the different kinds of vegetables to be found and they 
spend prolonged periods of time on collection vegetables.  Local ethno-botanical 
knowledge is often little known by outsiders, but it could be of crucial importance to 
managing forests. This links to broader debates about indigenous ecological knowledge 
and its role in broader issues of natural resource management (such as in Menzies or 
Berkes). 
 
The change in the natural environment, both from logging and hydropower dam 
construction, has placed a pressure on the livelihoods of people along the Se San. Water 
and NTFP collection, and for the men fishing, has become increasingly time consuming 
and sometimes impossible. For the women textile weaving used to be a traditional 
activity, however now they don’t have the time needed for this activity and have become 
more dependant on buying clothes from the market, a difficult situation when no cash is 
available and the barter economy not always works. In one Kreung village along the Se 
San it was mentioned that buying salt (as a source of nutrition) is considered more 
important as buying clothes, which is understandable, but a direct effect of the lack of 
 191 
fish in the river and the distance to sites for collecting food such as vegetables and for 
hunting.  
 
Another way that people along the Se San River have adjusted to development has been 
eco-tourism. The small airport in Ban Lung frequently is the arrival place of foreigners 
wanting to explore the pristine nature of North-East Cambodia, including its red earth 
which has given name to a well known hotel in the area named “Terre Rouges”. The most 
impressive place of eco-conservation for visitors near Ban Lung is the Yeak Laom 
Commune Protected Area which is located 3-4 kilometres east of Ban Lung. The centre 
piece of the area is Yeak Laom Lake, a volcanic crater lake believed to have been created 
about 700,000 years ago. The present day lake is about 800 metres across, more than 50 
metres deep at the centre and surrounded by forest to the top of the crater rim. 
 
Experiments with eco-tourism is one way helping the local people adjust to development, 
but eco-tourism might not help all the people and only provide limited gains in some 
places. The indigenous inhabitants of the region, the Khmer Leu, have long recognized 
the lake as a sacred place, home to the spirits of land, water and forest. These “geo-
symbols” are considered points of privileged encounters between the celestial world 
populated by supernatural entities and the world of humans. Yeak Laom Lake caries a 
rich mythology, evoking its genesis and history and describing the fabulous aquatic 
beings that lived there. It is said that no permanent building can be established on its 
banks, just as the surrounding forests cannot be cut because they are the privileged home 
of the spirits. 
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The livelihood strategy of indigenous peoples is largely based upon agricultural products, 
which includes some swidden forms of cultivation, wetland rice cultivation, pig and 
chicken rearing, gathering food, materials and medicine form forests, and hunting and 
fishing activities. Sometimes some cottage industry and eco-tourism helps provide 
additional income for villages.  
 
Whilst some villages began lowland rice farming in the 1960s, many communities still 
continued with swidden and upland rice cultivation as a key element of their food 
security. Undoubtedly, new pressures are emerging in relation to indigenous village 
economies, such as the spread of commercial agriculture, land grabbing, and illegal 
cross-border timber and smuggling activities. According to Gordon Paterson, a long-time 
leader of the NTPF (Non-Timber Forest Products) NGO, Ratanakiri is an environmental 
resource frontier which is being affected by Vietnamese, Cambodian, Chinese and other 
investments and schemes, growing materialism, and loss of resources to stakeholders and 
places outside of the province (Interview, 21 December 2006). In one of my fieldwork 
areas, Andoung Meas District, cash crop plantations are being set up, involving 
substantial land grabbing and subsequent rocketing land prices. The NTPF is attempting 
to help villagers utilize indigenous rules and concepts to create user boundaries that the 
state and other agencies may recognize, based on the national 2001 Land Law in which 
indigenous communities are allowed to own land. Paterson also noted that many 
Cambodian authorities in the border province have strong business links with Vietnamese 
officials on the other side of the border, which may affect local geopolitics and mean that 
there is some degree of cross-border collusion, whether legal or otherwise.  
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The ‘trans-border local impacts’ of the Yali Dam on the rapidly changing economy and 
livelihoods of people along the Se San deserve some comment. As noted in the previous 
sections, there are observed negative impacts on hydrology and ecology with direct 
consequences for fisheries and riverbank agriculture.  According to one study, it was 
estimated that in 1999 alone there were annual livelihood income losses amounting to as 
much as US $2.5 million, with household incomes decreasing from US$ 109 per month 
to US $46 per month between 1996 and 1999 (Fisheries Office and NFTP, 2000; 
McKenney, 2001; Wyatt and Baird, 2007). Deteriorating fisheries, damage to or loss of 
property from water surges, eroded or damages riverbanks and loss of agriculture near to 
the river are also contributing factors in the increase in indebtedness (Wyatt and Baird, 
2007: 434). Borrowing to pay for fishing equipment or investments on farm plots is very 
common practice throughout Cambodia, but once marginal returns diminish or there are 
additional costs to bare indebtedness can become severe and chronic affecting whole 
communities. Thus, the Yali Falls Dam impacts are having numerous negative indirect 
socio-economic impacts that are actually cumulative if there is no attempt to provide 








6.8 Negotiating indigenous livelihoods and civil society politics in the 
Mekong   
 
My own research and the research of several other scholars has been facilitated in the Se 
San River area by staff of the 3 S Rivers Protection Network (abbreviated as 3SPN), 
which has grown into a very active non-governmental group with extremely close 
community-level relations in the borderlands where the three rivers, the Se San, the Sre 
Pok and the Sekong rivers flow. The 3SPN developed out of the campaigning that was 
done in the wake of the large-scale flooding and loss of property along the Se San in 
early 2000. Initially, there was a loose coalition of NGOs (including national and 
international ones) concerned about the trans-border developments along the Se San 
River. The Se San Working Group (SWG) was formed out of the Non-Timber Forest 
Products Project (NTFP) which as then very active in Ratanakiri working with various 
indigenous communities on community forestry and land entitlement issues, as well as 
Oxfam America, which has for several years been active on livelihood and fisheries 
issues in Cambodia, and Cambodia’s NGO Forum, a coalition of various non-
governmental bodies in the country. Indeed, Oxfam America had previously recruited a 
team of environmental engineers to help investigate Yali Falls incidents, erratic changes 
in the dam’s ‘flow regime’ and various reports of adverse impacts well before the Se San 
Protection Network became established (Pepper, 2002). In the early days after the Yali 
Falls Dam became operational various reports utilized anecdotal evidence from villagers 
themselves, collected detailed local knowledge about the river, and obtained much 
needed data on local livelihoods connected with the river (Fisheries Office and NTFP, 
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2000; Baird et.al., 2002; Ratanakiri Se San Communities, 2002). The involvement of 
Phnom Penh based groups was helpful in extending the ‘spaces of engagement’ after ( 
Cox, 1998) of the Se San communities, providing national forums and contacts with 
numerous other Khmer organizations, whilst Oxfam America was able to publicise 
reports on their website and lobby on behalf of affected communities, and the Oxfam 
America’s East Asia Regional Office also provided technical, advocacy, and advisory 
support.  
 
By early 2001, a Se San Protection Network (SPN) had become established, which was 
then forerunner of the 3SPN, and supported by the NFTP and a group called the Global 
Association for People and Environment (GAPE). This Network has also received 
support from other international partners such as the Australian Mekong Resource Centre 
which helped organize workshops and publicized key events and issues in their online 
bulletin Mekong Update & Dialogue. Within a year of operations the SPN was able to 
develop and strengthen their community-based links, visiting villages, co-opting 
volunteers, organizing formal district meetings. In these formal Se San meetings there 
were district governors, commune chiefs, village chiefs, elders, and various other local 
officials from health, education and agriculture offices in the district government (Hirsch 
& Wyatt, 2004: 60).  
 
According to (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004) the initial strategy of the Se San Protection 
Network was to actively engage with the Mekong River Commission (MRC), Cambodian 
National Mekong Committee (CNMC) and Vietnam National Mekong Committee 
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(VNMC) even though these agencies had seemed to be impotent in handling the trans-
border negative impacts faced by people living along the Se San. The SPN clearly did not 
wish to be viewed purely as an oppositional NGO but had ‘assessed that engagement and 
negotiation through these key agencies and other donor-related agencies would be central 
to their strategy’ (Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004: 59). Following the initial meetings of the SPN 
various requests were made to halt the construction of more hydro-power dams on the Se 
San (and later the Sre Pok): to restore the ‘natural flow’ of the Se San; for villager 
compensation for lost and destroyed property and equipment (and livelihood incomes); 
for greater transparency and openness in trans-border negotiations; and for proper social 
and environmental impact studies to be carried out by relevant agencies (including the 
MRC and stakeholders).  
 
As noted in chapter 5, the MRC Secretariat took a lot of criticism for the Yali Falls Dam 
issue and also for its seeming lack of effectiveness in dealing with Vietnam’s extremely 
limited EIA, lack of prior notification and warnings to communities along the Se San, and 
seeming lack of respect for trans-border protocols in relation to projects with pronounced 
trans-border externalities. Whilst the MRC did set up the Cambodia – Vietnam Joint 
Committee for the Management of the Se San River in October 2000, as noted elsewhere 
in this thesis, the Joint Committee has met few times, and whilst the MRCS participates 
in them, other key participants in the Se San dispute (such as the SPN, other NGOs, and 
the provincial governments) were not invited to participate (Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004: 63). 
The MRCS has subsequently managed to engage Vietnam in releasing more data on 
water flows, to provide early warnings, and encouraged them to undertake impact studies 
 197 
along the entire length of the river. However, Vietnam’s hydro-power developments 
continue, their EIA reports are mostly carried out by technocratic consultants with vested 
interests in the dams, villagers still continue to face many negative impacts as well as 
unpredictable diurnal fluctuations in water flows, and there is still no compensation being 
provided to villagers (Probe International & NGO Forum, Cambodia, February 2008; 
3SPN, August 2007; Mekong Watch, February 2007; Wyatt & Baird, 2007).  
 
Even though the compensation goals of the 3SPN are not met and there are still many 
ongoing problems confronting villagers along the Se San (and Sre Pok, in particular), 
what is impressive is the fact that effective associational ties across various NGOs, 
international agencies and relevant academic agencies has managed to make the Se San 
story one that is often raised in different forums as an illustration of poor trans-border 
cooperation. One aspect of this form of social and environmental politics is the way in 
which different activists, practitioners and academics have tried to undertake measures to 
elevate indigenous ecological knowledge about the river, livelihoods and environment 
onto regional forums that do influence the agendas of key agencies and decision-making 
bodies. Examples of this are the numerous joint 3SPN studies with other agencies, 
researchers and scientists (Baird & Meach, 2005; Bush, 2005; Mekong Watch, 2007; 
Probe International & NGO Forum, Cambodia, February 2008).  
 
In the following chapter I would like to examine in more detail the development of new 
‘terrains of resistance’ (Routledge, 1996), which are partially based upon coalitions of 
community-based and non-governmental agencies, as well as upon the recognition that 
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various forms of knowledge are highly relevant to both conflict resolution and also to 
environmental resource management within the Mekong Basin. I shall also return to a 
discussion of geopolitics, sovereignty and various ways in which civil society groups are 
challenging for greater representation, participation and involvement in the arena of 



























































7.1 Story lines and stereo types  
 
In Chapter 6, I focused on numerous negative trans-boundary issues now confronting the 
riparian communities of the Se San watershed. So far in the thesis we have followed 
‘story-lines’ that are essentially in opposition to one another. In the blue corner, we have 
the hydro-power industry, with state energy agencies, energy consultants, donors and 
financiers, all of whom are considered beneficiaries, whilst in the red corner, we have the 
poor downstream communities, mostly indigenous ‘minorities’, supported by various 
NGOs, community-based groups, international environmental and social organizations.  
Hydropower is considered to be mostly providing energy to people who live a long way 
from the Se San watershed, whilst the costs are viewed to greatly affect particular 
localities and places. As (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004: 65) noted, it is as if both sides have 
reached ‘an impasse with non-negotiable positions on each side,’ but how solid is this 
impasse? Are there movements towards greater negotiation, dialogue, exchange of ideas, 
flows of information? Are dominant ‘discourse coalitions’ (Hajer, 1995) completely fixed 
on particular positions?  Is there scope for compromise and cooperation between the 
‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’? Or are political positions so divergent that only the politics 
of perpetual opposition are possible?  
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To discuss these issues further, it is useful to reconsider the idea of ‘story-lines.’ As 
(Hajer, 1995: 65) argues:  
‘Story-lines are devices through which actors are positioned, and through which 
specific ideas of ‘blame’ and ‘responsibility’, and of ‘urgency’ and ‘responsible 
behaviour’ are attributed. Through story-lines actors can be positioned as victims of 
pollution, as problem-solvers, as perpetrators, as top scientists, or as scaremongers.’ It is 
certainly the case that there are elements of unambiguous political positions being 
adopted by different protagonists in the Se San watershed. Nevertheless, story-lines often 
produce simplifications of explanation and produce research and analysis that is one-
sided and reduces problems to particular causes. (Forsyth and Walker, 2008) have 
demonstrated the issue of ‘problem closure’ in relation to the diametrically opposite 
perspectives of environmental change in the highlands of northern Thailand, which has 
tended to stereotype upland cultivators either as ‘destroyers’ or ‘guardians’ of the forests 
and watersheds. The way environmental problems are framed tends to negate possible 
other explanations for the changes that occur, which in turn, reinforces the original 
prejudiced positions. Finally, ‘story-lines’ also influence actors in their own production 
of knowledge’ (Hajer, 1995: 67), by which Hajer is referring to actors wanting to produce 
similar knowledge as they have seen from story lines. Later in this chapter, I wish to 
illustrate various ways in which existing ‘story-lines’ may become more permeable and 
flexible in relation to alternative environmental narratives. One way this could happen 
would be through regular and open dialogue between communities and NGOs (such as 
the 3SPN group) and local governments (districts) along the Se San River who could then 
refer their concern upstream to regional and national governments. Another way is 
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through multi-stakeholder research collaborations. Also, it is important to appreciate a 
particular ‘discourse coalition’ as being a loose groupings connected by a singular or set 
of story-lines, which influence discursive strategies and practices (Hajer, 1995: 65). But 
no coalition is monolithic, differences do occur, and alternative story-lines, strategies and 
actions may arise over time.  
 
All of the above is not to suggest that my earlier discussion of negative downstream 
impacts is propaganda. Far from it, there is cumulative evidence from numerous reports 
that there are multiple social, economic, cultural and environmental trans-boundary 
externalities. However, there are also many grey areas in our understanding of cause and 
effect, which will require dedicated research before definitive and concrete explanations 
are possible. Furthermore, there is a tendency in some reports of trans-boundary harm to 
list out many complaints about declining fisheries, pollution of water supply, and 
unpredictability of flow regime, but often without consideration of other possible 
contributions factors beyond pointing the figure of blame to the upstream hydropower 
station. On the other side of the boundary, there is often a reluctance to take community-
based reports as being legitimate or reliable sources of evidence, which is sometimes 
based on apparent lack of scientific method. As I will reveal, there are in fact many 
advantages to be had by actively engaging with different forms of knowledge, and 
‘recognizing that their production’ is never ‘entirely neutral’ (Forsyth & Walker, 2008: 
238-42). Before returning to the production of knowledge and opposing story-line debate, 
I will highlight some other key issues inhibiting better water governance.  
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7.2 ‘Trans-border scale’ politics and the national geographic 
 
The first one must be in relation to the indigenous geographies the institutions of 
boundaries and geo-bodies have superseded. As noted in Chapter 4, this has generated a 
form of resource geopolitics that is often related to the dualism of majority / minority, or 
to racialized resource politics (Laungaramsri, 2002). Years of attempts by states to either 
‘integrate’ or ‘assimilate’ or ‘dominate’ different indigenous groups have also helped 
spur many acts of resistance and the forging of political alliances within and across 
borders. Whilst this thesis has not explicitly focused on the politics of identity, these 
issues are present in the background, and from my own periods of fieldwork, the 
politicized ethnicity in Cambodia is just as intense as it is in Thailand and Vietnam see ( 
Keyes, 2008).  
 
A second important issue was raised by (Hirsch, 2006a), who observed that in water 
governance the ‘trans-boundary scale’ tends ‘to supersede any other way in which, and 
levels at which, water and resources or livelihoods dependent on it are held and managed 
in common.’ In other words, international and national agencies are much more likely to 
get excited about a major developmental project than they are to act in the defence of 
common pool resources relating to an artisanal fishery, or customary rights in a forest, or 
traditional irrigation systems. As with the politics of identity, the promotion of expensive 
large-scale trans-boundary projects is frequently described in terms of ‘national interest’ 
(Hirsch, 2007), which tends to mean that objections from rural civil society groups or 
borderland residents may then be perceived as being unpatriotic or unsupportive, or even 
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worse, as potential saboteurs or unruly agents by certain key vested interests and 
authorities. One of the problems here is that decisions are being made and people are 
influenced by radically different levels of understanding and there seems to be what 
Hirsch calls a lack of ‘scale sensitivity to what commonality if of interest’ (Governing 
water as a common good in the Mekong river basin: Issue of scale’, Transforming 
Cultures e-Journal, 1, 2, June 2006. URL: http://epress.lib.arts.edu.au/journals/TfC : 112) 
on the part of state agencies and other governance institutions.  
 
What these arguments suggest is that in addition to there being dominant story-lines and 
discourse networks there are institutional deficiencies. In Chapter 5, I discussed some 
aspects of the politics of environment in relation to the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC). Clearly, one of the ways that the MRC may broaden both its constituency and 
representativeness in the Mekong is by actually fostering both genuine trans-boundary 
instruments and by broadening and deepening its meeting space with various vested 
interest groups, agencies and NGOs in the Mekong basin. A key issue here may be 
reform or improvement of the National Mekong Committee structure, which seems to 
neither be particularly effective at sub-national provincial scales nor at national or 
international levels. However, that would still be unable to resolve problems of 






7.3 Community-based politics of ‘scale’, ‘position’ and ‘place’  
 
In this thesis I have argued that indigenous politics of the environment covers the 
interrelated and overlapping concepts of scale, position and place, and that there is a 
deepening social activism in many parts of the region. One of the major impacts of the 
Yali Falls Dam is one that may be perceived as positive. That is the increasing 
involvement of small riparian communities within a wider web of political linkages 
around a uniting, highly negative ‘story-line’. When I last met personally with Mr. Mean 
Meach, a community-based researcher with the 3SPN (visit, 25 December, 2006) he 
spelled out five critical areas of research and action for the communities in his turf. These 
were: (1) studying the availability of non-timber forest products; (2) researching into the 
problems of riverbank agriculture and gardens; (3) examining the issue of reported 
declines in birdlife and other creatures; (4) ongoing aquatic resources work, particularly 
investigating the decrease in numbers of shellfish, crabs and turtles;  and (5) continuing 
the studies of fisheries in the 3 Rivers. Mean is a prime example of a new breed of local 
NGO activists who has strong ties and relations of mutual trust with many local villagers 
from different ethnic groups. When I met him he had been carrying out workshops and 
‘brainstorming’ (as he put it) with villagers in Veun Sai (Se San) and Lumphat (Sre Pok) 
districts. The 3SPN in particular, has been concerned about cumulative losses to 
environmental resources over time, and is seeking ways to encourage villagers into 
alternative sources of food (such as fermented fish), developing crops, and developing 
community fisheries.  
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‘Place-based politics’ is an aspect of broader struggles, and it also brings with it the 
notion of ‘place specific’ indigenous ecological knowledge (IEK) (Berkes, 1999; 
Escobar, 1998). Undoubtedly, this raises the idea of rivers as being not just linear 
ecosystems or common pool resources, but as ichthyofaunal ‘repositories of knowledge’ 
(Hirsch, 2004). Thus, we need to consider the ‘politics of production and ownership of 
fisheries knowledge’ (Hirsch, 2004: 92), which may incorporate distinct specialists, 
practitioners, professionals, several branches of the sciences, and also incorporates 
different sector agents and actors (often with highly specific formal representations of 
particular resources and the functions of a river). Hirsch gives useful examples, including 
scientific / indigenous; EIA (engineering and basic science); culture and capture fisheries 
knowledge; ichthyology, taxonomy and biological studies; fishery and livelihood 
knowledge; and different positions or explanations relating to fisheries decline (more 
important story-lines). According to (Hirsch, 2004: 92): ‘Knowledge and power are 
intricately bound up and there is continuing tension between positivist objectified 
knowledge in the guise of science and a relativist, contextual epistemology in the guise of 
indigenous knowledge.’ At a certain level this epitomizes aspects of the struggle the 
riparian communities have in overcoming the assertion that their intimate, grounded and 
practical understandings of fisheries are nothing more than providing ‘anecdotal 
evidence’ (Hirsch, 2004: 93) until real scientists and practitioners from outside arrive to 
undertake proper studies using well-established scientific methodologies. However, there 
are many ways in which the production of knowledge, its uses, its values, and its role in 
the politics of environmental resource management and water governance, are radically 
transforming notions of IEK.    
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Another critical aspect of the politics of scale, place and position in relation to riparian 
communities and their allies is the shifting notion of ‘local politics’. Escobar’s (1998) 
notion of places being part of much broader networks, and that parts of networks become 
important ‘sites’ where intensive ‘translations, transfers, and mediations’ occur, is 
particularly relevant to an analysis of the Se San watershed. Ban Lung in Ratanakiri 
could easily be regarded as both place and a site enabling particular ‘knowledge – power 
constellations’ to take shape, for it has been a base for NTFP activities, for the Se San 
Protection Network and subsequent 3SPN programmes, and it is a well-known stopping 
off point for interactions between international agencies such as Oxfam America, Care or 
German Agro Action, activist researchers, other NGO representatives from elsewhere in 
the region and Cambodia. The flight from Phnom Penh to Ban Lung was only twice a 
week in a PMT Air Antonov An-24 Twin propeller plane (with Russian pilots) when I 
did my last stint of fieldwork (now defunct since the plane crashed and killed all on board 
near Sihanoukville in June 2007, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/6243842.stm), so currently the trip to Ban Lung can only happen using overland 
transportation. It was obvious that passengers were a mix of vested interest groups 
ranging from private businessmen, provincial bureaucrats, international agency 
representatives, itinerant researchers, and NGO activists. Ban Lung like Chiang Khong, 
Northern Thailand (base for activism against proposals to blast rocks and reefs in the 
river to improve navigation), and Ubon Ratchathani, Northeast Thailand (during anti-Pak 
Mun Dam protest days), and numerous other places, was also becoming a well networked 
sites for resistance, engagement and action. Furthermore, through the 3SPN and NTFP, 
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Ban Lung is linked to other nodes and various community-based activists within the Se 
San watershed and beyond. In fact, multiple sites may exist within a river basin or 
watershed, but the important idea according to (Escobar, 1998: 56) was that they become 
important in the development of ‘counter-discourses’.  
 
Much of the above relates to the work of other geographers on the importance of 
particular places within ‘terrains of resistance’ (Routledge, 1996); the forging of alliances 
in complex ‘spaces of engagement’ (Cox, 1998); various debates about ‘jumping scale’ 
(Glassman, 2001; Howitt, 2003); and scaled politics within the Mekong Basin (Hirsch, 
2006b; Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004), in fact the notion of ‘sites’ is immediately multi-scalar in 
practice. As (Featherstone, 2008: 33) argues: Subaltern political activity may help 
engender ‘forms of agency, forms of intervention, through the way it generates, or 
attempts to generate, new forms of relations between different associations of humans 
and non-humans.’ I would now like to turn my attention back to the politics of knowledge 
production in relation to the particular ways environmental knowledge is being produced 
in relation to the trans-boundary Se San for this is relevant to the discussion of networked 
relations (and geographies of power).  
 
7.4 Producing ‘natural capital’, merging methods and agendas 
 
The idea of ‘natural capital’ is particularly relevant when studying river basins. (Lansing, 
Lansing and Erazo, 1998) illustrate how and why clashes in conceptions of resource 
space and environmental resources occur with different stakeholders. Their study of the 
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Skokomish river basin in Washington State exposes totally separate visions of the same 
river by a hydropower utility company and the Twana Indians. (Lansing et.al., 1998) 
discuss the significance of different forms of knowledge to the actual valuations of a 
river. The power utility saw the value of the river in a pipe to power turbines. The Twana 
Indians viewed the river as a lived resource space, including spatial-temporal relations 
according to seasons, salmon runs, hunting and gathering in the surrounding wetlands and 
river’s estuary. So, their perspective and social values were in relation to a functioning 
biophysical ‘natural’ system. The concept of ‘natural capital’ is useful in this context 
because it incorporates aspects of social capital but also ‘requires ecosystem functions in 
order to accumulate.’  
 
Calculating the total accumulated value of large numbers of environmental services is an 
immense bio-economics task. However, what is very necessary in this case is the fact that 
‘natural capital’ is often left off policy-making agendas, and hardly features at all as a 
concept worthwhile in pre-project environmental impact assessments (EIAs) (Mirumachi 
and Nakayama, 2007; Wyatt & Baird, 2007). Assessments that incorporate broader 
values and meanings of river functions, particularly those related to functioning and 
healthy ecosystems, would go some way to addressing the issues of livelihood and food 
security linkage to rivers and wetlands in the Lower Mekong basin (Kristensen, 2001).  
 
The symbolic, mythical and spiritual meanings of rivers (‘cultural capital’) should also be 
part of the equation. Carl Middleton of the International Rivers Network recently 
published a circular, which did the rounds of concerned online activists, educationalists, 
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practitioners, and Mekong institutions. What I find interesting is that Carl focused 
primarily on the functions of the river in relation to cultural and social life along it, which 
is quite distinct from the usual very project-focused, fact-finding documents produced by 
IRN. To give a brief example, he writes:  
 
‘As the river provides many of life’s basics for both rural and urban populations, 
it also nourishes their vibrant cultures and traditions, inspiring music, dance, song, 
cuisine, crafts, and rituals that colourfully breathe life into the region. Throughout 
its course, celebrations of the river abound. Boat races and festivals celebrate the 
fish harvests and annual cycles of the river. Cambodia’s water festival in 
November marks the mass fish migrations from the Tonle Sap Lake as it empties 
into the Mekong. (…) The river has inspired a wealth of folklore and vivid 
mythology. In Laos and Thailand, the “Naga Fireballs” draw tens of thousands 
who are awed by the reddish-pink orbs that mysteriously emerge from the river 
into the night sky. The fireballs are said to be the mythological serpent Naga’s 
breath, forming a staircase to heaven for the Lord Buddha to descend and close 
Buddhist Lent. If the Naga’s rivery home was turned into a series of placid lakes 
by mainstream dams, would it continue to work its magic?’ (Middleton, 8 
December, 2008). 
 
I have included this long passage here as a kind of mythical and cultural ‘story-line’ with 
considerable currency in a region where there are deep connections with the river. 
Indeed, one of the Rak Chiang Khong (Love Chiang Khong) calls to arms against the 
 211 
Chinese proponents in favour of blasting reefs from the Thai-Lao section of the Mekong 
River, was the fact that many local people believed that these reefs contained the souls of 
ancestors. Yet again, we can see that multiple place-specific notions about ‘cultural’ and 
‘natural’ capital, or as (Liesbeth Sluiter, 1992) termed it, ‘Mekong Currency’ that is so 
very relevant to the politics of environment and resources at bigger ‘scales’. 
 
The combining of knowledge(s) is another way in which both empirical understandings 
of the river can be improved and more sophisticated politics based on such knowledge 
production may emerge. For example, political geographer (Paul Routledge, 2003) has 
urged committed intellectuals to ‘stand in the river’, to engage and to actively collaborate 
‘alongside activists in their struggles’, arguing that collaborative methodologies ‘involve 
a deconstruction of state / elite discourse and practices’ (Routledge, 2003: 116). In the 
Mekong, various academic activists and dedicated researchers have been doing this for 
years. But, perhaps not necessarily in the form of resistance or oppositions to State and 
Capital in the manner that I think Routledge was urging. What has tended to happen is 
that various specialist researchers have become actively engaged in the production of 
knowledge alongside community-based groups. This is particularly noticeable in the 
collection of fisheries data and knowledge about fish life-cycles, migration patterns and 
so on (for instance, Baird, Hogan, Phylaivanh & Moyle, 2001; Baird & Flaherty, 2004; 
Baird & Meach, 2005). Information on the migratory habits of cyprinid carps, their 
seasonal movements, fish stock information, and so on, was based fully on intensive 
collaborative methods, utilizing scientific ecology, ichthyology, and biology alongside 
detailed situated knowledge. As (Baird and Flaherty, 2004: 282) observed: ‘On the 
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quantitative side, Local Ecological Knowledge (LEK) held by fishers is an extremely 
important resource, especially when combined with quantitative fisheries data, based on 
extensive fishery catch data.’  
 
The value of combining methodologies and epistemologies is widely recognized. 
(Silvano, Silva, Ceroni and Begassi, 2007) examined various ways of combining 
ecological and conservation biology into ethnobiology research utilizing LEK in several 
river basins of Brazil. They found that there were many instances ‘when LEK provides 
new data, unknown to scientists, setting the guidelines for future studies and new 
discoveries’ (Silvano et. al., 2007: 252). As the authors put it: ‘Wise use of natural 
resources in the face of growing demand for them and increasing market influences is 
hard to achieve, but this would be better accomplished if both scientists and local people 
could talk and learn from each other’s knowledge’. As noted in Chapter 7, there have 
been numerous studies that have looked specifically at environmental and biophysical 
changes in rivers affected by upstream dams. The McRem scientists from the University 
of Tsukuba, Tohoku University, and the National Institute of Environmental Studies, 
have long been monitoring conditions in the Se San under the auspices of the Japanese 
sponsored Mekong Watch, working with the 3SPN. Organizations such as Oxfam 
Australia have also implemented studies on downstream impacts on fisheries and also on 
community and co-management forms of fishery governance (Bush, 2005).  
 
These research collaborations have enormous political significance, not necessarily 
because of the particular politics of the concerned researchers or even the fishers. It is the 
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actual data itself which has geopolitical implications in relation to the principles of 
integrated water resource management (IWRM). The growing wealth of information 
about straddling fish stocks (across political boundaries), mainstream upriver and 
downriver, and tributary – mainstream migrations, especially in the southern Lao PDR, 
Khone Falls area, through Cambodia to the Tonle Sap, and also migrations from the Se 
San, Sre Pok and Sekong rivers, mean that an ecological and biophysical picture has 
emerged of highly complex, extremely rich fisheries spanning at least three, may be four, 
international boundaries of the Lower Mekong basin. Information on fish lavae being 
carried by current downstream, on seasonal breeding grounds, on fish refuges, and the 
actual tracking of fish migrations, provides scientific – indigenous knowledge data for 
several organizations concerned with multiple aspects of biodiversity protection, fisheries 
management, and livelihood security.  
 
7.5 MRC as a knowledge producer and data broker 
 
During my internship with the MRC Secretariat in Phnom Penh, I was aware of the vast 
array of information about river governance, natural resources management, technical 
assessments for hydropower, ecological research data on river dynamics, and legal-
political documents on the Mekong, all stored in the MRC Library. However, the users of 
the Library were mostly Secretariat staff and the occasional visitors. It was obvious to me 
that the Secretariat is at once a very valuable knowledge producer but an under-utilized 
repository in terms of public awareness and access to data. Even so, during my time the 
MRCS was trying to engage with various non-governmental organizations on different 
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river issues.  TERRA, the Rivers Coalition in Cambodia, the Southeast Asian Rivers 
Network (SEARIN) and other groups have raised concerns that the MRC is becoming 
more interested in representing riparian state perspectives and in turning into an 
‘investment broker’ than it is in holding open information-sharing sessions with civil 
society organizations (Chapter 6).  
 
In spite of the criticisms of the MRC and allegations of secrecy over certain mainstream 
assessments for hydropower dams, it is in the realm of providing valuable research-based 
data that the Secretariat plays a very necessary role in the region. As (Hirsch, 2004: 95) 
notes: ‘The sense of ownership of MRC knowledge and data and the level of 
independence of the research carried out has moved in a positive direction since 1995.’ 
MRC fishery specialists do occasionally work alongside local fishers in its Assessment of 
Mekong Fisheries Component (Poulsen & Valbo-Jorgensen, 2001). The MRC has also 
developed very significant online resources, and it has become active as an invitee to 
NGO and concerned stakeholder meetings. (Hirsch, 2007: 24-5) argued: The MRC needs 
to address the current gap between the knowledge it has to offer, such as “river science” 
and its diverse audience. This knowledge needs to be accessible to non-specialists and 
cognizant of local communities’ knowledge, their interests, perspectives and values.’ 
Clearly, there have been advances in such collaborations and knowledge sharing 
exercises in the field of fisheries research. However, when considering the links between 




7.6 Water quality and public health: Gaps in knowledge and 
participation 
 
Occasionally there are differences between the MRC and riparian communities. This has 
emerged in the Se San watershed over concerns about water quality. One of the first 
reports to indicate possible connections between changes in water quality and 
deteriorating human health was by the Fisheries Office and (NTFP, 2000). Whilst this 
report is based largely on interviews with local people and observations, there is also an 
effort by the researchers to find out more information from particular specialists. The 
report states: ‘It is also possible that many [people] were weakened by poor quality water, 
resulting in them dying from other diseases (pers.comm. in report with Dr. Christelda 
Pais, May 2000). Nevertheless, Dr. Christelda Pais helped rule out a number of major 
illnesses commonly reported in Ratanakiri. These included cholera, measles, chicken pox, 
respiratory problems, malaria and diphtheria. The symptoms described by villagers 
generally did not fit any of the above diseases, and seem likely to have been largely 
caused by some type of poisoning related to water quality (pers.comm.in report with Dr. 
Christelda Pais, May 2000). Dr. Lena Vought, a stream limnologist associated with Lund 
University in Sweden, has suggested that the problem may be associated to the presence 
of toxic blue green algae in the Yali reservoir, which has contaminated the Se San River 
(pers.comm. in report with Dr. Lena Vought, May 2000). However, since there has never 
been any detailed water quality surveys conducted in the Se San River in Ratanakiri, it is 
difficult to confirm this hypothesis’ (The Ratanakiri Fisheries Office & NTFP, 2000: 14).  
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In 2006, the MRC did carry out a trans-boundary water quality study in the Se San River 
following a request by the Cambodian National Mekong Committee. Eventually, 
Vietnam and Cambodia agreed that the MRC Secretariat should assess information 
following concerns raised by ‘the NGO’ (presumably the 3SPN). The MRC stated:  
‘With only anecdotal evidence of the effects of water quality on public health, it 
was not possible to develop a program of investigation that targeted specific water quality 
and health attributes (my emphasis).’ However, the MRC did monitor for standard 
parameters such as temperature, pH, conductivity, turbidity (suspended sediment), 
dissolved oxygen (DO), chlorophyll, and total coliform bacteria, with monitoring carried 
on in one station in Vietnam and three in Cambodia. Measurements were taken in the 
rainy season (May-November 2004) and dry season (Dec-May 2005), and the study 
found that the Se San was in relatively good health. Results were shared with the 
authorities on both sides, and the NGO, the latter apparently still concerned about short-
term, sudden changes in water quality, filamentous algae, and connections with human 
health issues. The Secretariat has assured the NGO that trans-border monitoring of water 
quality will continue (Mekong News, October-December 2006).  
 
The debate is still going on. (Probe International, July 2007: 9) called for intensive water 
quality monitoring, particularly ‘for nutrients, algal species composition and algal toxins. 
Water samples should be taken every month. The water quality sampling in Cambodia 
could be performed by the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRAM) 
staff in Ban Lung and sent by plane to Phnom Penh for analysis. An algal monitoring 
program should be established which could reveal any problems as well as an 
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information campaign that informs the people about the danger of drinking water with 
high algal content. A toxic algal bloom can develop within 2-3 days and a warning 
system should be established.’  In June 2007, environmental groups received an 
environment impact assessment, that was produced in December 2006 by SWECO 
CRONER, which focused on the Cambodian part of the Se San River which indicated the 
‘possibility of a connection’ between blue-green algae on the river and various skin, 
stomach, headaches, and respiratory problems experienced by villagers (Kuroiwa, 2007).  
 
Once again there seem to be considerable gaps between full transparency and partial 
disclosure, with a tendency for key agencies, whether consultants or the MRC to carry 
out research on important water quality and public health issues without full participation 
from relevant community-based representatives or concerned non-governmental 
organizations. This relates to what Sivaramakrishnan (2005: 258) calls ‘a crisis of 
confidence in the basic tenets of justice and due process that must govern the transactions 
involved in multi-agency, consultative land management’, and the same applies to water 
governance (Hirsch, 2006a, 2006b; 2007). Hajer (1995: 67) shows how story-lines 
‘influence actors in their own production of knowledge’, which may ultimately produce 
what Forsyth and Walker (2008) called “problem closure”. It seems that some of the key 
institutions responsible for trans-boundary governance, and other responsible for trans-
boundary impacts, need to open the doors to wider social consultation processes, 
otherwise riparian communities will continue to feel excluded from processes that are 
directly affecting their own sense of security.  
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In contrast to a reticence on the part of the MRC and hydropower consultants, to allow 
full participation of riparian communities, the 3SPN has argued that its role is as ‘a 
partner of the government and other private sectors. We cannot work without each other. 
Our role is not to protest against plans of governments, but rather to work closely with 
them to provide comments and feedback, to follow up with their plans, and to reach 
agreement together, in order to ensure that the policies and “best practice” guidelines for 
environmental and social development are fully represented and implemented’ (Kim and 
Tep, 2006). Whilst this soft diplomacy may help develop trust relations in time, it seems 
that the most successful strategies to date are ones that involve concerted actions, across 
places, positions and scales, by multiple agents targeting specific issues and applying 
pressure on specific agencies.    
 
7.7 Comparative science for mitigation of adverse impacts  
 
Another key potential for knowledge transfer in relation to the Mekong Basin, and 
particularly in relation to mitigating some of the effects of hydropower dams, is in 
learning from other rivers in the world. A brief but important example of this is provided 
by Gráinne Ryder (2005) with the example of a Canadian case in British Colombia of BC 
Hydro, a provincially owned utility, which has been legally obliged under the BC 
government’s Water Act to undertake multi-sector water-use planning to review 
operating conditions, water flow, and evaluate effects of flow regulations on fisheries. In 
collaboration with the Watershed Watch Salmon Society, a process was begun which 
monitored different water flow regimes and the effects on fisheries. This involves cross-
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sector collaborations between scientists, engineers and fishers. Ryder (2005: 217) argues 
that the study revealed ‘significant advances in understanding the interactions between 
hydroelectric operations and fish conservation, and improving methods for balancing 
objectives.’ She suggested that such a comparative and practical example could be 
transferred to the Se San watershed, and may help to improve water flows regulation and 
efforts to restore river flows closer to ‘natural’.  Unfortunately, it seems that the 
hydropower authorities of Vietnam are much more likely to expand capacity than they 
are to invest large sums in mitigation efforts.  
 
7.8 Multi-pronged preventative diplomacy  
 
Featherstone (2008:52) has argued that trans-national networked resistance does not 
necessarily have to accord with ‘prior spatialities of domination’, but can actually help to 
produce new ‘geographies of power.’ Similarly, it seems to me that there are some very 
interesting examples of networked, concerted action that have evolved in the Mekong 
basin over recent times, which involve quite distinct actors and agencies, but with strong 
overlapping interests over specific problems. It also is apparent that distinct groups acting 
within flexible networks are more likely to find out where they beg to agree and to differ 
on complex politics concerning matters of social and environmental justice.  
 
Howitt’s (2003: 149) argument is relevant to this context: ‘To construct the means 
of new forms of social, economic or political participation, the networks and relationships 
that bring people together must undergo transformation through their confrontation with, 
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marginalization from and interpenetration by the institutions, relations and processes of 
existing complexes of territory-governance-identity.’ In this context, projects along rivers 
with trans-border consequences represent a major challenge for civil society groups and a 
whole plethora of others who are deeply and genuinely concerned about the future of 
water resource governance and the environmental and social futures of the people whose 
lives are still largely tied to the Mekong’s future well-being, however that is defined.  
 
One of the most pointed exampled of networked preventative diplomacy that I can give 
relates to the actions of various scientists, scholars and practitioners in response to the 
news that the Don Sahong Dam was being planned by the Government of Lao PDR on a 
highly strategic mainstream location in Khong District, Champasak Province. What 
interests me the most in this context is the way different sites and agencies were 
mobilized into action. No less than 34 respected scholars, many of whom have worked in 
Southeast Asia and the Mekong at some stage in their careers, signed a letter (dated 25 
May 2007) from ‘Scientists concerned for the sustainable development of the Mekong 
River’, which was sent on Australian Mekong Resource Centre letterhead, and addressed 
to ‘governmental and international agencies responsible for managing and developing the 
Mekong River’ (see Appendix 7). The letter sharply criticized the Don Sahong Dam 
scheme, arguing that it involved ‘a rushed feasibility study’, did not address a whole 
range of potential negative impacts on fish, fisheries, livelihoods, biodiversity, 
environment and economies. The letter is supported be detailed summaries of studies on 
the integrated ecosystem of this part of the Lower Mekong, supported by several key 
references. Similarly,  the NGO group, Rivers Coalition in Cambodia sent a letter (dated 
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27 March 2008) to H.E. Lim Ken Hot, Minister of Water Management and Meteorology 
and the Chairperson of the Cambodian National Mekong Committee, urging him ‘to call 
on the Government of Lao PDR to declare a moratorium on the Don Sahong dam.’ Like 
the ARCM letter from the scientific community, the NGO supports the letter with 
detailed studies based upon the biophysical and ecological integrity of the trans-boundary 
wetlands and fisheries (see Appendix 4). Thus, data based upon scientific and social 
research collaborations, including significant LEK, is used in the service of targeted 
political lobbying and networked politics of the environment. Professional scientists from 
the World Fish Center in Phnom Penh added to the growing number of agencies against 
the Don Sahong Dam with a report which states explicitly: ‘There are no effective 
measures in the region to mitigate the impact of dams on fisheries. The economic costs 
from the lost fisheries production, could outweigh the expected economic benefits of the 
dam’ (Baran & Ratner, June 2007). This lesson has already been learned from the Yali 
Falls Dam on the Se San River, but seems not to be taken into account when planning 
new dams such as the Don Sahong. Many other organizations have become involved in 
this singular issue, which indicates that since the Yali Falls Dam incident, the trans-
national, multi-scaled, multi-faceted alliances with riparian communities are starting to 
forge new terrains, sites and methods of proactive resistance.    
 
In a sense, there is not much difference to the various alliance-based and independent 
scientific actions described above and John Dore’s (2008) view of what is in very short 
supply in the Mekong region, and that is ‘deliberative water politics’ (DWP). As stated 
by Dore (2008:2): ‘deliberative water politics, involves trans-national, discursive 
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democratic ideas.’ It is trans-national, communicative, pluralistic ‘in embracing the 
necessity to communicate across difference without erasing difference’, and it is also 
‘reflexive in its questioning orientation to established traditions’. The key obstacle is that 
the key institution responsible for the Mekong, the MRC, is welded to inter-governmental 
structures and riparian states that are still very tightly holding onto modern political 
geographic notions of sovereignty, and are far more authoritarian in their diverse 
characters than democratic. For the MRC to develop what (Hajer, 1995: 286) calls 
‘reflexive institutional arrangements’ there would need to be a considerable political 
transformation in intra- and inter-state politics, which seems unlikely in the near future. 
In the meantime, various agents and actors will need to continue to develop their own 
spaces of reflexive, deliberative and collaborative engagement in order to protect social 
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8. Conclusion: (Mis) Managing Contested Mekong Waters. 
New Challenges, Conflicts and Directions 
 
8.1 Critical Reflections 
 
 
The fieldwork at the trans-boundary Se San River Valley in relation to the construction of 
dams upon this river and its sister rivers the Se Kong and the Sre Pok was chosen since it 
demonstrates clear impacts from one country to the next (Vietnam to Cambodia) between 
a “strong’ geopolitical upstream player and a much weaker and also poorer one 
downstream one and presents a case of how this does limit the role of an international 
organization (the MRC) in relation to civil society.  
 
The Mekong was until recently an unusual river, compared to the Nile or the Mississippi, 
in the sense that it was relatively pristine due to a lack of ‘development’ (read hydro-
development) over the years, mostly due to a lack of cooperation between the Mekong 
countries as a result of ideological and military warfare. The 1995 agreement between the 
four Lower Mekong riparian states changed this. Dams have been constructed on 
practically all the main tributaries, and China has developed her own cascade of dams 
along the upper Mekong. Even during the period I was empirically engaged with this 
thesis, there have been many new hydropower initiatives and the region’s hydro-power 
landscape has been transformed. In turn, this requires scholarly and independent research 
efforts to explore and critically analyze the complex multi-scale, multi-stakeholder 
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geopolitics, geo-economics, social and environmental justice dynamics of the hotly 
‘contested waterscapes’ of the region (Molle, Foran and Käkönen, 2009). 
 
Cambodia has long been considered a country with the most to lose from upstream 
hydropower developments, and indeed, the Yali Falls Dam story is one that clearly 
demonstrates many negative trans-boundary impacts. When I first heard about the flash 
floods, loss of lives, property, boats and health problems attributed to changes in river 
hydrology and water quality, I was living and working in Phnom Penh. Ratanakiri 
province and the Se San Valley seemed very remote. Many of my Khmer friends and 
acquaintances have never visited the north-eastern province and had images of it being 
dense, dangerous jungle. Whilst these notions are partially true, one of the themes of this 
thesis is the way in which people and places become entangled in webs of relations, 
partly as a result of faraway decisions. Places may also become transformed into 
networked ‘sites’ of intense political activity related to the associational politics of 
resistance and engagement. During my time in Cambodia, the highway to the frontier was 
being much improved, and now it only takes 6 hours by car to get to the province. In 
many respects, so-called ‘development’ projects, such as hydropower, plantations, and 
infrastructure are leading to fast-paced changes in the physical and human landscape. 
 
I became engaged in one particular research ‘site’ – the Mekong River Commission 
Secretariat – as an intern, and it was during my time there that attempts were made to 
encourage bilateral cooperation between Cambodia and Vietnam in the form of the Se 
San Committee (set up through the MRC). This form of trans-boundary management 
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might be one way forward if certain technical issues relating to trans-boundary dam 
management receive attention from international donors, and if the member states 
approve of it.  
 
Hydropower in and of itself was not what most people in Ratanakiri were objecting to. 
Rather, it was the impact of the upstream dams on environmental resources and on 
livelihoods, such as less fish to eat, which became major food security issues in the 
highland areas where indigenous people traditionally grow less rice and live from the 
forests and rivers. Now these traditional socio-ecological and livelihood resource bonds 
are being threatened, or in worse cases, completely eroded.  
 
As the MRC has become stuck in the mire of inter-governmental disputes, it seems that 
there is still a governance gap to fill for many people are benefiting little and yet being 
adversely hit by the costly externalities of river hydropower schemes. In the process, 
there seem to be gridlock in the trans-boundary mechanisms and channels to tackle 
disputes between member states. The colonially inspired boundaries are sometimes major 
impediments to developing genuine cross-border cooperation on environmental and 
social impacts. There is still a strong tendency for new mega-projects utilizing water 
resources to be shrouded behind veils of secrecy, particularly as states prefer to undertake 
limited environmental and social impact assessments under the auspices of paid 
consultant firms, with little transparency, consultation with villagers, and a virtual 
absence of prior consultation with downstream parties.  
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Earlier in the thesis, particularly in Chapter 2, I discuss several concepts that highlight the 
issues of trans-border governance and mentioned the notion of “the Mekong Spirit”, 
which is meant to imply peaceful, consensus-building and cooperation following years of 
turmoil and division during the Cold War. Actually, as we can see, there are definitely 
peaceful forms of economic development underway, and the Mekong Commission has 
been able to function unlike its predecessor the Mekong Committee which was always 
handicapped by deep ideological and military divisions within the Mekong Basin. 
However, it is also clear that there are multiple different developmental storylines that 
criss-cross borders and socio-economic groups in the Mekong (Hajjer, 1995), but one 
dominant hydropower developmental discourse has become supreme, which threatens to 
sweep all alternatives aside.  
 
The new threats are to the mainstream river itself (see discussion below), but one may 
ask: Why are international legal principles of a ‘shared’ river basin not more forcefully 
applied? Whilst this question goes beyond this thesis, it is definitely something that 
should be taken up in ongoing and future research. Definitely the MRC through the 1995 
Agreement does abide by certain equitable utilisation principles, but individual states are 
still able to make interpretations and undertake actions which sometimes go against such 
principles in practice. Finally, the idea of common management fits with principles of 
integrated water resources management, but such ideas are often remote from the real 
worlds of ordinary villagers throughout the Mekong Basin. It there is one overall message 
from this study it is that there are extremely important sub-state, trans-national actors, 
agents, impacts and forms of collaboration, which need to be brought much more 
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centrally into the realm of environmental and social impact assessments and the realms of 
consultation, negotiation and policy-making. One of the most important ‘scales’ in the 
Mekong relates to environmental and social actions that are at once international, sub-
national, trans-border, trans-national, sub-regional and local all at the same time. The 
story of the Se San is one of many such cases throughout the Mekong Basin, and it holds 
many lessons for improving resource governance to include rather than exclude those 
people who are most dependent upon natural resources within rivers and their basins.  
 
An important socio-political dimension of this thesis is the way Se San riparian 
communities and indigenous groups have become increasingly involved in a dynamic 
trans-national politics of ‘place’, ‘scale’ and ‘position’ involving multi-stakeholders over 
the last 15 years. The Three Rivers Protection Network (3SPN) has become one of the 
key non-governmental organizations involved in trans-boundary affairs between Lower 
Mekong states. Furthermore, numerous other partners have become deeply involved in 
environmental resource politics in the Se San watershed. However, the process also 
involves horizontal alliances between interested parties, including various well 
established environmental, human rights, academic and social awareness groups. Since I 
undertook my fieldwork in Cambodia there are several new challenges within the 
resource politics arena of the 3SPN area which are necessary to highlight.  
 
8.2 3 Ss Basins versus 3SPN: Clashing Conceptions of Waterscapes 
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Arising out of the ashes of poor trans-border cooperation and collaboration over water 
resources there have been growing institutional efforts coordinated by the Mekong River 
Commission Secretariat, which remains responsible for lengthy ‘basin development 
programmes’ throughout the Mekong Basin, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), to 
develop multi-track, multi-stakeholder dialogue over water resources. One of the 
outcomes of this has been the ADB financed 3 Ss Basins initiative to improve inter-
agency and institutional collaboration in the area of the three river basins of the Se San, 
Sekong, and Sre Pok (3Ss). In April 2006, the National Mekong Committees of 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam jointly requested the ADB to help provide finance and 
technical support to strengthen arrangements for cross-border collaboration in managing 
the 3Ss. Basically, there is a stated aim of trying to construct a ‘Shared Vision’ and a 
common ‘Road Map’ for the 3 Ss Basins. Development-friendly language permeates their 
website (http://reta.3sbasin.org), which is hyper-linked to the National Mekong 
Committee sites of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam, and other international agencies. 
At the top of their website is a very revealing ‘shared vision’ which states: ‘Shared vision 
... How to keep reasonable balance ... traditional life, outstanding natural resources, clean 
and abundant water are not necessarily compatible with increasing expectation for socio-
economic development, increasing needs for energy. There may be beneficiaries but also 
losers ... (my emphasis).’ 
 
Under the idea of ‘Building the 3Ss Road Map’, the site creates a sense of purposeful 
developmental dialogue at the scales of watershed, sub-basin levels (delimited by the 
hydrological and national boundaries), and most significantly, trans-boundary levels. And 
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indeed, there are constructive efforts aimed at improving dialogue at all these levels. For 
instance, from 31 May to 1 June, 2010, one of the trans-boundary meetings was held in 
Buon Mae Thuot, Vietnam, and it involved over 130 Cambodian, Lao and Vietnamese 
‘stakeholders’ from the Sekong, Se San and Sre Pok river basins. The meeting was part 
of a joint Mekong River Commission Secretariat and RETA (ADB) 3Ss initiative ‘to 
discuss visions’ and ‘build consensus on core values’ on ‘how to strengthen collaboration 
and coordination for managing water resources’, viewed as central to ‘each of the 
countries’ development ambitions.’ Calls for greater transparency and stakeholder 
participation were a major component of the meeting, which is definitely an improvement 
on past performance in the region. Nevertheless, the ‘core values’ seem to be an 
institutionalized effort to build notions of the benefits derived from state-led 
developments, which still includes more hydropower for energy in the future. Whilst the 
meeting did hear from the Cambodian NGO Forum calling for more transparency, 
alternative energy options, and improved assessments of planned development, there is 
little evidence that the hydropower machine of the 3 River Basins is being critically 
challenged by the sponsoring agencies, the MRCS and the ADB. Rather, the aim seems 
to be that of improving dialogue over future hydropower schemes and developing better 
approaches for assessing ‘the sustainability and cumulative impacts of hydropower 
development in the 3S Rivers’ (http://reta.3sbasin.org, accessed 01.08.11). 
 
The recent actions of these large regional inter-governmental and financial bodies to 
improve the process of consultation across the 3 Ss Basins area can be seen as a direct 
outcome of the trans-boundary tensions that were originally generated by the adverse 
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downstream impacts of the Yali Dam in the late-1990s, and the subsequent development 
of a significant community-based, non-governmental voice, the Se San Protection 
Network, eventually becoming the 3 S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN), as it adeptly 
transcended localized concerns to become a truly national and regionally recognized 
social and environmental lobbying group (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004). Essentially, the 
3SPN sought to ‘ensure “BEST PRACTICE” principles of socio-economic development 
with guarantees of social safety, environmental balance and accountability in the 3S area’ 
(3SPN, January-June 2011: 9). However, the sort of ‘best practice’ the 3SPN is fighting 
for seems to come into conflict with certain developmental values of the so-called ‘3Ss 
Road Map.’ There is more than one Road. To elaborate upon this I wish to highlight 
some of the continuing anxieties, tensions and conflicts that still continue to muddy the 
developmental visions in the 3S area.  
 
One of the major upcoming hydropower schemes is the proposed 400 MW Lower Se San 
2 dam, with an estimated cost of $650 million (US $) to be built on the Cambodia section 
of the river. Thus, the downstream state that was hit by various negative social and 
environmental externalities of upstream dams is now transforming into itself into another 
hydropower state which seeks to export electricity in the other direction, to Vietnam’s 
rapidly transforming national economy. On 31 May, 2011, community representatives 
from around Cambodia came together in a ‘National Consultation Workshop on 
Hydropower in the Lower Se San’ to discuss the Lower Se San 2 Dam. The meeting was 
presided over by H.E. Brach Soun, Secretary of State for the Cambodian Ministry of 
Environment, and there were 147 participants, including representatives from the affected 
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areas of Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri, Stung Treng, and also from areas around the Tonle Sap. 
Other stakeholders from government and industry were present. In his address, H.E. 
Brach Soun emphasized the developmental discourse that has proven so powerful in the 
Mekong in the last two decades. He said: ‘Dam construction must have a negative impact 
on fisheries and livelihoods of people living along the rivers. However, Cambodia really 
needs electricity to develop its country. So I believe that electricity from this dam will 
reach to rural people. This means that mitigation and compensation should be discussed 
in this consultation workshop’ (3SPN, January-June, 2011: 3). Thus, the landscape of 
hydro-development in the 3Ss area is perhaps a microcosm illustration of the potential 
future of the whole Mekong Basin. For once one dam is built there is a developmental 
logic to construct more dams, and politics transforms too, from being that of resistance to 
that of mitigation, adaptation to change, and demands for compensation.  
 
In line with the notion of seeking “best practice” based on social and environmental 
justice, the meeting was not a one-way road. One of the coordinators of the 3SPN, Meach 
Mean, called for much more rigorous and independent scientific environmental impact 
assessments to be carried out prior to any final decision to construct the dam. Researcher 
and activist-scholar, Ian Baird argued that ‘the electricity generated by the Lower Se San 
2 will be solely for export to Vietnam’, and so it is highly unlikely that the most impacted 
communities of Stung Treng and Ratanakiri provinces would benefit from the electricity 
generated.  Other community representatives called for much more information on the 
‘likely impacts’ and for ‘suitable compensation for every impact.’ Whilst 69 
representatives of indigenous people living along the 3 S Rivers, representing more than 
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500 families from the two most impacted provinces, including six communes and 18 
villages in Stung Treng and six districts, 21 communes and 74 villages in Ratanakiri, 
requested a complete review of the quality of the existing EIA report, which they argued 
is unacceptable and needs serious re-examination with full participation from local 
inhabitants. Herein lies a distinction between the institutionalized forms of consultation 
being advanced by the ADB and MRCS, with ‘equal’ involvement of proponents of 
hydropower as well as certain invited non-governmental bodies, and the more bottom-up 
participatory alliances the 3SPN has actively been cultivating. The 3SPN activists are 
calling for independent, detailed environmental and social impact assessments that take 
into full account the anxieties, fears and understandings of local people.  
 
An important component of this thesis was to highlight some of the negative trans-
boundary impacts created by upstream dams built by Vietnam. Now the problem has 
become one of challenging the proponents of a Cambodian built dam to be more open 
with the affected populations prior to any construction. As Meach Mean, 3SPN 
coordinator, states: ‘Based on the impact of the Yali Falls dam in Vietnam, the fish stocks 
have already decreased markedly, and that will be exacerbated significantly by a second 
dam. Farming areas will have to change, and that will negatively impact livelihoods, and 
food security as well’ (3SPN, January – June, 2011: 7). The issue of food security is one 
that is becoming central in debates about water utilization, hydropower and sustainable 
development in the Lower Mekong.  
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Food security is also tied to the issue of wild-capture fisheries, which remain a most 
important source of food protein in the region. However, as a dominant state-led 
discourse seems to be that energy needs, national developmental goals and hydropower 
benefits ultimately outweigh the value of the rivers wild capture fisheries. This was 
brilliantly argued by Friend, Arthur and Keskinen (2009) as ‘Songs of the Doomed’; that 
is, there exist many ‘rarely challenged’ assumptions advanced by key agencies and 
institutions that wild-capture fisheries are inevitably on the decline as a result of other 
economic and profitable uses of precious rivers take hold. The long-run and inevitable 
decline of wild-capture fisheries has effectively become one of several bits of 
developmental ‘conventional wisdom’ leading to serious neglect of the vitality, 
productivity, socio-ecological and human security significance of wild-capture fisheries 
to the ‘wetlands cultures’ of the Lower Mekong Basin (Friend, Arthur, Keskinen, 2009). 
As detailed historical, ethnographic, and political ecology research of the Xekong River 
Basin in Laos has shown, wild-capture fisheries are absolutely integral to people’s local 
culture, belief systems, indigenous ecological knowledge, and livelihood security (Baird 
and Shoemaker, 2008). The same issues apply in the 3S river basins.  
 
In this conclusion, I have suggested that the 3S river basins which have already witnessed 
dramatic transformations of the natural and human landscapes are a sort of template for 
change in other parts of the Mekong Basin, particularly as more and more hydropower 
schemes come on stream. Even so, this thesis has focused primarily on the politics of 
scale, place and position in relation to trans-boundary tributaries, deflecting attention 
away from mainstream resource geopolitics. Over the last year, there has been an 
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intensive focus on the proposed 12 or more hydropower schemes for the mainstream of 
the Lower Mekong, which will have enormous downstream implications for both 
Cambodia and the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam. In the next section I wish to briefly 
highlight some of the major implications of current debates concerning Lower Mekong 
mainstream dams on the key theme of this thesis – trans-boundary resource governance.  
 
8.3 Implications of Lower Mekong Mainstream Dams: The Case of 
Xayaburi Dam in Lao PDR 
 
During the period this thesis has been revised, a major new controversy has emerged in 
the Mekong region. This relates to a proposed new hydropower project in Lao PDR at a 
site within mountainous Xayaboury province, which is now called Xayaburi Dam, some 
350 km from Vientiane, the Lao capital city. This project is estimated to cost some $3.5 
billion ($US) involving finance from several leading Thai banks, a Thai construction firm 
called Ch. Karnchang Public Company, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT), and the Lao PDR Government and Ministry of Energy and Mines. A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Project Development Agreement was signed in 
November 2008 between the Lao PDR and EGAT, and the project’s EIA was apparently 
submitted to the Lao PDR Government on February 2010 (International Rivers, January 
2011). A further MOU was signed by EGAT and the Government of Laos in July 2010 
allowing EGAT to purchase electricity at a stipulated price per kilowatt-hour via a 200 
km long trans-border transmission line from Xayaburi Dam to Thailand’s northeastern 
province of Loei. In September 2010, Xayaburi Dam became the first mainstream dam to 
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be submitted for formal approval by the region’s governments through the “Procedures 
for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement” (PNPCA), which is a regional 
process facilitated by the MRC. Previously, the dams built along the upper mainstream 
Mekong in China have not been subject to the PNPCA as China is only an observer and 
not a party to the 1995 Lower Mekong Agreement. Thus, Xayaburi has become a huge 
test case in relation to the MRC’s ability to manage contentious issues of dam 
construction on the mainstream.  
 
According to the international NGO, International Rivers, the Xayaburi Dam will require 
2,100 people in its vicinity to be relocated, and will cause adverse socio-ecological 
impacts for another 202,000 people living near the dam (International Rivers, January 
2011). As in the case of the Se San, Sre Pok and Sekong River Basins, the most 
damaging impacts relate to riverbank agriculture, wild-capture fisheries with at least 23 
migratory fish species being adversely affected by the dam construction, access to non-
timber forest products, localized gold-panning in the river, and other local livelihoods 
linked to the river. As International Rivers (January 2011: 3) put it: ‘The dam’s impacts 
would disproportionately affect communities whose livelihoods are dependent on the 
river’s natural resources, which overall are also locations where high levels of poverty 
exist.’ The parallels with my research sites in the trans-border areas of the Se San could 
not be stronger. Only the Xayaburi case illustrates profound weaknesses in the trans-




One of the most important issues lies with the notion of prior consultation. It seems that 
Laos PDR Government has been able to proceed with its plans for Xayaburi in open 
consultation with EGAT of Thailand right under the noses of the Mekong River 
Commission officials. An even more serious dent in the notion of prior consultation and 
cross-border transparency has been the way in which the Lao PDR Government seem to 
have fast-tracked infrastructure development ahead of approval at the level of the MRC 
and downstream governments (Cambodia and Vietnam). In an IR Press Release (23 June, 
2011) entitled ‘Laos Steamrolls Neighbours in Xayaburi Dam Process’ it was argued that 
Laos was guilty of defying the downstream states by effectively stating that the prior 
consultation process had been completed in favour of the mainstream hydropower 
project. A leaked letter from the Lao PDR’s Ministry of Energy and Mines Deputy 
Ditector to the Xayaburi Power Company Limited, dated 8 June 2011, states that: ‘the 
Prior Consultation of the Xayaburi Project has now been completed and the River 
Consultation process has ended at the MRC Joint Committee level’ in accordance with 
the terms of the 1995 Lower Mekong Agreement. If the PNPCA process is duly 
completed then it would allow for the go-ahead of dam construction and the trans-border 
power purchase agreements would also come into effect. However, the leaked document 
has led to a storm of controversy within the Mekong governance system, for it seems that 
the Lao PDR letter was extremely premature.  
 
The MRC has subsequently suspended the prior notification process on Xayaburi until 
further notice. As Chapter 2 of the 1995 Lower Mekong Agreement makes clear, no 
individual state has ‘a right to veto nor unilateral right to use water by any riparian 
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without taking into account other riparian’s rights.’  Prior to the leaking of the Lao PDR 
letter, on 23 April 2011, at a meeting in Phnom Penh, the Governments of Cambodia and 
Vietnam raised serious concerns about the potential environmental and economic 
downstream impacts of the Xayaburi dam. And at the 18
th
 ASEAN Summit in Jakarta on 
7 May 2011, the Lao Prime Minister agreed to a request from Vietnam to ‘temporarily 
suspend the Xayaburi Dam’ and commission a proper EIA under the auspices of the 
MRCS (International Rivers, 8 June, 2011). Indicative of the international environmental 
organization outrage to the Lao letter of 8 June 2011, the recently appointed regional 
director of International Rivers, Ame Trandem argued that ‘Laos has committed an 
egregious breach of trust and joined the ranks of rogue nations.’  That said, it is clear that 
Laos does have trans-border partners in Thailand, and it is equally obvious that these 
partners are still bent on developing mainstream hydropower projects in spite of the 
umbrella water resource governance structure of the MRC.  
 
A recent article in Science (12 August, 2011) has emphasized the potential socio-
ecological costs of mainstream dams like Xayaburi on the unique wetlands and 
hydrological systems of the Lower Mekong. Alarmingly, the article also argues that the 
hydropower political economic juggernaut is undermining existing Lower Mekong 
governance structures by continuing infrastructure development even before proper prior 
consultation dues processes have been completed. A further Press Release by 
International Rivers on 4 August 2011 provided ample evidence of ongoing construction 
work to the Xayaburi Dam site, complete with numerous photos based on fieldwork. A 
legal opinion from US law firm Perkins Cole states: ‘The Mekong Agreement precludes 
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any unilateral decision that threatens the river’s ecological balance or impacts on the 
needs of people who rely on it.’ The opinion concludes: ‘Lao PDR’s unilateral action to 
prematurely terminate the PNPCA process, without allowing its neighbour countries to 
properly conclude that process, violates the Mekong Agreement, and therefore 
international law’ (Perkins Cole, 2011).  
 
There do seem to be many contradictions and potential conflicts that are subverting any 
semblance of regional trans-border water resource governance in the Lower Mekong 
Basin. This leads to my final section of this conclusion.  
 
8.4 Future Research on Trans-Border Resource Governance in the 
Mekong 
 
As my research in the Se San and in relation to the 3 Ss Basins has revealed, there remain 
considerable problems in terms of issues of trans-border inter-state transparency, mutual 
trust, environmental and social impact assessments, and the encouragement of genuine 
dialogue and participation involving local community-based organizations. The Yali Falls 
Dam has left a long shadow of state secrecy, inadequate sharing of data on impacts, 
unilateral actions aided by considerable international finance and corporate involvement. 
Sadly, the darkest shadows fall across the most vulnerable, most adversely hit indigenous 
riparian communities. The geo-economics and politics of scale rarely favour the 
disadvantaged communities because of the development of significant trans-border 
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markets in energy through the creation of an effective regional energy grid, which has 
aided the development of hydropower over the last two decades.  
 
This thesis has argued that the sub-national, trans-boundary scale is very important in 
terms of analyzing the social, economic and environmental impacts of hydropower 
schemes. As the Se San case illustrates, and more recently the proposed Xayaburi Dam 
does, the regional water governance mechanisms are being downplayed or side-tracked 
by powerful hydropower political economy alliances between relevant state agencies, 
overseas partners in the electricity power grid, and vested interest construction and 
hydropower companies increasingly from within the region.  
 
There are growing question-marks over the Mekong River Commission’s ability to 
handle the issue of water governance in an era of rampant hydropower expansion in the 
Mekong. A review of hard and soft law regulating the Mekong River Basin has found 
there to be a lack of consistency and clarity in the legal trans-boundary framework. The 
article states that ‘to date it has been unclear what impact(s) international and regional 
laws and trans-boundary legal institutions have had, and are having, on decision-making 
and governance in the Mekong’ (Johns, Saul, Hirsch, Stephens and Boer, 2010: 6). The 
same authors argue that there are several tracks for future research on the political – legal 
issues of trans-border resource governance, including a focus on regional norms and 
consensus-building, and on ‘why protagonists do or do not opt for law’ in making key 
water-utilization decisions with downstream impacts. They argue that we need to be 
mindful of the following: ‘(a) national regulations and institutions concerning water and 
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environmental protection; (b) regional rule-making and governance practices concerning 
trans-boundary rivers and riverine resource; and (c) forms of legal and non-legal 
expertise concerning trans-boundary water governance and development’ (Ibid. 17). In 
addition to this list, I would like to add that forms of politics that combine different kinds 
of knowledge about the river and its resources combined with agencies that are able to 
transcend different politics of scale, are also vital ingredients if the sub-national, trans-
border riparian communities are to be given a greater involvement in the future of their 
rivers, and for issues of cross-border social and environmental justice to be given greater 
salience within regional governance processes.  
 
Given time again, I would like to examine the significance and processes of knowledge 
production and knowledge collaborations between different non-state stakeholders. For 
these agencies will continue to be powerful agents and contribute to shaping geographies 
of power within the Mekong Basin for decades to come. 
 
I shall close this conclusion with another recent illustration of the ways in which local 
indigenous communities are responding to the broader changes affecting their river-based 
livelihoods and cultures. As one form of response to the proposed Lower Se San II Dam, 
112 community representatives from Kbal Romeas, Srekor I and Srekor II in Stung Treng 
Province, and from six districts in Ratanakiri Province (Vuen Ai, Ta Veng, Andong Meas 
– where I did some of my fieldwork, O’Yadav, Lumphat and Kon Mom districts) 
gathered together to call upon the Ko La Kann Spirit to help protect their river and 
livelihoods in the future. The ceremony took place at the sacred landscape of the Kor La 
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Kann rapid along the Se San River in order to: ‘1. Wish for the happiness and good health 
for all communities living along the Se San and Sre Pok Rivers who are relying on 
environmental and natural resources. 2. Ask the Spirit to soften the government’s and 
company’s heart to stop building the Lower Se San II Dam and choose other options for 
electricity generation with the aim of avoiding the negative impacts which will affect the 
communities who are alongside the Se San and Sre Pok Rivers’ (3SPN, January-June, 
2011: 11). The researcher strongly advocates that in addition to the blessings of water 
spirits, the people of the 3S river basins, and the Lower Mekong region, will be granted 
tangible transparency, participation and active empowerment involving key water-use 

























1) List of People interviewed during fieldwork: 
 
Mr Ian Baird, researcher, 
Dr. Chris Barlow, MRC Fisheries Programme 
Fisherman Aim Cheah from Lum village 
Mr. Glandun, Chief of Bor Kham village, Andoung Meas District 
Mr. Gordon Paterson, NTFP NGO based in Ban Lung 
Mr. Jen Pol of the 3 SPN NGO 
Mr. Kamduan, 2
nd
 District Head of Andoung Meas District 
Fisherman Baang Khan 
Mr. Joern Kristensen, Former CEO Mekong River Commission  
Mr. Jiang Lun 
Mr. Mean Meach, Se San Protection Network (3 SPN) 
Mr. Sangha, Se San Protection Network (3 SPN) 
Mr. Si Phat, a commune chief for two villagers 
Mak Sithirith, Fisheries Action Coalition Team 


















2) BASIN DEVELOPMENT PLAN Programme Phase 2 2006-2010 Programme 
Document Final Version 15 August 2006 
  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
The 1995 Agreement charges the Joint Committee of the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC) with the formulation of a Basin Development Plan (BDP) “to promote, support, 
co-operate and co-ordinate in the development of the full potential of sustainable benefits 
to all riparian States and the prevention of wasteful use of the Mekong River Basin 
waters, with emphasis and preference on joint and/or basin-wide development projects 
and basin programmes “. The BDP would be used to identify, categorize and prioritize 
the projects and programmes to seek assistance for and to implement at the basin level. 
However, seeking assistance to and implementing projects and programmes is outside the 
scope of BDP and is primarily the responsibility of the Member States. Extensive 
preparation and approval activities followed in the wake of the Agreement and BDP 
Phase 1 commenced in October 2001. The programme was launched with a budget of 6.1 
Million USD and the duration has now been extended up to mid 2006. BDP Phase 1 work 
programme was established following a logical framework with two immediate 
objectives. The first objective was to ensure that a basin planning process was established 
and maintained and the second objective was to enable drafting and agreement on a basin 
development plan. The BDP team including both staff at MRCS and staff in-country has 
worked towards these objectives and a series of important outputs. These include 
National sector overviews and participatory planning at Sub-Area level. Ten Sub-Areas 
have been defined as hydrological planning units and more than 200 agencies have 
participated in the analyses and reporting and are now part of a solid network. The 
planning has, among others, resulted in a number of project and programme proposals, 
which have been included in a process of identification, ranking and formulation leading 
towards an implementation stage (the BDP planning cycle). A database on these projects 
and programmes today hold well over 400 projects at different stages of maturation and a 
total of 69 joint projects have been identified. Assessment tools for use in the strategic 
planning have been developed under BDP in collaboration with other programmes within 
MRC. The Decision Support Framework (DSF) tool can for instance assist the estimation 
of changes in water flows and levels and the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) 
tool can be used to evaluate environmental effects of larger programmes and strategies. 
Economic modelling (Resource Allocation Model) is applicable in trade-off situations 
and during estimates of the value of water. Social Impact Assessment (SIA) is another 
valuable tool designed to assist the in social studies. Analyses of some key water resource 
development scenarios have been made using selected assessment tools. A collection of 
common values and priorities related to water resources and shared between the four 
countries is found in the document on “Strategic Directions for Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM)”. Information and knowledge is synthesized and 
documented in the BDP Core Library. The creation of these products is to large degree a 
result of capacity building, training and dialogues at BDP organized workshops. It is 
obviously of critical importance that the BDP processes are continued and further 
developed. Four good reasons for this are: 
  
  
  BDP is a strong support for the strategic goals of MRC, which aims to assist a 
move towards “an economically prosperous, socially just and environmentally sound 
Mekong River Basin”  
 
  BDP is a mechanism through which the four riparian countries can “ promote, 
support, cooperate and coordinate in the development of the full potential of sustainable 
benefits”  
 
  BDP will be able to identify and assess regional, trans-boundary and shared 
projects and programmes that will benefit more than one country.  
 
  BDP can be developed into a framework for the cooperative management of the 
basin by giving the full picture of the water resources availability, use and development 
options  
 
BDP Phase 1 has developed many useful planning tools, has set up mechanisms for 
participatory planning and has established a portfolio of priority programmes and projects 
some of which Member States can implement themselves and some that can be 
implemented under or in conjunction with existing MRC programmes. The scenario 
analyses made in Phase 1 have shown a lot of potential value in assessing the effects, 
impacts and the realism of different visions for large scale developments. They are only a 
small subset of a multitude of feasible scenarios. The implications of climate changes, 
land use changes, drought mitigation, cropping patterns, groundwater use and many other 
critical factors is important knowledge for water resources management decisions and 
could provide background for decisions to embark on large-scale development projects in 
cooperation with regional investment initiatives for instance Greater Mekong Sub-region 
Programme and the emerging World Bank Mekong Water Resources Assistance 
Programme (MWRAP). Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and the 
principles behind are keys to sustainable water resource management. Developing 
awareness on these principles and knowledge on how to apply them in practice is 
important also seen in the light of the Strategic Directions for IWRM, which the four 
countries support and agree on. Knowledge generation and management and capacity 
building will be needed to get the full benefit of the IWRM approaches. BDP Phase 2 has 
thus been designed to support Goal #1 of the MRC Strategic Plan 2006-2010 (draft of 19 
June 2006) which is “to promote and support coordinated, sustainable and pro-poor 
development”. It shall support a basin-wide rolling IWRM based plan with focus on (i) 
development and assessment of basin-wide scenarios, (ii) identification and assessment 
of joint development projects and large national projects and policies with significant 
basin-wide implications. Given that the riparians provide comprehensive information on 
existing and planned water use, water quality and activities with impact on water 
resources, BDP Programme Phase 2 will become an essential framework for well 
coordinated water resources development in the basin. At the same time BDP will (i) 
assist generation and management of knowledge base and tools for facilitating 
discussions on trade-offs in relation to development options, (ii) develop methodologies 
and practices for public participation, stakeholder involvement and mainstreaming gender 
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concerns in support of IWRM, and (iii) develop associated institutional competences 
through capacity building.  
 
Key products from the BDP Phase 2 
 
An updated IWRM Strategy for the Lower Mekong Basin  
A rolling IWRM based Basin Development Plan  
A portfolio of programmes and projects identified and short-listed under the BDP 
Planning Cycle  
Enhanced knowledge base and assessment tools within MRC  
Enhanced capacity for IWRM based planning and mediation in MRCS and NMC levels  
Input to MRC Strategic Plan for 2011 – 2015  
 
 
BDP Programme Phase 2 will start in December 2006 and follow the MRC strategic 
planning period (2006-2010). The programme will be implemented through the existing 
BDP structures within MRCS and within the NMCs. The total budget is 11.044 Million 
USD and includes in-kind contribution from the Member States of 1.004 Million USD. 
The direct donor support is 10.040 Million USD. The secondment of a Senior River 
Management Expert is not included in these budget figures. The direct donor support is 




























3) EVN News 
Monday, January 5, 2009 
EVN to generate power in Laos  
The EVN International Joint Stock Co of Viet Nam signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment of Laos to invest capital in three hydroelectric plants. 
 
The Nam Et 1, 2 and 3 plants, designed to have a total capacity of 
420MW, are located in Muang Et District, Huaphane Province, Laos. 
 
The finished projects, which are part of a commitment on investment 
co-operation and electricity exchange between Viet Nam and Lao, will 
provide 20 per cent of its output to the Laos grid and the remaining 
will be sold to Viet Nam. 
 
CEO of the EVN International Co, Nguyen Duc Tuyen, said the 
company was also outlining investments in hydroelectric projects in 
Cambodia, including Ha Sesan 1/ Sesan 5 and Nattarat Kiri, Ha Sesan 
2. 
 
Both Ha Sesan projects, which are part of an investment co-operation 
between Viet Nam and Cambodia, are scheduled to begin construction 
later this year and be operational in 2014. 
 
EVN International Co will combine the 220kV electrical network of both 
Ha Sesan projects with the domestic electrical system. 
 
The completed projects will export a remarkable amount of electricity 
to Viet Nam and help solve the domestic shortage of electricity and 
ensure the local electrical system will be safer and more reliable. 
 




V I E T N A M  B U S I N E S S  F I N A N C E  
J A N U A R Y  9 ,  2 0 0 9  
EVN to issue bonds worth 500b dong on January 16  
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Electricity of Viet Nam Group (EVN) recently received approvals from the Ministry 
of Finance to issue EVN bonds for the first tranche with a total value of 500 billion 
dong on January 16. 
 
As planned, in the 2008-2010 phase, EVN would issue corporation bonds worth 
some four trillion dong to support EVN's projects. 
 
EVN plans to use the capital thus mobilised on projects such as Ban Ve 
hydropower plant, A Vuong hydropower plant, Song Tranh (Tranh River) 
hydropower plant No 2, Se San hydropower plant No 4, Buon Tuasrah 
hydropower plant, Buon Kuop hydropower plant, Srepok 3 hydropower plant, 
Dong Nai hydropower plant No 3 and 4, Ba Ha River hydropower plant, An Khe 
Kanak hydropower plant, Huoi Quang hydropower plant, Ban Chat hydropower 





V I E T N A M  B U S I N E S S  F I N A N C E  
J A N U A R Y  1 0 ,  2 0 0 9  
EVN brings nine power plants online  
State-run Viet Nam Electricity Group (EVN) will add nine electric power plants in 
2009 with total output of 2.969MW. 
 
The new plants, combined with existing plants, will help create a capacity of 
74.68 million kWh, up 13% from 2008. 
 
The new plants are: the hydroelectricity plants of Buon Kuop and Buon Tua Sa in 
the central highlands province of Daklak, Pleikrong and Sesan 4 in central 
highlands province of Kon Tum, Ba Ha River in south central coastal province of 
Phu Yen, and thermoelectricity plants Quang Ninh in northeastern coastal 
province of Quang Ninh, Hai Phong in Hai Phong seaport city and O Mon 1 in the 
western capital city of Can Tho. 
 
EVN will also set up four thermoelectricity plants with a total output of 3.8MW. 
These are Nghi Son, north central coastal province of Thanh Hoa , Mong Duong 
1 in Quang Ninh province, Duyen Hai in the Mekong Delta province of Tra Vinh 
and Vinh Tan 2 in the southeastern costal province of Binh Thuan . 
 
Other scheduled projects by EVN in 2009 include 220 smaller electricity projects 
of 110-220-500kv and the completion of stage 2 of ‘Power in rural areas’ to 
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provide electricity to highland villages in the Central Highlands and Khmer people 
in the Mekong Delta provinces of Soc Trang and Tra Vinh. (Sai Gon GP) 
  
http://www.vnbusinessnews.com/2009/01/evn-brings-nine-power-plants-online.html 
V I E T N A M  S T O C K  M A R K E T  N E W S  





































4) Letter to the Cambodian Minister for Water Management and Meteorology (and 
Chairperson of the CNMC) on the planned Don Sahong Dam (English Version) 
 
 
 An Alliance of Civil Society Organizations in Efforts to Protect and Restore River Ecosystems and River-Based Livelihoods 
in Cambodia 
C/o: NGO Forum on Cambodia # 9-11, Street 476, Phnom Penh, Cambodia,P.O. Box 2295 Phnom Penh ,Tel: (+855) 23 214 429 
Fax: (+855) 23 994 063 
Email : ngoforum@ngoforum.org.kh ,Web site : http://www.ngoforum.org.kh 
 
27 March 2008 
 
H.E Lim Kean Hor 
Minister of Water Management and Meteorology and 
Chairperson of CNMC 
 
Your Excellency Lim Ken Hor, 
 
RE: The Potential Impacts of the Don Sahong Hydropower Dam’s on Cambodia 
 
We are writing to express our deep concern regarding recent news that a Project 
Development Agreement has been signed between the Government of Lao PDR 
and the Malaysian company Mega First Corporation Berhad to build the Don 
Sahong hydropower dam on the Lower Mekong River, approximately two 
kilometers upstream of the Cambodian-Lao border. This dam would be the first 
dam to be built on the lower Mekong mainstream. We fear that, if built, this dam 
will have serious downstream environmental impacts, which will negatively affect 
the economy, livelihoods, and food security of hundreds of thousands of 
Cambodians, whose lives are dependent on the river’s natural resources. 
Construction of the Don Sahong dam could hinder Cambodia in attaining its 
Millennium Development Goals, particularly CMDG1: Eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger, CMDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability, and CMDG 8: Forge 
a global partnership for development. 
The dam is proposed for the Khone Falls area in Champasak province, Lao PDR; 
a location with many narrow, interconnected channels and large waterfalls, which 
supports more than 201 fish species, including endemic or endangered species, 
such as Probarbus jullieni and Mekongina erythrospila, as well as Irrawaddy 
dolphins.1,2 While large quantities of these and other fish migrate through this 
area, the Hoo Sahong channel is the only channel that migratory fish can easily 
pass through when the river is at its lowest, as there are no natural barriers such 
as waterfalls. The Don Sahong dam would block this channel, effectively blocking 
dry season fish movement, which is a critical period for fish migration between 
the Tonle Sap Lake feeding habitats and the upstream breeding zones of the 
Mekong basin. Additionally, this “run-of-the-river” dam could alter flow patterns in 
the immediate downstream area, especially during the driest periods, and thus 
may disrupt fish migration, as many fish species are sensitive to changes in 




RIVERS COALITION IN CAMBODIA 
(Formerly known as the 3S Working Group) 
 
1 Baran, Eric and Blake Ratner. 2007. The Don Sahong Dam and Mekong Fisheries. Science brief. 
WorldFish Center, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. P.2. 
2 WWF (2007) “The Don Sahong Dam and the Irrawaddy Dolphin”, WWF science brief 
3 Baran, Eric and Blake Ratner. 2007. The Don Sahong Dam and Mekong Fisheries. Science brief. 
WorldFish Center, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. P.2. 
 
There are a considerable number of scientific studies confirming that the site of 
the Don Sahong dam is a significant fish migration route in the basin. The 
impacts to the Mekong’s fisheries therefore cannot be underestimated and 
would have serious negative consequences for fishery production in Cambodia. 
All of these changes to fish migration mentioned above would considerably 
impact Cambodia’s economy. Fishing is not only an essential component to local 
livelihoods and the food security of many poor and disadvantaged Cambodians, 
but the commercial fish catch also contributes significantly to Cambodia’s GDP. 
And while a degree of mitigation is sometimes feasible for some dams, the 
impacts that the Don Sahong dam will cause to the Mekong fisheries simply 
cannot be mitigated. A fish pass would prove ineffective in allowing numerous 
species to pass through under a wide range of flow conditions.4 A recent report 
by World Fish Center and Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC) also 
concludes that there are "no examples of positive long-term impacts of dams on 
fisheries, nor any effective mitigation measures in the Mekong Basin."5 
 
For these reasons, we respectfully ask the Cambodian government to call on the 
Government of Lao PDR to declare a moratorium on the Don Sahong dam. 
During the moratorium period, a comprehensive and participatory scientific 
transboundary environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) must be 
carried out by an independent party. This assessment should be done in 
accordance with the 1995 Mekong Agreement, while following regional and 
international best practice standards. As part of this scientific assessment there 
should be public consultations and discussion between the countries of the lower 
Mekong region that examine and assess the future costs and benefits of this 
project to each country, and the poor and vulnerable communities living in 
affected areas. 
 
On 22 February 2008, the Cambodia Daily reported that Your Excellency 
announced that the MRC is studying the impacts of the Don Sahong dam, and 
will be releasing a report by the end of this year. We warmly welcome this 
development and request further details of the study, in particular how the public 
will be involved. 
 
We would also like to take this opportunity to respectfully request confirmation on 
whether the CNMC has received notification from the Government of Lao PDR 
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through the MRC in accordance with Article 5 of the 1995 Agreement. 
An Alliance of Civil Society Organizations in Efforts to Protect and Restore River Ecosystems and River-Based Livelihoods 
in Cambodia 
C/o: NGO Forum on Cambodia # 9-11, Street 476, Phnom Penh, Cambodia,P.O. Box 2295 Phnom Penh ,Tel: (+855) 23 214 429 
Fax: (+855) 23 994 063 
Email : ngoforum@ngoforum.org.kh ,Web site : http://www.ngoforum.org.kh 
 
RIVERS COALITION IN CAMBODIA 
(Formerly known as the 3S Working Group) 
4 University of Sydney. 25 May 2007. Letter to Governmental and international agencies responsible for 
managing and developing the Mekong River by Scientists concerned for the sustainable development of 
the Mekong River. Sydney, Australia. P. 4. 
5 Baran E., P. Starr, and Y. Kura. 2007 Influence of Built Structures on Tonle Sap Fisheries. 
Cambodian National Mekong Committee and the WorldFish Center. Phnom Penh, Cambodia. P.24. 
 
In order to discuss the potential impacts of this project in more detail, we would 
welcome the opportunity to meet with you and/or your staff at a time that is 
convenient for you. We would also be pleased to send you copies of the 
documents mentioned in this letter or copies of some of the scientific studies that 
have been done related to the fisheries of the Khone Falls area. In order to 
arrange a meeting with us and/or to request further information, please have your 
staff contact Tonn Kunthel, Mekong Community Rights Project Officer at NGO 
Forum on Cambodia at 012737623 or kunthel@ngoforum.org.kh. 
Thank you very much for your time and attention. We look forward to your 
response. 
Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of our highest regards. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Chhith Sam Ath Tep Bunnarith Meach Mean 
Executive Director Executive Director Acting Coordinator 
NGO Forum CEPA 3SPN 
 
Copy to: 
- H. E Dr. Mok Mareth, Senior Minister and Minister of Environment 
- H.E Pich Dun, Secretary General of CNMC 
- H.E Touch Seang Tana, Member of Economic, Social, Cultural 
Observation Unit of the Office of Council of Ministers 
- Puth Sorithy, Director of EIA Department of Ministry of Environment 
 
An Alliance of Civil Society Organizations in Efforts to Protect and Restore River Ecosystems and River-Based Livelihoods 
in Cambodia 
C/o: NGO Forum on Cambodia # 9-11, Street 476, Phnom Penh, Cambodia,P.O. Box 2295 Phnom Penh ,Tel: (+855) 23 214 429 
Fax: (+855) 23 994 063 
Email : ngoforum@ngoforum.org.kh ,Web site : http://www.ngoforum.org.kh 
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5) Possible Mainstream Projects on the Mekong River 1961 
 
 













Pak Beng PNF Laos 1,450,000 - 280 
Luang 
Prabang 
PN Laos    560,000 - 110 
Pak Lay PN Laos      60,000  100 
Pa Mong PINF Laos/Thailand 1,800,000 1,500,000 340 
Thakhek PIN Laos/Thailand    500,000      50,000 160 
Khemarat PIN Laos/Thailand 1,450,000      50,000 260 
Khone PN Laos/Cambodia 1,000,000      50,000   50 
Stung 
Treng 
PINF Cambodia 2,200,000 1,000,000 220 
Sambor PIN Cambodia 1,600,000    150,000   80 
Tonle Sap PNID Cambodia - 3,000,000 120  
 
P = Power, N = Navigation, I = Irrigation, F = Flood Control and D = Drainage 
 

























6) Images from the Se San River: 
 
Photo 1: A fisherman from Andoung Meas, Ratanakiri, Cambodia sets out to 
































Photo 3: The Se San River close to the border with Vietnam in Ratanakiri Province, 







Photo 4: A fisherman from a village near the border with Vietnam in Ratanakiri 




Photo 5: The Se San River near Veun Sai, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. The 






Photo 6: The author in the field in Veun Sai, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia  
(near the Se San River) with former CEO of the Mekong River Commission Mr. 



























Photo 7: Again the author and Joern Kristensen, but here inspecting the Sre Pok 
River near Lumphat in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia, where water levels are still 





























 District Head in Andoung Meas, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia Mr. 
Pen Kamduan at his water level inspection site at the Se San River where he daily 


























Photo 9: Jungle Forest along the Se San River near Andoung Meas, Ratanakiri 
Province, Cambodia. Notice the bubbles on the water which is the result of outlet 






















Photo 10: The cool morning air results in damp when the warm river meets the cool 




























Photo 11: The home of 3
rd
 District Head Mr. Pen Kamduan at Andoung Meas, 
Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. The author stayed at his house while doing 



























Photo 12: Primary School Children on their way to school in Andoung Meas, early 




























Photo 13: Vegetables grown along a small stream in Andoung Meas, where the 
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